Grayson v. Crawford

Decision Date28 October 1941
Docket NumberCase Number: 28949
Citation1941 OK 349,189 Okla. 546,119 P.2d 42
PartiesGRAYSON v. CRAWFORD, Adm'r, et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. LIENS--Equitable lien on 'land for money advanced pursuant to verbal agreement.

Where one party advances money and property to another relying upon a verbal agreement by the latter that certain specified land will stand good for the money, equity will impress upon the land a lien for the security and satisfaction of the debt in favor of the creditor who advanced the money and property.

2. SAME--FRAUDS, STATUTES OF-Furnishing of money and property by creditor sufficient performance to avoid operation of statute of frauds.

The furnishing of money and property to a debtor, by a creditor having ail equitable lien created by verbal agreement, is sufficient performance to avoid the operation of the statute of frauds.

3.EXEUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS--Equitable lien on land of deceased debtor enforceable without filing creditor's claim against estate.

A creditor having an equitable lien upon land of his debtor is not precluded from asserting it by the death of the debtor, and may maintain an action thereon without filing a creditor's claim against the debtor's estate.

4. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-- Where no time for performance specified statute begins to run at expiration of "reasonable time."

Where the time for the performance of an act is not fixed, the statute of limitation does not begin to run until a reasonable time for the performance thereof has elapsed, and what constitutes a reasonable time is to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

Appeal from Superior Court, Seminole County; Otis H. Presson, Judge.

Action by J. B. Crawford, individually and as administrator of the estate of Annie Barkus Crawford, against Rachel Grayson and others. From an adverse judgment, named defendant appeals. Reversed.

M. L. Thompson, of Wewoka, for plaintiff in error.

I. C. Saunders, of Shawnee, and A. B. Carpenter, of Roswell, N. M., for defendant in error.

HURST, J.

¶1 This is an action by the plaintiff, J. B. Crawford, individually and as administrator of the estate of Annie Barkus Crawford, deceased against Rachel Grayson and others to quiet title and cancel a deed to 80 acres of land in Seminole county. Rachel Grayson, whom we shall refer to as defendant, filed a cross-petition seeking to establish and foreclose an equitable lien on the land involved. After the main action had been tried and adjudicated, the trial court proceeded to try the issues raised by the cross-petition and plaintiff's reply thereto. When the defendant had produced her evidence and rested, plaintiff demurred thereto. The trial court thereupon rendered judgment for plaintiff. While the trial court announced that he was not sustaining the demurrer to the evidence, but was rendering judgment on all the evidence, it is apparent his judgment was based upon the insufficiency of the evidence offered by defendant, as plaintiffs were not required to produce any evidence. Defendant Rachel Grayson appeals.

¶2 The uncontroverted evidence adduced by defendant showed: That Annie Barkus Crawford was her aunt, being the sister of defendant's mother, who died when the defendant was an infant. Upon the death of her mother, she was taken into the home of her aunt, and until she reached the age of 19 she believed the latter to be her mother; that the aunt was defendant's guardian, and after defendant reached her majority the aunt continued to transact her business, never having been discharged as guardian, and apparently never having filed a final account. At the time of the trial defendant was 32 years of age; that all parties are Seminole freedmen; that defendant lived with her aunt as a member of the family until shortly before the death of the latter in 1935, her status in the home being that of a daughter; that in 1924 her aunt married plaintiff Crawford, and on her death intestate, left him and her daughter by a former husband as her sole heirs; that this daughter testified for defendant at the trial; that up to the time of the death of Annie Barkus Crawford, the family relations were apparently harmonious, but after she died friction arose between the plaintiff on the one side and his stepdaughter and defendant on the other side, the stepdaughter and defendant attempting to have admitted to probate a will which was declared to be a forgery; that the terms of this alleged will are not shown, but it was evidently unfavorable favorable to plaintiff; that the transaction upon which defendant relies in support of her claim to an equitable lien on the land involved herein occurred in 1924 or 1925, shortly after she had reached her majority, and while she resided in the home of her aunt; that at that time Annie Barkus Crawford was threatened with the foreclosure of a mortgage on the land, and that she borrowed $1,700 from defendant and paid the mortgage off, assuring defendant that "the land would stand good" for the repayment of the loan; that both plaintiff and the daughter of deceased were present when such assurance was given; that subsequently a house of the agreed value of $500 was removed from land of defendant and placed upon the tract herein involved; that at that time, in the presence of her daughter and plaintiff, deceased stated that the land "would stand good" for the house and the loan; that thereafter the deceased at various times assured defendant that the land was "standing good" for the debt, and that deceased hoped to sell an oil and gas lease thereon or mineral rights thereunder, for a sum sufficient to reimburse her for the loan and the house, but this was not done, and the debt was unpaid when Annie Barkus Crawford died; that the last time such assurance was made was about three weeks before her death. Several other witnesses testified that deceased told them that she owed defendant for the loan and house. Some of these conversations were in plaintiff's presence. Several witnesses also testified that during the lifetime of deceased the relation between her and defendant was that of mother and daughter. The land involved is not shown to have been the statutory homestead of deceased.

