Greathouse v. Heed

• Decision Date: 01 January 1873
• Citation: 1 Idaho 494
• Parties: George L. Greathouse, Respondent, v. Albert Heed And George Rundell, Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 494

George L. Greathouse, Respondent, v. Albert Heed And George Rundell, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1873

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.-When we know the reason which alone determined the will of the lawmakers, we ought to interpret and apply the words in a manner suitable and consonant to that reason and as will be best calculated to effectuate the intent.

IDEM.-The prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real meaning of the ambiguous provision of a statute.

JURISDICTION.-Before a court, clothed with jurisdiction of a person or subject-matter, can be ousted of it by the creation of another forum, having the same power, the grant of jurisdiction to the latter must contain words of exclusion.

IDEM-PROVISO.-A proviso in a statute is to be strictly construed. Its province is not to enlarge or change the purpose of the enacting clause; and its terms may be limited by the general scope of the enacting clause to avoid repugnancy.

IDEM.-It is a maxim of interpretation that, in ambiguous things, such a construction is to be given a statute, that what is inconvenient and absurd is to be avoided.

JURISDICTION - PROBATE COURTS-DISTRICT COURTS.-The act of Congress approved December 13, 1870, giving jurisdiction to the probate courts in certain cases, does not confer exclusive jurisdiction upon those courts in such cases. It does not take away the jurisdiction of the district court therein, but the power of the district courts and the probate courts is by said act made concurrent in certain cases.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-PROVISO.-Some effect should be given to a proviso in a statute, if possible; but if, by doing so, the manifest intention of the act, as gathered from its general scope and the circumstances connected with its passage, will be defeated; or, should the meaning of the proviso be such as to leave the court in doubt respecting its aim, then there is no alternative but to reject it as of no validity.

LEGISLATIVE POWER.-When the act of Congress of December 13, 1870, had invested the probate courts with enlarged jurisdiction, it was competent for the territorial legislature to limit and define its character, and to extend it, except as to the amount involved. It was, therefore, competent for the legislature to provide that the jurisdiction of the district and probate courts, in certain cases, should be concurrent as is provided by its act of January 11, 1871.

APPEAL from the Second Judicial District, Ada County.

Action commenced in the district court upon a promissory note for the recovery of a sum within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The plaintiff had judgment.

J. Brumback, for the Appellants. Prickett & Hasbrouck, for the Respondent.

HOLLISTER, J.,

delivered the opinion,

WHITSON J., concurring specially. NOGGLE, C. J., dissented.

This case is brought here from the district court of Ada county, and the question pointed out for consideration is this: Does the act of Congress of the 13th of December, 1870, confer exclusive jurisdiction in all civil cases when the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, upon the probate court of the territory?

The act is as follows: "That probate courts of the territory of Idaho in their respective counties, in addition to their probate jurisdiction, be and they are hereby authorized to hear and determine all civil causes wherein the damages or debt claimed does not exceed the sum of five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, and such criminal cases arising under the laws of the territory as do not require the intervention of a

grand jury. Provided, that they shall not have jurisdiction in any matter in controversy, where the title, boundary, or right to the peaceable possession of land may be in dispute or in chancery or divorce cases; and, provided further, that in all cases an appeal may be taken from any order, judgment, or decree of said probate courts to the district court."

Section 2. "And be it further enacted, that all acts, and parts of acts, inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed. Provided, that this act shall not affect any suit pending in the district courts of said territory at the time of its passage."

Had the question been made to depend upon the title of the act, or the enacting clause, there would have been no difficulty in solving it; for it is clear there is nothing in either, which by any known rule of interpretation would lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to take away the jurisdiction of the district courts with which they had been clothed by the organic act, and to give it to these inferior courts exclusively. It is claimed, however, that the proviso in the act, that it shall not affect any suit pending in the district courts at the time of the passage, necessarily means that, except as to such suits, the probate courts are alone authorized to hear and determine all civil cases embraced within the act.

Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law, page 228, says: "The reason of the law, that is to say, the motive which led to the making of it, and the object in contemplation at the time, is the most certain clue to lead to the discovery of its true meaning." On page 272, he further says: "When once we certainly know the reason which alone has determined the will of the person speaking, we ought to apply the words in a manner suitable to that reason alone." Says Blackstone in the third volume of his Commentaries, page 236: "That as to the subject matter, words are always to be understood as having regard thereto; for that is supposed to be in the eye of the legislator, and all his expressions are directed to that end." And on page 237: "The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, where words are dubious, is

by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it."

When we know the reason which alone determined the will of the lawmakers, we ought to interpret and apply the words in a manner suitable and consonant to that reason, and as will be best calculated to effectuate the intent. The prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real meaning of the ambiguous provision. (Cooley on Const. Limitations, 65.) Having regard to these maxims, it becomes important to examine the previous legislation of Congress, and also of the territory, on the subject, with a view to determine the reasons which may fairly be presumed to have governed Congress in passing the act in question.

By the organic act creating the territory, provision was made for the establishment of supreme, district, probate, and justices' courts, and for giving to the district courts full chancery, criminal, and common-law powers. By this act the jurisdiction of probate courts was confined to matters relating to the probate of wills and the settlement of estates, etc.; and that of justices' courts to such cases as might be confided to them by the laws of the territory within the limits prescribed by the organic act.

On the first day of February, 1864, an act was passed by the territorial legislature, providing that the district courts should have original jurisdiction in civil cases, when the amount in dispute exceeds one hundred dollars, etc. By the same act, original jurisdiction was given to probate courts: 1. Of actions to enforce the liens of mechanics and other; 2. Concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts in all civil actions where the amount in controversy shall not exceed eight hundred dollars.

The jurisdiction of justices' courts was also prescribed by the same act, limiting it so as to meet the requirements of the organic act. This was the condition of the law as it related to the powers of the several courts, so far as it is necessary to consider it in this connection, until August, 1866, when the act attempting to confer civil jurisdiction upon probate courts was decided by the supreme court of the territory to be invalid,

because of the want of power in the territorial legislature to confer it.

By this decision, the benefits which it was the design of the legislature to secure to the people by this enlarged jurisdiction of the probate courts, were lost, and they were then thrown back upon the district courts, as the only tribunals in which actions exceeding the jurisdiction of justices' courts could be brought. This was found to be detrimental to the public interests owing to the infrequency of the terms of these courts, there being in some counties...