Grayson v. Carey
Decision Date | 16 August 2011 |
Docket Number | 2: 03 - cv - 1694 - MCE TJB |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | ALFRED LEE GRAYSON, Petitioner, v. TOM L. CAREY, Respondent. |
Petitioner, Alfred Lee Grayson, is a state prisoner proceeding with a counseled1 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of 26-years-to-life in prison after a jury convicted him of one count of murder in the first degree and one count of assault with a deadly weapon, with a sentence enhancement for use of a weapon. On remand from the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner raises one claim for relief: The introduction into evidence of hearsay statements made by the victim before she was killed violated Petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the victim's statement to police three days prior to her death that Petitioner had said to her that he "had to kill her because if he didn't he'd go back to jail for three years,"admitted pursuant to a recently added statutory exception to the general bar on hearsay testimony did not bear the required indicia of reliability to meet the requirements of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For the reasons stated herein, the federal habeas petition should be denied.
Judgment was entered against Petitioner in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Case No. 96F04725, On September 3, 1999. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on September 27, 2002. The California Supreme Court denied review on December 11, 2002.
Thereafter, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed this federal petition for habeas corpus on August 12, 2003, in which he raised six claims for relief. Respondent answered the petition on January 21, 2004, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on April 26, 2004. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge, who recommended the petition be denied on all grounds. Docket No. 20, filed August 10, 2006. In ruling on Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim, which Respondent had argued in his memorandum of points and authorities was procedurally barred, the court found as follows:
Without argument, in conclusory fashion, respondent claims this "issue is not properly before this Court" because petitioner's objection to the evidence covered only its use in support of the false imprisonment charge and did not specifically rely on the Confrontation Clause. As noted above, however, the state bears the burden of raising procedural default as a defense or it loses the right to assert the defense thereafter. Bennett [v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003)]. The state's burden includes demonstrating that the procedural rule has been regularly and consistently applied. Id. at 586. In this case, respondent has made no effort to satisfy his burden on this issue. Answer at 14-21. There is no bar to this court's consideration of petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim.
Id. at 13-14. Finding the claim was not procedurally barred, the court reached the merits. Pursuant to Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) overruled by Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007), the court retroactively applied the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and concluded that Petitioner's confrontation rights had not been violated. Id. at 14-19.
After reviewing objections by both Respondent and Petitioner to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations, the district court adopted the Findings and Recommendations in full. Docket No. 22, filed September 11, 2006. The district court issued a Certificate of Appealability with regard to the Confrontation Clause claim, and Petitioner appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.
On August 13, 2008, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court did not correctly apply circuit precedent with regard to procedural default:
Docket No. 39 [hereinafter Appellate Op.], at 3-4. The court also recognized that while the district court appropriately applied Crawford v. Washington retroactively to Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim under then-existing circuit precedent, the Supreme Court had held in the interim that Crawford was not to be applied retroactively. Bockting, 549 U.S. at 421. As a result, the Ninth Circuit instructed that if this court reaches the merits of Petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim, it is to apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the law at the time of the state court's decision.
After the case was remanded to the district court, the court appointed counsel to act on behalf of Petitioner. Docket No. 44 (Order Appointing Counsel). The parties have provided additional briefing on the issues remanded by the Ninth Circuit, and the case is ready for decision.
An application for writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under judgment of a state court can only be granted for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus after April 24, 1996, thus the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). Under AEDPA, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in the state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Perry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000).
In applying AEDPA's standards, the federal court must "identify the state court decision that is appropriate for our review." Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). "The relevant state court determination for purposes of AEDPA review is the last reasoned state court decision." Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). "Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting same claim rest upon the same ground." Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). To the extent no such reasoned opinion exists, courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether...
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