Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson

• Citation: 254 F. 683
• Decision Date: 28 October 1918
• Docket Number: 5130.
• Parties: GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. v. JOHNSON.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

254 F. 683

GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. v. JOHNSON.

No. 5130.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

October 28, 1918

M. L Countryman, of St. Paul, Minn., and C. J. Murphy, of Grand Forks, N.D. (T. A. Toner, of Grand Forks, N.D., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

L. J Palda, of Minot, N.D., for defendant in error.

Before HOOK and STONE, Circuit Judges, and WADE, District Judge.

STONE Circuit Judge.

Writ of error from judgment for damages on account of personal injury death claim brought by wife.

The plaintiff founded her right of recovery upon the claim that she was the wife of deceased through a common-law marriage. Plaintiff based the marriage upon a written contract sent from Minnesota, where deceased then was and continued for some time afterwards, to her in Missouri, where she resided and was employed. Her testimony was that upon receipt of the duplicate papers, which had been signed by deceased, she signed them and returned one to him. The contract in question was Exhibit C in this case and was as follows:

'St. Paul, Minn., March 10, 1916.

'It is hereby agreed, by and between E. R. Spiers and Mayme Woodall, from this date henceforth to be husband and wife, and from this date henceforth to conduct ourselves towards each other as husband and wife, the said E. R. Spiers to contribute to the support and maintenance of the said Mayme Woodall as her husband, and the said Mayme Woodall to conduct herself towards the said E. R. Spiers as a dutiful wife.

'(Signed) E. R. Spiers. 'Mayme Woodall.'

The contentions of plaintiff in error are concisely stated in a portion of the printed argument as follows:

' * * * Claimant has testified in the case at bar that she intended at the time of executing Exhibit C to then become the wife of decedent. If this statement of hers must be believed, and the law does not require the parties to agree in the presence of each other, then we concede that the finding of marriage in this case must be sustained.'

The state of Minnesota recognizes common-law marriages, but the contract is governed by the laws of the state of Missouri, where acceptance by plaintiff of the contractual offer made by deceased occurred. That state recognizes and enforces common-law marriages. R.S. Mo. 1909, Sec. 8279; Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am.Rep. 359; State v. Bittick, 103 Mo. 183, 15 S.W. 325, 11 L.R.A. 587, 23 Am.St.Rep. 869; State v. Cooper, 103 Mo. 266, 15 S.W. 327; Banks v. Galbraith, 149 Mo. 529, 51 S.W. 105; Topper v. Perry, 197 Mo. 531, 95 S.W. 203, 114 Am.St.Rep. 777; Bishop v. Investment Co., 229 Mo. 699, 129 S.W. 668, Ann Cas. 1912A, 868; Imboden v. Trust Co., 111 Mo.App. 220, 86 S.W. 263; Davis v. Stouffer, 132 Mo.App. 555, 112 S.W. 282. Under these decisions the rule seems to be that marriage is a civil contract, possessing in its creation in praesenti the elements, and only the elements, attaching to any contract, but that because it establishes a legal status of grave concern to the state and society, and because of the natural temptations to perjury, and the difficulties of combating such testimony, both of which frequently arise, the courts will closely scrutinize testimony intended to establish such a contract after the death of one of the parties thereto.

The court fairly submitted the facts of execution, time of execution, and intent at time of execution of the contract. The evidence has been carefully examined, and in our judgment there was substantial evidence upon all of those points to sustain the verdict...