¶3 1. The defendant's first contention involves the sufficiency of the evidence to establish an equitable lien. She asserts that the promise of Annie Barkus Crawford, that "the land would stand good for the debt" was an agreement to thereafter make a mortgage upon it to secure the debt, or in any event to create an equitable lien thereon for the amount of the debt. Plaintiff argues that the language used was so vague and indefinite that it did not create a lien on the property or amount to a promise to mortgage the land to defendant. He argues that no note, memorandum, or mortgage was made in connection with the transaction and that the time when the money was delivered to Annie Barkus Crawford, and the house moved upon her land, is nowhere definitely fixed.

¶4 An agreement or contract to charge described property as security for money advanced, according to the great weight of authority, creates in equity a lien in the nature of a mortgage on the property agreed to be charged. 37 C. J. 321; 17 R. C. L. 604; 33 Am. Jur. 427-44; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) § 1233; Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.) §§ 226-227.

¶5 This rule has been adopted in this state. Mullens v. Geo. C. Wright Lbr. Co., 182 Okla. 355, 77 P.2d 700; Kelsay v. Kelsay Land Co., 64 Okla. 291, 166 P. 173; Carter v. Sapulpa & I. Ry. Co., 49 Okla. 471, 153 P. 853. See, also, Ketchum v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 306; Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 17 S. Ct. 453; Valley State Bank v. Dean, 97 Colo. 151, 47 P.2d 924; Farmers' State Bank of Cunningham v. St. Aubyn, 120 Kan. 66, 242 P. 466. We think the evidence of defendant was sufficient-to invoke the application of this rule by the trial court, and to justify a finding that her aunt had created a lien for her security on the land in question. While the language used might not be well chosen, it must be remembered that the parties were not shown to be highly educated, and occupied the relation of mother and daughter. Under such...

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16 cases
  • Slusarz v. Slusarz
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 7, 1958
    ... ...         Several jurisdictions have held it is not necessary that the contract creating the lien be in writing. In Grayson v. Crawford, 189 Okl. 546, 119 P.2d 42, 45, it was held that the agreement that the land would stand good for the debt was an oral one, but to the ... ...
  • Bradshaw v. Superior Oil Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • October 31, 1947
    ... ... Grayson v. Crawford, 189 Okl. 546, 119 P.2d 42; Briscoe v. Devonian Oil Company, supra ...         But, appellants say that there is no evidence to ... ...
  • Casper v. Neubert
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • December 19, 1973
    ... ... Such equitable claims are not required to be presented to the executor. Johnson v. Hazaleus, 338 P.2d 345, 349 (Okl.); Grayson v. Crawford, 189 Okl. 546, 119 P.2d 42, 45. Moreover, recognizing the vendor's lien against the property despite non-presentment of the claim does ... ...
  • I.C. Gas Amcana, Inc. v. J.R. Hood
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • July 14, 1992
    ... ... 15 O.S.1981, § 173; Grayson v. Crawford, 189 Okla. 546, 119 P.2d 42 (1941). What constitutes a reasonable time is a question to be determined from consideration of all the ... ...
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