Greater Wash. Bus. Ctr. v. D.C. Com'n On H.R., 91-312.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 91-312.,91-312.
• Citation: 454 A.2d 1333
• Parties: GREATER WASHINGTON BUSINESS CENTER, Petitioner, v. D.C. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

454 A.2d 1333

GREATER WASHINGTON BUSINESS CENTER, Petitioner, v. D.C. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent.

No. 91-312.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 16, 1981.

Decided December 22, 1982.

Roma J. Stewart, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., filed appearances in behalf of respondent.^*

Barry H. Gottfried, Washington, D.C., for intervenor.

Before KERN, NEBEKER and BELSON, Associate Judges.

BELSON, Associate Judge:

This is a petition for review of a final decision and order of the District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights. The Commission held that the dismissal of intervenor Pearl D. Langhorne (hereinafter "complainant") from her employment by petitioner Greater Washington Business Center was a discriminatory act which violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C.Code 1981, §§ 1-2501 et seq.¹ Complainant was awarded compensatory damages and attorney's fees by the Commission.² Having reviewed the record and considered the contentions of the parties, we conclude that the Commission's determination that complainant's rejection of sexual advances by her immediate supervisor was a factor³ in the decision to discharge her is not supported by substantial evidence of record. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision and order.

I

On March 19, 1979, Ms. Langhorne filed a complaint with the Office of Human Rights alleging that she had been unlawfully terminated from her employment on the basis of her national origin, Guyanese. On April 20, 1979, she amended her complaint to allege that petitioner had discharged her because she had declined sexual advances by her supervisor.⁴ The case was ultimately referred to the Commission and a public hearing was held before the Commission's examiner.

Complainant testified that on April 10, 1978, she began working as a financial analyst for petitioner, a company which provides technical assistance to small businesses in connection with government loans. She stated that in June or July 1978, Mr. Collin King, her immediate supervisor, came up behind her and rubbed his genitalia against her back. Complainant pushed him away and threatened to tell his wife about the incident. She also testified that approximately six weeks later, King walked into her office and attempted to kiss her. Complainant stated that she again pushed him away and threatened to telephone his wife. According to complainant, King made unwelcomed sexual remarks to her on a regular basis through February, 1979. In his testimony, King denied having made sexual advances to complainant.

There was virtually no dispute concerning the remaining events which led to her dismissal. During December 1978, Mr. Joseph Tunstall of the Small Business Administration received information which led him to believe that Ms. Langhorne had earlier given incorrect advice to a client. Tunstall called Mr. William Jameson, the President of the Greater Washington Business Center, to apprise him of the matter. Jameson, in turn, asked Mr. Frank Washington, petitioner's Executive Vice-President to talk to Ms. Langhorne about the matter.

On December 22, 1978, Washington met with complainant and told her that one of her clients, Dr. Robert Key, had complained to Jameson about her work. Washington lectured complainant about her condescending behavior to the client. Subsequently, complainant, on her own initiative, prepared a memorandum relating to her dealings with Key and attempted to show the memorandum to King. King, however, told her it was unnecessary for her to prepare the memorandum since clients complained frequently.

On February 15, 1979, Robert Key telephoned complainant. She asked him why he had called her if he had been dissatisfied with her earlier performance and had complained about her. Key told her that he had never complained about her and suggested that he was being used as a "scapegoat" in a set-up of complainant. Immediately after the telephone conversation, complainant went to King and told him about her conversation with Key. King dismissed the matter and told her to forget about it.

Later that day, Mr. Marvin Doxie, an Assistant Vice-President of petitioner, went to King and told him that he had overheard complainant's conversation with Key and that complainant had been rude to the client.

The next day, King and Doxie held a meeting with complainant. They expressed their concern with the manner in which complainant dealt with Key on the telephone. Ms. Langhorne insisted that she had the right to ask the client why he had complained. She told King that Key told her he thought the matter was a set-up. At that point, King asked complainant to write a memorandum concerning her conversation with Key. She refused to do so.

After the meeting, King wrote a memorandum to Washington recounting his conversation with Ms. Langhorne, advising him of her version of her conversation with Key and her refusal to write the memorandum, and requesting a meeting with him.⁵ Later that day, King met with Jameson to discuss complainant's refusal to prepare the requested memorandum. At that meeting,

King did not seek any sanctions against complainant. King then left for vacation and did not return to petitioner's office until March 5, 1979. Before leaving, however, he asked Doxie to follow up on his requested memorandum from complainant.

On February 22, 1979, Doxie met with complainant and again asked her to submit a memorandum about her conversation with Key. Complainant again refused and Doxie recommended to Washington that she be suspended without pay. Complainant then requested a meeting with President Jameson. She told Jameson that Key had said that the whole matter was a set-up of complainant. Jameson, however, told complainant that King and Doxie were within their rights to request a memorandum and he agreed with any decision to suspend her if she refused. Complainant reiterated her refusal to prepare the memorandum and stated that she would rather be fired than suspended. At her meeting with Jameson, she did not mention sexual advances by King. Following her meeting with Mr. Jameson, complainant was suspended without pay. Ms. Langhorne continued to refuse to prepare the memorandum and on March 19, 1979, she was terminated from employment. At no time prior to her termination did complainant raise the matter of sexual harassment. On the day of her termination, she filed her original complaint of discrimination with the Human Rights Commission.

On February 18, 1981, the Human Rights Commission issued its final decision and order. The Commission found that Ms. Lang-horne had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination by proving that her rejection of sexual advances by King led to her eventual dismissal. Furthermore, the Commission held that she had proven that petitioner's stated reason for discharging her was a pretext. The Commission concluded that complainant was a victim of sex discrimination in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act. Ms. Langhorne was awarded $19,088.44 in damages for lost wages, $400.00 in damages for "embarassment, humiliation and indignity" and $8,492.86 for attorney's fees.

II

By enacting the Human Rights Act of 1977, the Council of the District of Columbia sought

to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to, discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap, source of income, and place of residence or business. [D.C.Code 1981, § 1-2501]

The Council "affirmatively and forcefully convey[ed] to the executive and administrative agencies of the District Government the importance which the Council places on vigorous enforcement of [the Act]." Committee Report of Bill 2-179, "The Human Rights Act of 1977," July 5, 1977. Fair and principled resolution of charges of sexual discrimination is of great moment to both complainants and persons charged, and to the general public as wells⁶ Recognition of the important public purpose to be served by the Human Rights Act is not, however, inconsistent with our obligation to exercise our statutory appellate review function.⁷

As an appellate court, our review function is to determine whether the Commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole and whether its conclusions of law flow rationally from those findings. D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a)(3)(E); Newsweek Magazine v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, D.C. App., 376 A.2d 777, 783-84 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 729, 54 L.Ed.2d 758 (1978); Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, D.C.App., 367 A.2d 149, 152 (1976). See Neer v. District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, D.C.App., 415 A.2d 523, 525-26 (1980); Jameson's Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 384 A.2d 412, 418 (1978); Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 282, 285 (1974); Stewart v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 305 A.2d 516, 518 (1973). The Commission has the primary power to make findings of fact since its examiner, having heard the evidence and seen the witnesses, is in the best position to make those fact findings. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Commission. See Liberty v. Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, D.C.App., 410 A.2d 191, 192 (1979); Spevak v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C. App., 407 A.2d 549, 554 (1979); Jameson's Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, su...