Grayson v. State
| Decision Date | 06 June 1967 |
| Citation | 35 Wis.2d 360,151 N.W.2d 100 |
| Parties | Theopolis Eugene GRAYSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Robert H. Friebert, State Public Defender, Madison, for plaintiff in error.
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., Madison, Hugh R. O'Connell, Dist. Atty., Robert E. Sutton, Asst. Dist. Atty., Milwaukee Co., Milwaukee, for defendant in error.
The defendant presents three issues in this appeal:
1. Did the trial court improperly restrict the examination of the prosecutrix?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
3. Should the defendant be granted a new trial in the interest of justice under sec. 251.09, Stats.?
The defendant contends that the rulings of the trial court unduly limited the defendant's right to cross-examine the prosecutrix and therefore constituted prejudicial error. We have closely examined the entire record, particularly the portions thereof referred to in the defendant's brief. On one occasion, counsel for the defendant attempted to inquire about her whereabouts during the several weeks prior to November 12, 1964. Objections to these questions as being immaterial were sustained. The matter was not further pursued by defendant's counsel. There were objections as to questions as to the knowledge of the Tyler family concerning Sherry staying in the attic; these were also sustained as being immaterial. Again, this matter was not further pursued. On another occasion, counsel for the defendant inquired as to whether or not defendant's sister lived next door to the Tyler residence. The objection to this question was sustained as being immaterial and again the matter was not further pursued. At no time during the trial did counsel endeavor to further pursue the prior relationship, if any, between the defendant and the prosecutrix or attempt to lay any foundation for any relationship that might have existed between the defendant and the prosecutrix or attempt to lay any foundation for any relationship that might have existed between the parties and the boyfriend of the prosecutrix and her boyfriend's brother, which it is alleged by counsel for the defendant was of some significance.
The defendant also claims the trial court improperly restricted the cross examination with respect to the initial story of the prosecutrix wherein she stated she had been raped, and the results of a subsequent examination by a physician. We find no evidence of such alleged improper restriction or cross examination. The record discloses that when she first went to the office of the District Attorney, she reported she had been raped because as she testified, 'I considered it rape.' Subsequently, she was examined by a physician and found to be a virgin, and the present charge was the result. The trial court correctly found that counsel's attempt to cross examine on this matter was argumentative and also properly directed counsel not to testify himself.
All of the objections were well taken. The rulings of the trial court only prevented improper formulation of questions and counsel was at all times free to make further inquiries provided that his questions were properly phrased in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Also, in resolving this issue, we are confronted with the basic rule 'that the scope of cross-examination in a criminal case lies to a great extent in the discretion of the trial court.' Simpson v. State (1966) 32 Wis.2d 195, 205, 145 N.W.2d 206, 211, and cases therein cited. We conclude that the trial court did not improperly restrict the cross examination.
The defendant urges that the state did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. On an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case, the test of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether or not the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the finder of fact was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Oseman v. State (1966), 32 Wis.2d 523, 531, 145 N.W.2d 766. In a criminal case, the same test applies whether the trial is to a court or to the jury. Alston v. State (1966), 30 Wis.2d 888 100, 140 N.W.2d 286. The test does not require the members of this court to become equally convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that this court be satisfied that the finder of fact on the credible evidence submitted could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Stevens (1965), 26 Wis.2d 451, 464, 132 N.W.2d 502. The prosecutrix and the defendant were the only...
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