Gray Well Drilling Co. v. Wisconsin State Bd. of Health

• Decision Date: 31 March 1953
• Citation: 263 Wis. 417,58 N.W.2d 64
• Parties: GRAY WELL DRILLING CO. v. WISCONSIN STATE BOARD OF HEALTH.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 64

58 N.W.2d 64

263 Wis. 417

GRAY WELL DRILLING CO. v. WISCONSIN STATE BOARD OF HEALTH.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March 31, 1953.

Rehearing Denied June 2, 1953.

Upon its own motion the State Board of Health (hereinafter called the 'Board') commenced a proceeding to suspend or revoke the well drilling permit of the Gray Well Drilling Company, a Wisconsin corporation (hereinafter called the 'company'), as provided by sec. 162.03(2), Stats. This section provides that any well driller's permit may be suspended or revoked if the Board finds that the holder has wilfully violated for a second time any provision of ch. 162, Stats., or any rule, regulation, or order prescribed by the Board, or if the holder has been guilty of any failure to fully comply with the terms of any contract for drilling a well. Following a hearing thereon, an order was entered suspending the privilege of the company to apply for a renewal of its well drilling permit for a period of ninety days. The company petitioned for a review thereof under the provisions of ch. 227, Stats., and appealed from a judgment of the circuit court entered May 21, 1952, affirming the order of the Board.

Rheingans & Ketterer, Milwaukee, Oliver P. Rheingans, Milwaukee, of counsel, for appellant.

Vernon W. Thomson, Atty. Gen., Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Atty. Gen. and Beatrice Lampert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BROADFOOT, Justice.

The first allegation of error is that the complaint was not verified. The statute provides that the Board may proceed on its own motion or upon complaint in writing duly signed and verified by the complainant. In this matter the Board elected to proceed on its own motion. Not only pleadings, but all proceedings before administrative bodies, are generally simple and informal. The functions of administrative agencies and courts are so different that the rules governing judicial proceedings are not ordinarily applicable to administrative agencies, unless made so by statute. It is not the province of courts to prescribe rules of procedure for administrative bodies, as that function belongs to the legislature. The legislature may either prescribe rules for pleadings and procedure before such bodies, or it may authorize the administrative board or agency to prescribe its own rules. There is nothing in the statutes or rules of the State Board of Health that requires a complaint to be verified, unless the complaint is made by an individual. The contention of the company that when the Board elected to proceed by complaint such complaint should have been verified cannot be sustained.

The company filed a demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled, and the company was directed to file an answer to the complaint. The company admits that the Board is not bound by common law or rules for judicial procedure, but contends that its proceedings should be within the limits and requirements of the statutes, should be orderly, and should conform to certain fundamental requirements. It contends that one of these fundamental requirements is the right to file a demurrer, and the denial thereof results in serious prejudice to it. The statutes and rules of the Board provide that the persons served with a copy of a complaint shall file an answer thereto. The hearing upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer was conducted pursuant to the statute and the duly adopted rules of the Board. The allegations of the demurrer were repeated in the answer and all of the issues raised thereby were passed upon by the examiner and the Board, and were preserved in the record for review by the court. There was no prejudice to the company, and its contentions cannot be sustained.

The next contention upon this appeal is that ch. 162, Stats., is unconstitutional because of the failure of the legislature and the Board to provide for a demurrer, and because under the present statutes and rules one individual may be the examiner, the prosecutor, and the jury, and that this results in a denial of due process.

The right to demur is not guaranteed by the constitution. It is a matter of procedure and, as we stated above, all of the issues raised thereby were considered and preserved in the record, and the company has not been prejudiced.

The Board, by order, appointed one of its engineers to conduct the hearing. Specifically the company makes the following complaints:

'(a) That the same man was instrumental in framing the complaint in this matter;

'(b) The same man sat as an Examiner;

'(c) The same man, in his guise of Examiner, examined witnesses of the board and cross-examined witnesses of the company, through the medium of which he brought out considerable testimony not otherwise at issue in the pleadings and which could have been successfully resisted by proper objection in any court of law;

'(d) The same man, while sitting as an Examiner, counseled with the attorney prosecuting the case on behalf of the board when said attorney had apparently reached an impasse;

'(e) The same man has in effect admitted his interest and bias;

'(f) The same man, interested as he was in the outcome, is the one who presented the matter to the board for its ultimate decision.'

There is nothing in the record to substantiate the allegations made under (a)(e) and (f). They are pure conjecture. The examiner did, upon occasion, examine witnesses and some collateral issues were gone into. These collateral issues, however, were not included in the findings of the...