Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co v. Grosjean

Decision Date17 May 1937
Docket NumberNo. 652,652
Citation112 A.L.R. 293,81 L.Ed. 1193,301 U.S. 412,57 S.Ct. 772
PartiesGREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA CO. et al. v. GROSJEAN, Sup'r of Public Accounts, et al. *
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Messrs. Monte M. Lemann, of New Orleans, La., Robert L. Wright, of Chicago, Ill., and J. Blane Monroe, of New Orleans, La., for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 413-415 intentionally omitted] Mr. E. Leland Richardson, of Baton Rouge, La., for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from Page 416 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause presents the questions whether the method prescribed by a chain store tax act for ascertaining the rate of taxation offends the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause (article 1, § 8, cl. 3) of the Federal Constitution.

In 1932 the legislature of Louisiana adopted an act levying an occupation or license tax upon chain stores,1 under which the exaction was fifteen dollars upon each of two or more stores, not in excess of five; upon each store in excess of five, but not exceeding ten, $25; and the amount increased in brackets for additional stores, the last bracket embracing stores in excess of fifty upon each of which the tax was $200.

By Act No. 51 of 19342 the earlier law was amended to lay the tax on 'persons, firms, partnerships, corporations or associations of persons engaged in the business of operating two or more stores or mercantile establishments, one or more of which is located in this State, * * * under the same general management, supervision, ownership or control.' Section 1. Section 3 provides that the tax 'shall be based on the number of stores or mercantile establishments included under the same general management, supervision, ownership or control, whether operated in this State or not, and shall be fixed and graded as follows, to-wit: (1) Upon stores or mercantile establishments operated in this State and belonging to a chain or group having a total of not more than ten stores, the annual license shall be Ten ($10.00) Dollars for each such store operated in this State.' There are fifteen additional paragraphs progressively increasing the rate per store in Louisiana of larger chains, the last fixing the rate for a store belonging to a chain of more than five hundred at $550.

The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, an Arizona corporation, owning, operating or controlling 15,082 stores in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, 106 of which are in Louisiana, filed its bill in the District Court to restrain the appellees, state officers, from enforcing the statute. Other corporations operating chains, some units of which are located in Louisiana, intervened as plaintiffs. A temporary restraining order issued, the appellees answered the bill, and the case was heard upon pleadings and proofs by a specially constituted court of three judges, which upheld the statute and dismissed the bill.3

The constitutional infirmity of the act is said to consist in arbitrary discrimination in favor of local as against national chains, in the attempt to tax property and activities which are beyond the state's jurisdiction, and in burdening interstate commerce. We hold the legislation impregnable to attack on these grounds.

First. The exaction is an occupation or license tax. The subject is the conduct of a business within Louisiana. Without contravening the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state may separately classify for taxation the conduct of a chain store,4 and may increase the rate in proportion to the increase in the number of stores within the state, since the opportunities and powers of a chain store operator become greater with the growth of the number of units maintained.5 The appellants assert that in adjusting the rate for a chain store in Louisiana the legislature may not take into account the size of the chain to which the store belongs, by counting the total number of its units wherever located. So to do, it is claimed, is arbitrarily to discriminate against sectional or national chains in favor of intrastate chains.

The District Court found that the testimony offered by the State was similar to that in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, supra; established the difference in type of opera- tion between the operator of one store and the operator of many, and the variance in advantage and mode of operation with the number of units in the chain. In addition, the court found that all the stores of a retail chain contribute to the central purchasing power of the chain irrespective of state lines and location of stores, and increase the per unit multiple advantage enjoyed by the operator of the system; that the greater the number of units the greater the purchasing power of the chain, the greater the rebates and allowances, the greater the advantages in advertising, the greater the capital employed, the greater the social and economic consequences, and the lower the cost of distribution and overhead. 'In fine, the record in this case shows the contribution to the advantages made by each unit in the chain, and the per unit advantage made possible by the whole system, and in that respect only does it differ materially from the proof which was before the court in the Jackson Case.' These findings are assigned as error, but they have substantial support in the record and we therefore accept them.

If the competitive advantages of a chain increase with the number of its component links, it is hard to see how these advantages cease at the state boundary. Under the findings a store belonging to a chain of one hundred, all located in Louisiana, has not the same competitive advantages as one of one hundred Louisiana stores belonging to a national chain of one thousand. The appellants lean heavily on the findings of the court respecting the relative business in New Orleans of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Company and the H. G. Hill Stores, Inc., a Louisiana corporation. The court found that the operations of the two are generally of the same character; the former conducts one hundred and six stores in the state, sixty-two of which are in the city of New Orleans; the latter ninety-two in the state, of which eighty-seven are in the city. Each concern conducts grocery and meat stores with substan- tially the same line of merchandise and their sales methods are practically the same. The gross volume of sales of Hill in New Orleans is much greater; it has more stores, and does more business per store in that city than the Atlantic & Pacific. The court further found, however, that the total purchasing power of the Atlantic & Pacific is much greater than that of Hill; that Atlantic & Pacific has field offices located at primary markets, which are in charge of specialists and supervised by central purchasing offices in New York, and maintains divisional warehouses throughout the country, whereas the operations of Hill are confined to Louisiana, and chiefly to New Orleans. Under the statute Hill is taxable at the rate of $30 per store as against $550 assessable against Atlantic & Pacific. These facts are said to demonstrate that the act denies the appellant and other intervenors the equal protection of the laws by arbitrarily discriminating against national in favor of local chains. But the contention is answered not only by the specific finding respecting the difference between the two companies' methods but by the general finding that addition of units to a chain increases the competitive advantage of each store in the chain.

The court's findings are supported by evidence bearing upon a variety of advantages enjoyed by large chains which are unavailable to smaller chains. One striking illustration is furnished by the uncontradicted proof that the Atlantic & Pacific Company received, in the year 1934, from its vendors, secret rebates, allowances, and brokerage fees amounting to $8,105,000 which were demanded by the company as a condition of purchasing from the vendors in question. The leverage which accomplished this was the enormous purchasing power of the company. The amount thus obtained equals $530 for each of the Atlantic & Pacific Company's stores or nearly the amount of the tax exacted by the statute. The appellants insist that these facts are not significant because there is testimony that, in the drug trade, quantity discounts usually do not increase after a certain volume of purchases is reached, but the testimony does not specify the point where quantity discounts cease to grow. The record discloses what would be plain enough without evidence, that generally volume of purchasing power spells lower prices, special terms, and other advantages. It is unnecessary to discuss the evidence supporting the findings with respect to other facilities enjoyed only, or in increased measure, by the larger chains.

The appellants urge that the act arbitrarily discriminates in favor of local chains because it is inconceivable that a chain operating wholly within the state would have five hundred stores, not to mention upwards of fifteen thousand, the number maintained by the Atlantic & Pacific. The argument is inconsistent with the finding that additional units, wherever situate, increase the advantages and economic effects of the chain as a whole and of each unit; and ignores the possibility that a chain-store company of national scope might well be incorporated in Louisiana, whose stores in that state would be rated for taxation according to its total stores within and without the state.

Other instances of the working of the act are cited to show that it arbitrarily discriminates against national chains and in favor of local ones solely because they are such. Thus, it is said, if a national chain owning 501 stores in other states, establishes a single store in a Louisiana city where there is a local chain of two...

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