Great Northern Railway Company v. Capital Trust Company

• Decision Date: 04 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 107,107
• Citation: 37 S.Ct. 41,242 U.S. 144,61 L.Ed. 208
• Parties: GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. CAPITAL TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of William M. Ward, Deceased
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

242 U.S. 144

37 S.Ct. 41

61 L.Ed. 208

GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v CAPITAL TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of William M. Ward, Deceased.

No. 107.

Submitted November 15, 1916.

Decided December 4, 1916.

Messrs. A. L. Janes and M. L. Countryman for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Samuel A. Anderson for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

While employed by the railway company as a switchman, William M. Ward was accidentally killed, December 13, 1912; and the administrator brought suit in a state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as amended, for the benefit of his father and mother, seeking to recover their pecuniary loss and also damages for the injuries suffered by him prior to death. Some evidence tended to show that, after being run over by one or more cars, although wholly unconscious, the deceased continued to breathe for perhaps ten minutes. Testimony of other witnesses supported a claim that there was no appreciable continuation of life. Judgment upon an unapportioned verdict, in favor of the administrator, was affirmed by the state supreme court, October, 1914. The railway company duly excepted to the following portions of the charge:

'Did Ward's injuries kill him instantly? If he was killed instantly, one rule of damages applies, while if he lived some time after he was injured, another rule of damages would apply. There is some evidence that he lived a few minutes after receiving his injuries; there is other evidence that he was dead when taken out from under the car. If you should find that Ward died from his injuries without living an appreciable length of time, then the plaintiff could only recover, if at all, what would have been the pecuniary value of Ward's life to his father and mother had he lived. . . . And in that connection it would be proper for you to consider his health, his disposition to contribute to the support of his parents, the evidence of what he customarily earned, his earning capacity, the amount he was in the habit of giving to his parents, his age, his condition in life, the length of time he probably would have lived had not this accident happened, and the expectancy of the life of the father and mother, and the reasonable expectancy of the parents in respect to benefits, if any, from the services of their son; . . .

'In case you find that Ward did not die instantly from his injuries, but that he lived some appreciable length of time after the accident, then you would come to another question in the case.

'Under the law of the United States it is provided that any right of action given by the act of Congress in reference to injuries of this kind under such circumstances, that the right of action shall survive to the personal representatives of the deceased...