Grayson v. Harwell
Decision Date | 06 April 2023 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 3:23CV005-MPM-RP |
Parties | ASHLEY MASSENGILL GRAYSON PLAINTIFF v. DERRICKA HARWELL et al DEFENDANTS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This cause comes before the court on the motion of plaintiff Ashley Massengill Grayson to dismiss the defamation counter-claim asserted against her by defendant Derricka Harwell. Having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, this court is prepared to rule.
This lawsuit presents competing allegations of defamation asserted by two African-American women of some prominence, whose online acquaintance has become a bitter feud. In her complaint, Ms. Grayson describes herself as an individual “engaged in the business of digital consulting” who “depends upon social media to generate and maintain business for her company.” [Complaint at 2]. The complaint asserts that she is the “owner of Digital Course Recipe, a consulting agency” located in North Carolina. [Id. at 1]. In her motion to dismiss Ms Harwell's defamation counter-claim against her, Ms Grayson describes her allegations in this lawsuit as follows:
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that on April 1, 2022 the Defendant, Derricka Harwell posted defamatory remarks about the Plaintiff via Facebook. The posts of Derricka Harwell were posted underneath pictures of the Plaintiff and stated that she, Ms. Harwell “had to get legal and file a whole restraining order on this one” referring to the Plaintiff. The post went viral, being shared over forty thousand (40,000) times.
[Motion to dismiss at 1]. In her complaint, Ms. Grayson insists that, contrary to Ms. Harwell's Facebook post, she “has never been the subject of a restraining order filed by the Defendant” and that “[c]ontrary to the defamatory statements of the Defendant, the Plaintiff maintains a reputation for being a law-abiding citizen who does not harass or stalk others.” [Complaint at 2].
Ms. Harwell thus contends that this defamation lawsuit against her is part of an attempt by Ms. Grayson to “cover up the murder-for-hire investigation” against her. In her defamation counter-claim, Ms. Harwell further alleges:
That [Ms. Grayson] ha[s] posted statements under anonymous names (Amanda Stone and Jane Deaux) that were traced back to [Ms. Grayson], alleging that [Ms. Harwell] has a fraudulent business and reposted videos of a disgruntled tenant with the defamatory and derogatory hashtags, on or about October 2022.
[Answer and counterclaim at 18]. In her response, Ms. Harwell, a Desoto County resident, describes herself as “a public figure and CEO of Beautify Credit and a real estate mogul,” [response at 1], and she, much like Ms. Grayson, alleges that the defamatory statements made against her have caused her economic injury in her business.
Needless to say, the parties offer dramatically different characterizations of the facts of this case, and this court suspects that, at the end of the day, it will be left to a jury to decide whose version of events is accurate. At this juncture, however, this court must address Ms. Grayson's motion to dismiss the defamation counter-claim against her on the basis of the dismissal of a separate defamation action which was filed by Ms. Harwell in Desoto County Circuit Court. In asserting that the dismissal of Ms. Harwell's state court defamation action should be granted collateral estoppel effect in this case, Ms. Grayson must first confront the fact that this state court action was filed not against her, but rather against Ms. Rachel Maclin. Ms. Maclin is the “disgruntled tenant” referenced in the portion of the defamation counter-claim quoted above, and, once again, Ms. Harwell alleges that Ms. Grayson anonymously reposted Ms. Maclin's youtube video which was critical of Ms. Harwell and her business practices.[3]
It should be noted at the outset that a party's claim is barred by collateral estoppel if: (1) the issue in both actions are identical; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue was a necessary part of the judgment in that action. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 397 (5th Cir. 2004). Significantly, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel may be applied against a party who was not a party to the original suit from which the judgment derives, so long as the missing party was "in privity" with the party in the original suit. For a nonparty to be considered in privity, he or she must be “connected with [the former action] in their interests [and be] affected by the judgment with reference to interest involved in the action, as if they were parties.” Baker & McKenzie, LLP v. Evans, 123 So.3d 387, 401-02 (Miss. 2013). While it thus seems clear that nonparties may be held to be in privity with parties to a particular lawsuit for collateral estoppel purposes, Ms. Grayson fails to submit arguments supporting a conclusion that Ms. Harwell was, in fact, so “connected with [the Desoto County action] in [her] interests [and was so] affected by the judgment with reference to interest involved in the action” that she should be considered “in privity” with Ms. Maclin under the Baker & McKenzie standard. Ms. Grayson has the burden of demonstrating that collateral estoppel applies in this case, and this court concludes that her failure to offer arguments on this point is, standing alone, sufficient to reject her motion to dismiss Ms. Harwell's defamation counterclaim.
Even if this court were to somehow find that the privity requirement is met in this case, it would still conclude that, under Ms. Grayson's own description of the Desoto County action, the trial judge in that case made no final ruling that the defamation claims against Ms. Maclin lacked factual merit. In describing the Desoto County lawsuit, Ms. Grayson writes in her reply brief that:
In order to satisfy the second prong, a party must show that the prior action was “actually litigated”. Petro-Hunt, 365 F.3d at 397. “An issue is actually litigated when the issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.” Mack Energy Co. v. Red Stick Energy, LLC, No. CV 16-1696, 2019 WL 4602242, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 20, 2019)...
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