Grayson v. Eisenstadt, Civ. A. No. 68-1098.
| Citation | 300 F. Supp. 979 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 68-1098. |
| Parties | Glen GRAYSON, by his next friend, John Grayson, Plaintiff, v. Samuel EISENSTADT, Elwood S. McKenney, Charles I. Taylor, and Philip A. Tracy, Justices of the Roxbury District Court; Kessler Montgomery, Clerk of the Roxbury District Court; and Julius Goldstein, Assistant Clerk of the Roxbury District Court, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Michael L. Altman, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
Office of Atty. Gen., Bruce G. McNeill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for defendant.
This is a civil action in which plaintiff, having been convicted in the Municipal Court of the Roxbury District of three criminal offenses, seeks a declaratory judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that certain alleged actions by officers of that court unconstitutionally coerced him into withdrawing his appeals to the State Superior Court. The amended complaint characterizes the action as one arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,1 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation under color of state law of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
The plaintiff, Glen Grayson, is an eighteen-year-old high school senior residing with his parents in Roxbury, Massachusetts. The defendants are the four Justices, the Clerk and the Assistant Clerk of the Roxbury District Court in Boston.
The gravamen of the complaint is the plaintiff's allegation that, following his being sentenced by the district court, he announced his intention to appeal, whereupon the district court increased the severity of the sentences, thereby coercing plaintiff to withdraw the appeals and to forego trials de novo before a jury in the Superior Court.2 This opinion can be better understood, however, in the light of a more complete recitation of the allegations.
Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that on November 20, 1968, plaintiff was tried in the Roxbury District Court for two counts of assault and battery and one count of trespass, both of which are misdemeanors under Massachusetts law. The amended complaint further alleges that at the termination of the trial the judge found plaintiff guilty on all three charges and sentenced him to concurrent suspended three-month sentences on the two assault and battery convictions, with the trespassing charge placed on file. Plaintiff alleges that these sentences were announced by the judge and repeated by the Assistant Clerk in open court; that the plaintiff was asked whether he intended to appeal; and that counsel requested that the case be put over for fifteen minutes so that plaintiff might discuss the matter with his parents and attorney.
That request was granted, the amended complaint continues, and the plaintiff after consultation determined to appeal. The amended complaint further alleges that plaintiff's attorney communicated plaintiff's decision to the Assistant Clerk, who stated that the appeal would be noted and that plaintiff and his attorney could leave the courthouse. Plaintiff alleges that his attorney did in fact leave but that immediately thereafter the Assistant Clerk again called the case and plaintiff, who had lingered in the courthouse, was again brought before the Court. Plaintiff alleges that the trial judge, upon being notified of plaintiff's intention to appeal, increased the sentence on each charge by imposing a $20 fine on the trespass charge and by revoking the suspension of the three-month sentences previously imposed. The amended complaint also alleges that the trial judge ordered that plaintiff be held on $300 bail pending trial in the Superior Court and directed that plaintiff be taken into custody immediately, whereupon plaintiff, who lacked funds with which to post bail, was placed in the courthouse jail.
The amended complaint further alleges that plaintiff's father was advised by a court officer that plaintiff would be released immediately if the appeal were withdrawn. Plaintiff alleges that upon learning this, he (plaintiff) announced to the court that he would withdraw the appeal. He alleges that the trial judge thereupon ordered plaintiff released, withdrew the $20 fine on the trespass charge, suspended the sentences on the assault and battery charges (adding two years probation) and accepted the withdrawal of the appeal.
Finally, the amended complaint alleges that plaintiff, after returning to his home, telephoned his attorney and related what had happened; that plaintiff indicated his continued desire to appeal; that the attorney returned that afternoon to the Roxbury District Court and attempted to file notices of appeal; and that the Assistant Clerk of Court refused to file, docket, or otherwise accept the notices of appeal.
Plaintiff contends that these alleged facts show a violation of his right, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to an unfettered exercise of his right to appeal, citing Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,3 1966, 1 Cir., 370 F.2d 713, 718, and Marano v. United States,4 1967, 1 Cir., 374 F.2d 583, 585.5
The amended complaint seeks the following relief:
(1) a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 declaring unconstitutional the various alleged actions of the defendants, outlined above, which allegedly coerced the plaintiff into withdrawing his appeals;
(2) an injunction prohibiting the defendants from refusing to accept and process plaintiff's appeals;
(3) an injunction prohibiting defendants from noting or recognizing any sentence except that allegedly imposed originally by the district court;6 and
(4) such other relief as is just and proper.
