Great Plains Resources v. City of Benton
| Decision Date | 19 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-83-0858,5-83-0858 |
| Citation | 469 N.E.2d 341,127 Ill.App.3d 971 |
| Parties | , 82 Ill.Dec. 807 GREAT PLAINS RESOURCES, INC., a Colorado Corporation, R.S. Lewis, Meredith M. Lewis, A.L. Favour, Frank E. Whitham, Elizabeth L. Tuck and Farrar Oil Company, a Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF BENTON, a Municipal Corporation under the laws of the State of Illinois, Gene Hill, Mayor of the City of Benton, Illinois, Margaret Kelley, City Clerk of the City of Benton, Illinois, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Gerald D. Owens, Benton, for defendants-appellants.
Raymond J. Gengler, Gengler & Gengler, Denver, Colo., Howard & Howard, Mount Vernon, for plaintiff-appellee; G.W. Howard III, Mount Vernon, of counsel.
Appeal is taken from a declaratory judgment of the circuit court of Franklin County, in which the court found a city ordinance regulating the drilling of oil wells violative of the constitutions of the United States of America and the State of Illinois. The issue presented is whether the judgment was contrary to law or the manifest weight of the evidence before the trial court.
Chapter 28 of the Revised Code of the City of Benton governs the licensing and regulation of gas and oil wells. The following sections are the subject of this action: section 28-1-9, concerning license fees and royalty payments; sections 28-1-3(A) and 28-2-3, concerning the number and spacing of wells; and section 28-1-12, concerning who may apply for a drilling permit.
Although the constitutionality of section 28-1-12 is discussed in the parties' briefs, the discussion has the effect of nullifying the issue. Section 28-1-12 requires that one who applies for a drilling permit must either own the property upon which the well will be placed, or lease the property from the owner. The trial court presumed the term "owner" to refer to the owner of the surface land, and not to the owner of the mineral rights. The court reasoned that requiring such consent of one who possessed no interest in the subject of the drilling constituted "an unconstitutional taking of property in effect forcing the driller to 'pay off' the landowner who owns no part of the minerals." The record is void of evidence suggesting that defendant intended the term "owner" to refer to the owner of surface property, and defendant asserts in its brief that the term refers to the owner of mineral rights. Plaintiffs assert in their brief that if the term "owner" refers to the one who possesses mineral rights, plaintiffs have no interest in the court adjudging section 28-1-12 unconstitutional. Thus, that portion of the court's order declaring section 28-1-12 unconstitutional is not at issue in this appeal.
Sections 28-1-3(A) and 28-2-3 contain the following provisions:
"28-1-3 PERMITTED WELLS: DRILLING BLOCKS.
(A) Not more than one (1) well for oil or gas shall be drilled to and completed in any sand, stratum, or horizon productive of oil and/or gas in the following drilling block:
(1) Drilling block numbered 1 * * *.
28-2-3 WELL LIMIT TO PARTICULAR STRATUM. Not more than one (1) well for oil or gas shall be drilled to or completed in any sand, stratum, or horizon productive of oil or gas or oil and gas in any one of the drilling blocks mentioned as defined in Section 28-2-2 of this article and comprising the area mentioned in Section 28-2-1 of this article, provided, however, that if more than one (1) well shall be drilled outside the area mentioned in Section 28-2-1 and within four hundred feet (400' ) of the boundary of any drilling block, one (1) additional well may be drilled in such drilling block to the sand, stratum, or horizon to which such well outside the area is drilled, which additional well shall be drilled at a location not more than three hundred feet (300' ) from the limit line of the area to offset the additional well or wells that shall be so drilled on the land situated outside the area."
The trial court found that "[s]ections 28-1-3(A) and 28-2-3 are unlawful mainly because there is no valid reason for such a rule and, therefore, is not a valid exercise of the City's police power [sic]." This conclusion--i.e., that the spacing requirements of the ordinance are arbitrary--could reasonably have been based on the evidence presented at trial. Plaintiff L.L. Tuck testified that the requirements constituted "a wasteful type of order in that it would require you to drill more wells than needed in order to comply with the ordinance." Defendant pursued minimal cross-examination on this subject and presented no evidence to rebut Mr. Tuck's testimony. It is not the function of the appellate court to pass upon legal questions in an abstract sense, but rather to determine whether the decree of the circuit court is contrary to law or contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Brosam v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. (1965), 61 Ill.App.2d 183, 190, 209 N.E.2d 350.) Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that the requirements of section 28-1-3(A) and 28-2-3 were arbitrarily drawn.
Section 28-1-9 contains the following provision:
The trial court found that "the deposit of $3,000.00 plus a 1/32 overriding interest bears no relation to the City's administrative costs and constitutes a confiscation of property." These provisions, the court reasoned, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. (U.S.Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1; Ill.Const.1970, art. 1, sec. 2.) We consider first the question of due process.
While the powers of a municipal corporation to regulate activities and impose taxes are distinct, each power may be exercised by imposing a license...
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