Graybill v. Plant

• Decision Date: 11 December 1951
• Citation: 138 Conn. 397,85 A.2d 238
• Parties: GRAYBILL v. PLANT et al. In re PALMER'S ESTATE. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 238

85 A.2d 238

138 Conn. 397

GRAYBILL v. PLANT et al.

In re PALMER'S ESTATE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 11, 1951.

Morris Tyler, New Haven, with whom was Charles J. Parker, New Haven, for appellants (defendants).

Herbert L. Emanuelson, New Haven, with whom was John F. Wynne, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

BALDWIN, Judge.

The defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to set aside the verdict and from the judgment, alleging errors in the charge and rulings on evidence.

The jury could reasonably have found the following basic facts: The plaintiff was graduated from the Branford High School in June, 1930. She stood first in her class in the commercial course and was selected to receive the Rotary Club award for service. During the award presentation ceremonies, the defendants' decedent, Palmer, who was engaged in the real estate and insurance business in Branford and was an active member of the Rotary Club, offered her a position as his secretary at a weekly salary of $15, with the promise of increases if she remained. The plaintiff accepted the position and began work in September, 1930. About April 1, 1931, Palmer purchased another insurance agency and combined it with his business. This increased the plaintiff's work three or four fold. The plaintiff told Palmer that she wanted $35 a week, a salary which she claimed was warranted by the increased work and responsibility. Palmer agreed that such a salary was justified but stated that he could not afford at that time to pay it. He asked the plaintiff to stay with him and promised to remember her generously in his will if she would do so. Relying upon this promise, the plaintiff remained in his employ and did not further request any additional compensation. In 1941 Palmer purchased another insurance agency and added it to his business. In November, 1943, the plaintiff was married, but she continued to work until April, 1945, when she left because she was expecting the birth of a child.

Throughout the years of her employment, the plaintiff performed a great variety of secretarial duties in connection with Palmer's real estate and insurance business and his ecclesiastic, political and social activities. She assumed responsibility, exercised good judgment, was loyal to her employer's interests, and was friendly, co-operative and helpful to his customers. In short, she was a most able and efficient secretary. She earned the repeated praise of her employer and became indispensable to him. At various times through the years she had offers of other positions at considerably higher salaries but, relying upon Palmer's promise, often repeated, to remember her generously in his will if she would remain, she continued in his employ. From time to time Palmer increased her pay, until at the time she left in 1945 she was receiving $35 a week. Her compensation, however, was never commensurate with her worth, a fact conceded by her employer. Palmer died on May 12, 1949, leaving a will which was admitted to probate. This will made no provision for the plaintiff. During the period from September 13, 1930, to April 14, 1945, she was paid $15,371. Reasonable compensation for that period, with increases from time to time from a starting wage of $15 per week to $50 per week, would have been $29,880, leaving a difference of $14,509, to which the plaintiff claimed she was justly entitled.

A claim for compensation for services from the estate of a decedent over and above that already received should be carefully examined by the trier. It should be established only upon clear and satisfactory proof that the services were rendered under a mutual understanding and agreement, or under circumstances that clearly and satisfactorily demonstrated, that they were to be paid for in the manner claimed. Bartlett v. Raidart, 107 Conn. 691, 696, 142 A. 398; Leahy v. Cheney, 90 Conn. 611, 615, 98 A. 132, L.R.A.1917D, 809; Hoskins v. Saunders, 80 Conn. 19, 21, 66 A. 785. The reason for this rule is that the living claimant is in a position of great advantage because of the death of the other party to the transaction and some check must be provided against the possibility of imposition and fraud. Yantz v. Dyer, 120 Conn. 600, 603, 181 A. 717; Clark v. Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507, 514, 147 A. 33.

The defendants concede that the court properly charged the jury on this standard of proof, and we assume that the jury heeded this instruction. Woodward v. City of Waterbury, 113 Conn. 457, 460, 155 A. 825. The defendants claim, however, that the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff's claim failed to meet the test as a matter of law. The plaintiff testified that when she asked for higher pay Palmer refused, saying 'Please stay with me, and if you do I will make it up to you in my estate, generously.' It was in reliance upon this promise, later repeated, that she stayed. The defendants argue that this statement, standing alone and uncorroborated, is not sufficient. See Yantz v. Dyer, supra, 120 Conn. at page 602, 181 A. 717. There was, however, ample corroboration to sustain the verdict. There was no kinship between the parties. Their relationship was that of employer and employee, which gives rise to a strong implication that services rendered upon request and accepted voluntarily are to be remunerated. Bartlett v. Raidart, supra, 107 Conn. at page 696, 142 A. 398. The witness Lake, a long time friend of Palmer, testified that on several occasions the latter had stated that the plaintiff was underpaid, that her services were invaluable to him, and that he planned to remember her in his will. There was testimony that Palmer was a bachelor, well past middle life, and not always in good health. He had no immediate relatives and lived with his mother until she died at eighty-five years of age. Under the rule stated, there was ample evidence of a clear and satisfactory nature to support the conclusion that the defendants' decedent had promised to compensate the plaintiff in his will and that, in reliance upon that promise, she had continued in his employ. Yantz v. Dyer, supra, 120 Conn. at page 602, 181 A. 717; Clark v. Diefendorf, supra, 109 Conn. at page 512, 147 A. 33; Howd v. MacGregor, 102 Conn. 331, 334, 128 A. 518; see Starkey's Appeal, 61 Conn. 199, 23 A. 1081; 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice, §§ 509, 512.

The defendants claim that the verdict should be set aside because there is no credible evidence from which the jury could have found that the plaintiff had not been adequately compensated. The plaintiff offered evidence that her services were reasonably worth $14,509 more than she had been paid. This amount was determined by deducting the amount she actually received from the amount to which she claimed she was reasonably entitled. The reasonableness of this amount was supported by testimony of one expert and denied by that of another. The jury returned a verdict for $6995.17, which included interest from the time her claim was disallowed. The trier's task was to fix the fair value of the services performed for which extra compensation was promised. Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 543, 29 A. 15; Yantz v. Dyer, supra, 120 Conn. at pages 603, 604, 181 A. 717; see 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice, § 512; § 513, p. 579. There is no way of telling with any degree of certainty how the jury arrived at the amount of their verdict, nor is it necessary that it be mathematically demonstrable. Kornblau v. McDermant, 90 Conn. 624, 637, 98 A. 587. It was within the province of the jury to fix the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled. The court was justified in denying the motion to set aside the verdict. Mercer Electric Mfg. Co. v. Connecticut Electric Mfg. Co., 87 Conn. 691, 698, 89 A. 909; Kornblau v. McDermant, supra; Yantz v. Dyer, supra, 120 Conn. at page 604, 181 A. 717.

The defendants complain of the failure of the court to charge the jury adequately on the weight of the evidence presented by an expert witness for the plaintiff upon the question of the reasonable value of her...