Great Northern Ry Co v. Galbreath Catte Co, 138

• Citation: 46 S.Ct. 439,70 L.Ed. 854,271 U.S. 99
• Decision Date: 19 April 1926
• Docket Number: No. 138,138
• Parties: GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. v. GALBREATH CATTE CO. et al
• Court: United States Supreme Court

271 U.S. 99

46 S.Ct. 439

70 L.Ed. 854

GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO.

v GALBREATH CATTE CO. et al.

No. 138.

Argued Jan. 15, 1926.

Decided April 19, 1926.

Under Judicial Code, §§ 28, 29 (Comp. St. §§ 1010, 1011), if any ground of petition for removal to federal court is well taken, it is error for state court to deny petition and proceed further with case.

Whether case is one arising under the laws of United States, as affects right of removal to federal court, is determinable from statement of cause of action in complaint.

Where cattle were shipped in interstate commerce under bills of lading issued under Carmack Amendment (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), and allegedly injured through carrier's unreasonable delay and failure to unload, as required by Act June 29, 1906, § (Comp. St. § 8651), held, action for damages was one arising under the laws of the United States, as affected right of removal to federal court, under Judicial Code, § 28 (Comp. St. § 1010).

Action between citizens of different states, within Judicial Code, § 24 (Comp. St. § 991), was removable to federal court under section 28 (Comp. St. § 1010), though, as matter of venue, action could not have been brought originally in court to which removal was sought.

Mr. J. Parker Veazey, Jr., of Great Falls, Mont., for petitioner.

Mr. Samuel Herrick, of Washington, D. C., for respondents.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an action begun in a state court in Montana to recover for injuries to cattle shipped by railroad in interstate commerce. In due time the defendant presented a verified petition, accompanied by a proper bond with good and sufficient surety, for the removal of the case into the federal District Court for Montana; but the state court denied the petition, accorded the defendant an exception, and proceeded to the disposal of the case on the merits. After a trial it gave judgment for the plaintiffs, which the Supreme Court of the state affirmed after a part of the damages awarded was remitted. 213 P. 610, 66 Mont. 198; 227 P. 65, 71 Mont. 56; Rev. Code Mont. 1921, § 9748. The case is here on writ of certiorari.

One of the rulings assigned for error in the Supreme Court of the state was the denial of the petition for removal; but that court held that the case was not removable and sustained the ruling. It was to review the decision on this point that certiorari was granted.

The material allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint were to the following effect: One of the plaintiffs is a corporate citizen of Montana and the other is an individual citizen of Wyoming; while the defendant is a corporate citizen of Minnesota. The cattle were shipped from Cody, Wyo., to Seville, Mont., on a through bill of lading over two connecting lines of railroad, the second being owned and operated by the defendant. The plaintiffs owned the cattle, were both consignors and consignees of the shipment, and were the lawful holders of the bill of lading. The cattle were injured while in transit over the defendant's road by the defendant's action in unreasonably delaying and carelessly handling them, and wrongfully omitting to unload them, when necessary, in a humane manner into properly equipped pens for rest, water, and feeding-the resulting damages to the plaintiffs being upwards of $30,000.

The petition for removal, besides showing the presence of the requisite jurisdictional amount and the defendant's nonresidence in the state where sued, asserted a right of removal on two grounds: First, that the case was one arising under the laws of the United States, particularly those applying to the shipment of cattle by railroad in interstate commerce; and, secondly, that the case was between citizens of different states.

If either ground was well taken, the case was removable (Judicial Code, § 28 (Comp. St. § 1010); General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 43 S. Ct. 106, 260 U. S. 261, 271, et seq., 67 L. Ed. 244; Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 43 S. Ct. 230, 260 U. S. 653, 67 L. Ed. 443), and the state court erred in denying the petition and proceeding further with the case (Judicial Code, § 29 (Comp. St. § 1011); New Orleans, Mobile & Texas R. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 141, 26 L. Ed. 96; National Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 1 S. Ct. 58, 106 U. S. 118, 122, 27 L. Ed. 87.

Whether the first ground was well taken is to be determined from the plaintiffs' statement in the complaint of their cause of action. According to that statement the cause of action was for injuries to cattle resulting from the defendant's negligent and wrongful nonperformance of duties devolving on it as a second and connecting carrier while the cattle were being transported over its road on a through bill of lading, including the duty to unload them for needed rest, water, and feeding. The bill of lading was issued under a law of Congress (Carmack Amendment, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593, 595 (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), and governed the entire transportation-that over the defendant's line as well as that over the line of the initial carrier (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Ward, 37 S. Ct. 617, 244 U. S. 383, 387, 61 L. Ed. 1213). And the carriers' duties in respect of unloading the cattle 'in a humane manner into properly equipped pens for rest, water and feeding' were prescribed by a law of Congress (chapter 3594, 34 Stat. 607 (Comp. St. § 8651)). So it is apparent that the case stated in the complaint was one arising under the laws of the United States. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 36 S. Ct. 555, 241 U. S. 319, 326, 60 L. Ed. 1022, L. R. A. 1917A, 265; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 37 S. Ct. 462, 243 U. S. 592, 595, 61 L. Ed. 917; Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 38 S. Ct. 130, 245 U. S. 359, 62 L. Ed. 345; Id., 38 S. Ct. 203, 245 U. S. 562, 62 L. Ed. 472; same case, 39 S. Ct. 138, 248 U. S. 446, 63...