Grayson v. State
Decision Date | 19 November 1999 |
Citation | 824 So.2d 804 |
Parties | Carey Dale GRAYSON v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Virginia A. Vinson, Birmingham, for appellant.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Tracy Daniel, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
This case was originally assigned to another judge and was reassigned to Judge McMillan.
The appellant, Carey Dale Grayson, was indicted on two counts of capital murder. Count I charged the appellant with the intentional murder of the victim during a kidnapping in the first degree, in violation of ž 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. Count II charged the appellant with the intentional murder of the victim during a robbery, in violation of ž 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. The appellant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Following a trial, the appellant was convicted of capital murder as charged in Count I of the indictment and the lesser included offense of intentional murder as contained in Count II of the indictment. Thereafter, a sentencing hearing was held before the jury, and the jury returned an advisory verdict recommending that the appellant be sentenced to death, by a vote of 12-0 as to Count I. A presentence report was presented at the separate sentencing hearing before the judge; thereafter, the appellant was sentenced to death by electrocution as to Count I; the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment as to Count II.
The trial court made the following findings of fact concerning the crime and the appellant's participation in it:
The record further indicates that, although the investigation originally involved suspects in Chattanooga because the victim was from that area, the investigation eventually led the police to the Jefferson County jail, where the appellant was incarcerated. He was interviewed by the police at the jail where he agreed to give a statement, indicating that "they were not hanging this case on him and [he wanted] to tell his side of the story." The appellant then gave the following statement which was admitted at trial:
Upon further questioning, by the authorities, the appellant made other statements concerning the details of the offense. The appellant stated that while T.R. was standing on the victim's throat, he placed his hands on the appellant for balance. He further indicated that, when they dumped the victim's clothes over the cliff, T.R. took some of the clothing and Kenny took a ring from the victim. The appellant indicated that he took nothing from her. The appellant was then asked why he and his accomplices had killed the victim; the appellant responded that he did not know why they had killed her, "but it was not his problem." The officer who took the appellant's statement noted that he was very cooperative and that his attitude was
The appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to allow the defense to question a State's witness concerning a civil suit involving the appellant, because, he says, this questioning would have tended to show the bias of the witness. Specifically, the appellant argues that he was improperly prevented from questioning the victim's mother, Jan Deblieux, concerning a wrongful-death action that had been filed by the victim's estranged husband against the Miller Brewing Company. The appellant argues that the suit was being brought by the decedent's estate and that the decedent's mother clearly had a financial interest in the civil suit, and allowing him to question her about it would prove her bias in seeing that the appellant was convicted.
The record indicates that the victim's mother had testified during the State's case-in-chief to establish that the victim was her daughter, and had also testified that, just before the offense, the victim had telephoned her, stating that she would be traveling home to Louisiana very shortly, by bus or by plane. The witness further testified that she never heard from her daughter after that conversation. Thereafter, during the appellant's presentation of his defense, the victim's mother was called as a witness. She was asked whether she knew an attorney who had been hired by her daughter's estranged husband. She stated that she had not met with the attorney, nor had she...
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