Graziani v. Epic Data Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-K-1284.,02-K-1284. |
| Citation | 305 F.Supp.2d 1192 |
| Parties | Larry GRAZIANI, Plaintiff, v. EPIC DATA CORPORATION and United Parcel Service Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Horton Perry Ryon, Ryon & Associates, Evergreen, CO, for Plaintiff.
Franklin Eastwood Wright, Winstead, Sechrest & Minick, P.C., Dallas, Geraldine A. Brimmer, Kimberley Ann Dempster, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This tort action brought by a former management level employee against his employer and the United Parcel Service Corporation ("UPS") is before me on UPS's motion for summary judgment. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. UPS seeks summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 56, on both of Plaintiff's asserted claims. Plaintiff Larry Graziani asserts two claims against UPS: one for intentional interference with a contractual relationship and the other, defamation. The action arose after Graziani's employer, Epic Data Corporation ("Epic"), terminated its agreement with Graziani. Pursuant to that agreement, Graziani was to receive monthly payments of $10,000 for a period of twelve months. Epic refused to pay Graziani his final two payments of $10,000, citing information from UPS that Graziani had attempted to embezzle over $740,000 in payments from UPS that were suppose to be paid to Epic. Graziani denied the allegations and then brought suit against both Epic and UPS. UPS moves for summary judgment on both of Graziani's claims against it.
Although each party's version of the events leading up to Graziani's termination varies substantially, these differences do not involve material facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. Further, no other pertinent facts or discovery were presented on which a valid intentional interference or defamation claim may rest. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is therefore granted and all claims against UPS are dismissed. Graziani's claim against Epic will proceed to trial.
Beginning in April of 1999, Graziani worked for Connectware, a company owned by Defendant Epic, as Vice President of Sales and Marketing. Graziani Dep. at 20:9-23:5. In August of 2000 Graziani signed a confidential employment contract with Epic making him Epic's Vice President of Sales. Graziani Dep. at 22:25-23:18; Exhibit E, Epic Employment Contract, Mot. Summ. J. Three months later, in November of 2000, Graziani and Epic terminated the employment contract and agreed to the conditions of a termination letter dated November 2, 2000. Graziani Dep. at 23:19-20; Exhibit F, Termination Letter, Mot. Summ. J. An undisclosed severance agreement provided that Mr. Graziani would receive $10,000 per month for a one-year period. Graziani Dep. At 81:11-81:17. Graziani received all but the last two payments of this package. Graziani Affidavit at 1. Epic terminated the severance payments after allegedly learning from UPS that Graziani had attempted to embezzle over $740,000 from Epic. In response to these actions, Graziani filed suit.
According to UPS, one of its employees, Dawn Magi, contacted Graziani on September 11, 2001 and inquired as to where a $743,220.00 payment from UPS to Epic should be sent. Magi Affidavit at 2. This call as well as two others are documented in UPS's telephone records. Ex. 1, Telephone Record Spreadsheet, Mot. Summ. J. According to Magi, Graziani informed her that the payment should be sent to his home in Evergreen, Colorado and he proceeded to provide her with his post office box and what he represented as a federal employer identification number (EIN) for tax purposes. Id. After pursuing the matter further, Ms. Magi discovered that Graziani no longer worked for Epic. Ms. Magi thereafter alerted Epic's CEO to the alleged conversations she had with Graziani. Id. at 3. Epic then terminated Graziani's severance package.
Graziani's version of the events differs substantially from that of UPS. He contends that he did not receive a telephone call from either Ms. Magi or any other UPS personnel. Graziani Dep. at 56:24-57:22. He further asserts that he did not request any money, owed to Epic from UPS, be directed to his address; nor did he give any UPS personnel an incorrect EIN to validate the transfer of money to his account. Graziani Dep. at 59:2-8. Graziani explains that if Ms. Magi did try to contact him, he did not receive her call. Graziani Affidavit at 1. On September 11, 2001 he was working outside on his deck and would have been unable to hear the phone. Id. He also maintains that the only conversation he had with UPS personnel was at the end of September 2001, when he was questioned by UPS as to whether he was an employee of Epic and, according to Mr. Graziani, he responded that he was not. P. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 4. Graziani sued, asserting claims for relief against Epic and UPS. Only Graziani's claims against UPS are at issue in the instant motion.1
UPS moves for summary judgment on Graziani's claims for intentional interference and defamation on grounds that Graziani's denial of the alleged conversation with Ms. Magi is insufficient to establish essential elements of both claims. Mot. Summ. J. at 7-9. Because Graziani has failed to come forward with evidence affirmatively establishing these elements, no genuine issue of material fact exists on which this case may proceed.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the court reviews the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sapone v. Grand Targhee, Inc., 308 F.3d 1096. 1098 (10th Cir.2002); Simms v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.1999) (). Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Upon such a showing, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus. Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). Further, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations contained in the complaint, but instead he must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.1980).
Additionally, when determining the adequacy of the non-moving party's opposition to a summary judgment motion, a decision should be based on whether reasonable jurors could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If in viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party, summary judgment is precluded. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
This Court is exercising its diversity jurisdiction and the substantive law of Colorado therefore governs this dispute. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist. v. Am. Guarantee, 214 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.2000). Colorado recognizes the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations. American. Express Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Topel, 38 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1241 (D.Colo.1999); Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159, 170 (Colo.1993); Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales and Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 690 P.2d 207, 210 (Colo.1984) (). To establish a prima facie case of intentional interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and the third party; (2) knowledge by the defendant of a contract; (3) intentional action by the defendant that induced the breach of the contract and; (4) resulting damages. Lutfi v. Brighton Cmty. Hosp. Ass'n, 40 P.3d 51, 58 (Colo.App.2001); see also Williams v. Burns, 540 F.Supp. 1243, 1251 (D.Colo.1982).
This dispute turns on whether Mr. Graziani has met his burden, by putting forth specific facts, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists to support his intentional interference claim. Specifically, the parties disagree as to whether two of the four requisite elements are met: 1) whether UPS knew or should have known of either the employment contract or the severance agreement with Epic and 2) whether UPS intended to cause the breach of a contract. Mr. Graziani declares that UPS's summary judgment motion, with respect to the intentional interference claim, should be denied. He argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pl. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 5. He asserts, "the inference can clearly be reached that Defendant UPS knew or should have known that Plaintiff Graziani and Epic Data had a contract for Plaintiff's termination." Id. at 5. Graziani reasons that "[i]f the ... undisputed evidence and the conflicting evidence are taken together in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... a substantial inference can be drawn that defendant UPS, through the conduct of its agents, intended to cause Defendant Epic Data to terminate the contract ..." Id. at 6. I disagree.
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