On December 19, 1968, following a hearing, the Court, with the assent of the defendants,7 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing that portion of the state court's order which subjected plaintiff to probation as a result of his convictions. On the same date, defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion that the Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Both sides briefed the legal issues raised by these motions, but on January 6, 1969, this Court deferred action on the motions until trial. A two-day trial on the merits was held on January 9 and January 31, 1969, following which both sides again briefed the applicable issues of fact and law.
This Court need not resolve the legal issues raised by defendants' motion that the Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Nor does the Court reach the merits of the basic dispute. The plaintiff has not exhausted the judicial remedies available to him in the state courts, and for that reason the complaint must be dismissed. Johnson v. Walker, 1963, 5 Cir., 317 F.2d 418, 419; Waldon v. Iowa, 1963, 8 Cir., 323 F.2d 852.
Despite the plaintiff's efforts to suggest the contrary, it is clear that his complaint stems from the custody and control exercised over him by state authorities as the result of the operation of the state's criminal processes. It was against that "custody" that the preliminary injunction in this case was addressed. It is in part to that "custody" that the prayer in the amended complaint speaks. And, indeed, did he not claim to be aggrieved by that "custody" plaintiff would lack standing to prosecute this action. Mowers v. United States Attorney General, 1969, S.D.N.Y., 297 F.Supp. 535, 537.8
In short, the plaintiff's status is that of a state prisoner seeking to challenge the legality of his custody by resort to the federal courts, and he differs from the traditional habeas corpus petitioner only in the name he ascribes to his petition and in that he seeks injunctive and declaratory relief.
The law is settled, however, that the civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may not be used as a substitute for habeas corpus so as to circumvent the familiar doctrine requiring the exhaustion of state remedies. Still v. Nichols, 412 F.2d 778 (1 Cir., June 5, 1969); Johnson v. Walker, 1963, 5 Cir., 317 F.2d 418, 419; Gaito v. Strauss, 1966, W.D. Pa., 249 F.Supp. 923, aff'd, 1966, 3 Cir., 368 F.2d 787, cert. denied, 1967, 386 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 1173, 18 L.Ed.2d 139; see Goss v. Illinois, 1963, 7 Cir., 312 F.2d 257, 259; cf. United States ex rel. Hunter v. Bibb, 1957, 7 Cir., 249 F.2d 839; cf. Davis v. Maryland, 1965, D.Md., 248 F.Supp. 951, 952-953. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to repealing the Congressional codification of the exhaustion doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Still v. Nichols, supra, Johnson v. Walker, supra, 317 F.2d at 419-420, and would fly in the face of carefully developed standards of comity between federal and state courts.9
Those same principles of judicial discretion and comity have also persuaded a long procession of courts to hold that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, likewise cannot be invoked by state prisoners so as to avoid the necessity of exhausting state judicial remedies.10 Federal courts have applied a similar rule to federal prisoners who have sought declaratory judgments rather than filing motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.11
It is no answer to argue, as does plaintiff, that his case requires a different result because his attack is aimed not at the Roxbury District Court's judgment of conviction but rather at the events which followed on the heels of the conviction and which affected his rights to appeal and to a trial de novo before a jury. Similar claims have been rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Waldon v. Iowa, supra, 323 F. 2d 852, where a state prisoner sought a declaratory judgment that the State had fraudulently deprived him of an appeal from his conviction and sentence and that he was entitled to an appeal, and in Christopher v. Iowa, supra, 324 F.2d 181, where a state prisoner sought by a declaratory judgment action to contest an alleged failure by the State Supreme Court to...
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Mederos v. Massachusetts
...bring petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, "so as to avoid the necessity of exhausting state judicial remedies." Grayson v. Eisenstadt, 300 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D. Mass. 1969) ("In short, the plaintiff's status is that of a state prisoner seeking to challenge the legality of his custody by ......