GREAT LAKES PIPE LINE COMPANY v. United States
Decision Date | 21 March 1963 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 12705-4. |
Citation | 216 F. Supp. 181 |
Parties | GREAT LAKES PIPE LINE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Swanson, Midgley, Jones, Blackmar & Eager, by Ralph M. Jones, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
F. Russell Millin, by Calvin Hamilton, First Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
This is an action to recover Federal excise taxes in the sum of $340,461.05 and interest thereon brought by an operator of an interstate pipeline company in the business of transporting petroleum products. The taxes were collected during the period between July 1, 1953, and July 1, 1957 inclusive, under the provisions of Section 3460 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and Section 4281 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. These taxing statutes are substantially identical in wording, which is as follows:
The point at issue is a very narrow one, but one not wholly free of difficulty. The defendant claims that it properly collected the taxes in question under the statutes quoted above, providing for a tax equivalent to 4½ percent of the amount paid for transportation of crude petroleum, and liquid products thereof, by pipeline.
The plaintiff claims that the taxes in question were unlawfully collected because the transaction which was taxed is exempted under the first sentence of Section 4283 of Title 26 U.S.C.A., which reads as follows:
"For the purposes of section 4281, the term `transportation' shall not include any movement through lines of pipe within the premises of a refinery, a bulk plant, a terminal, or a gasoline plant, if such movement is not a continuation of a taxable transportation." (Emphasis added.)
Section 3460(c) of the 1939 I.R.C. is identical in substance.
In the stipulation of fact, upon which this cause was originally submitted, it was agreed in Paragraph 43 thereof as follows:
"The plaintiff received a flat five cents (5¢) per barrel for billing and loading tank trucks and tank cars and this flat rate of five cents (5¢) per barrel was in addition to the transportation rate which the shipper paid and which varies with the distance between the refinery originating point and the various terminal destination storage points."
It was further agreed therein that by letter ruling of June 1, 1949, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue allocated one-half of the five cents (5¢) per barrel charge for billing and loading tank trucks and cars to the clerical work in filling out bills of lading (not subject to tax on transportation of oil by pipeline), and one-half to the loading process. The one-half allocated to the loading process was subjected to tax at the rate of 4½ per cent under Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 4281, and the earlier sections of the I.R.C. of 1939.
In defense of this action to recover the tax, the defendant asserts that the loading service in question is a "continuation of the taxable transportation" within the meaning of Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 4283 and the earlier identical section, Section 3460(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. At the outset it should be noted that in an action of this nature for the recovery of taxes allegedly illegally assessed and collected, the determination made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is presumptively correct, and that the plaintiff has the burden of proving all facts necessary to establish the illegality of the collection. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, l. c. 515, 55 S.Ct. 287, 290, 79 L.Ed. 623; Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289, l. c. 294, 55 S.Ct. 158, 161, 79 L.Ed. 367; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, l. c. 115, 54 S.Ct. 8, 9, 78 L.Ed. 212; Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357, l. c. 361, 50 S.Ct. 251, 252, 74 L.Ed. 901.
The facts must be determined from the stipulation of agreed statement of facts and the subsequently introduced evidence received at a hearing ordered by the Court on October 8, 1962, because of references by the Government to a published tariff of the plaintiff which was not identified or referred to in the stipulation of fact. Because of this extra-record reference and because of the desire of the Court to secure additional information concerning the exact nature of the operations which the billing and loading charge of five cents per barrel was intended to cover, the original submission was set aside and oral and documentary evidence was received at a formal hearing.
The facts which were agreed upon in the stipulation and which are accepted by both parties and the Court are as follows:
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United States v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Company
...the District Court erred in holding that the movements in question were exempt. Judge Becker's well-considered opinion is reported at 216 F.Supp. 181. It contains a full recitation of the stipulation of facts upon which the case was originally submitted, together with a discussion of the te......