Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. v. Wood
Decision Date | 23 October 2001 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0228-01-4. |
Citation | 37 Va. App. 54,553 S.E.2d 555 |
Parties | GREAT NORTHERN NEKOOSA CORPORATION and Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Larry L. WOOD. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Susan A. Evans (Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, on brief), Fairfax, for appellants.
Joseph T. Trapeni, Jr. (Trapeni, Romero & Morrison, P.C., on brief), Fairfax, for appellee.
Present: Judges BENTON, ANNUNZIATA and Senior Judge HODGES.
Opinion by Judge ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA.
The appellants, Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation and Employers Insurance of Wausau, appeal the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission to award benefits to Larry L. Wood, pursuant to Code § 65.1-56(18), the statute in effect at the time of the accident, upon finding he is permanently unemployable in gainful employment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal, we review the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn, in the light most favorable to Wood, the party prevailing before the commission. Great Eastern Resort Corp. v. Gordon, 31 Va.App. 608, 610, 525 S.E.2d 55, 56 (2000). Wood was injured on December 30, 1988, while working as a maintenance mechanic for Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation (employer). He was then thirty-seven years old. While he assisted in changing a 3/4 inch steel crane cable, the cable slipped and fell on Wood's face, causing him to fall from his position on top of a truckload of logs, twelve to fourteen feet to the concrete roadway. He was diagnosed with a closed brain injury, right frontal intracerebral hematoma, a basilar skull fracture with multiple air/fluid levels, a contusion to the right side of the face, multiple fractures to the face and right orbit, chest and neck trauma, aspiration pneumonities and pulmonary contusion, and pneumonia. The claim was accepted as compensable, resulting in a total of five hundred weeks of compensation benefits pursuant to various awards. Subsequently, Wood sought an award of permanent total compensation benefits pursuant to Code § 65.1-56(18).
After several years of medical treatment, the employer offered Wood a part-time position as a work order processor, which required him to process work orders using a computer software package by entering information into the computer database from card files. The position had previously been filled by college students on a part-time basis, but had been eliminated in August 1992. The job was revived and modified for Wood. The job was obtained for Wood by a vocational rehabilitation specialist and was approved by his treating physician and treating psychologist. Wood performed fewer than one-half the job tasks required of the last employee in the position. Wood testified that he obtained this position because "this was the only thing they could find that I might be capable of doing." He earns $8.59 per hour and certain fringe benefits, including holiday pay, vacation pay, health insurance and a retirement plan. Although the job was approved for sixteen hours per week, Wood was only scheduled to work twelve hours per week and, in fact, worked even fewer hours than assigned because of the fatigue and severe headaches he suffered. Furthermore, he often cannot perform his assigned tasks. In his stead, his supervisor performs those tasks when those tasks are important. Wood performs them when he is able.
The commission concluded that Wood was not employable in gainful employment and, thus, is totally and permanently incapacitated. It entered an award in his favor for $362 per week beginning July 30, 1998. It is from that decision that the employer appeals.
Code § 65.1-56(18) of the Workers' Compensation Act provided, inter alia, that:
[A]n injury to the brain which is so severe as to render the employee permanently unemployable in gainful employment, shall constitute total and permanent incapacity, to be compensated according to the provisions of Section 65.1-54.
The commission found that because the employer revived and modified the position to meet Wood's needs and not out of business necessity, his employment did not constitute "gainful employment." Employer contends (1) that the commission too narrowly defined "gainful employment" and (2) that Wood's position is beneficial to the employer. Employer argues that Wood does not meet this definition because he is and has been gainfully employed since January 11, 1993. We disagree.
The issue of whether the commission erred in finding that Wood was "unemployable in gainful employment," implicates a core question of first impression in Virginia. The commission's description of "gainful employment" is a conclusion of law that is not binding on this Court. Thomas Refuse Service v. Flood, 30 Va.App. 17, 20, 515 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1999). "However, the commission's construction of the Workers' Compensation Act is entitled to great weight on appeal." Id. (citing Wiggins v. Fairfax Park Ltd., 22 Va.App. 432, 441, 470 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1996)). We now adopt the commission's description of "gainful employment."
Barnett v. D.L. Bromwell, 6 Va.App. 30, 34, 366 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1988) (quoting McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 461, 69 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1952)).
To constitute total incapacity, a brain injury must render an individual "unemployable in gainful employment." The phrase "gainful employment" must, therefore, have some meaning beyond "any" employment.
We hold that the commission's interpretation of the phrase, "unemployable in gainful employment," is consistent with the statutory purpose and that it properly determined that Wood was totally and permanently incapacitated, in accordance with that interpretation. A definition of "gainful employment" in this context that does not consider the labor market and the motivations of a potential employer would swallow the rule such that any brain injury no matter how severe would be noncompensable if one employer were willing to hire an individual for non-business reasons, such as compassion. Under such a definition, that person would be "employable in gainful employment" and ineligible for total disability benefits. The limitation to "gainful" employment would be rendered meaningless.
While the Virginia appellate courts have not addressed the issue previously, we find that the definition adopted by the commission is supported by the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Worley, 161 Va. 951, 959, 172 S.E. 168, 171 (1934), in which the court addressed analogous issues. In its consideration of the phrase "total and permanent disability" in the context of insurance policy coverage, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected an interpretation of the phrase that disallowed benefits if the individual could engage in "any occupation whatsoever." Id. The Supreme Court defined "total and permanent disability" as the inability to perform work for profit "in substantially the customary and usual manner in which such occupation is prosecuted." Id. at 960, 172 S.E. at 172.1 The Supreme Court's definition, like the commission's definition, implies that the employer needs the employee as it would need any other employee to perform the tasks of the occupation. In short, the employment of a claimant has a business purpose.
In adopting the commission's definition of "gainful employment," we are also persuaded by Professor Larson's so-called "odd-lot" doctrine.2 Professor Larson defines "odd-lot" workers as within the category of the totally disabled:
[T]otal disability may be found in...
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