Greaves v. Fogel, C--1645

• Decision Date: 26 June 1950
• Docket Number: No. C--1645,C--1645
• Citation: 9 N.J.Super. 301,74 A.2d 350
• Parties: GREAVES et ux. v. fogel.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 301

9 N.J.Super. 301

74 A.2d 350

GREAVES et ux. v. fogel.

No. C--1645.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division.

June 26, 1950.

Charles S. Moore, Atlantic City, for the plaintiffs (Moore, Butler & McGee, Atlantic City, attorneys).

Bertram M. Saxe, Atlantic City, for the defendant.

HANEMAN, J.S.C.

This is a suit seeking the specific performance of an agreement to purchase real estate. On or about May 28, 1948 the plaintiffs entered into an agreement to sell a certain parcel of real estate situate in the City of Linwood, Atlantic County, New Jersey, to the defendant. On June 14, 1948, in accordance with the terms of said agreement, the parties met at the appointed time and place for final settlement or closing. At that time the defendant refused to pay the purchase price for the reason that the plaintiffs did not have legal title to said real estate under the laws of the State of New Jersey.

The parties hereto have stipulated all of the facts. The pertinent facts in connection herewith are as follows:

One James Greaves, of Prospect Park, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, died, a widower and intestate, on November 26, 1947, seized of the title to the real estate described in said written agreement of sale. Plaintiff, James N. Greaves, but known then as James Nellius Marshall, was born in the Borough of Marcus Hook, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, November 22, 1906. While plaintiff, James N. Greaves, was a young baby he was taken by the aforesaid James Greaves and his wife. From infancy the said decedent, James Greaves, and his wife cared for and raised plaintiff, James N. Greaves, as their own child. On March 25, 1919 the wife of James Greaves died. On or about December 15, 1920 decedent, said James Greaves, then a widower, petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, a court of competent jurisdiction, for permission to adopt as his own child plaintiff James N. Greaves. In response to said petition, and after a hearing on same, said Common Pleas Court of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, entered a decree on December 21, 1920, which decreed that:

1. Said minor, James Nellius Marshall, shall thereafter be the adopted son of said adoptive father, James Greaves.

2. The name of said James Nellius Marshall shall thereafter be James Nellius Greaves.

3. Said James Nellius Greaves shall thereafter have all of the rights of a child and heir of said James Greaves and be subject to the duties of such child.

Plaintiff, James N. Greaves, is the same person named and described in the foregoing as James Nellius Marshall and James Nellius Greaves, and by virtue of said decree became the adopted son of decedent, James Greaves. Decedent, James Greaves, never had any child born to him in his lifetime and never adopted any other child than plaintiff, James N. Greaves. Plaintiff, James N. Greaves, because of said adoption, is the only child and heir of decedent, James Greaves, under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, and by virtue thereof claims to be the owner of the real estate in question. Immediately following the death of decedent, James Greaves, plaintiff, James N. Greaves, took possession of the real estate described in the agreement and still holds possession of same.

The laws for adoption of children in the State of Pennsylvania in their essential requirements are similar to those of the State of New Jersey.

The State of Pennsylvania does not have separate statutes dealing with the distribution of personal property and the devolution of real estate. They have one statute dealing with intestacy. Section 16 of this Act, P.L.1917, p. 429, 20 P.S. § 101, among other things, provides as follows: 'Any minor or adult person adopted according to law, and the adopting parent or parents shall, respectively, inherit and take, by devolution from and through each other, personal estate as next of kin, and real estate as heirs, under the provisions of this act, as fully as if the person adopted had been born a lawful child of the adopting parent or parents.'

This same Pennsylvania statute dealing with intestacy law also provides that when a person dies intestate, leaving no widow but one child, all the real and personal property goes to this one child. 20 P.S. § 51.

The foregoing laws were in effect on November 26, 1947, the date of James Greaves' death intestate.

The sole question for determination therefore is whether a child adopted in a State other than New Jersey inherits real estate in New Jersey under the statute of descent upon the death of the adopting parent intestate.

Plaintiffs' counsel have filed a most scholarly, interesting and exhaustive brief to sustain their title. Admittedly, they are confronted with the decision of the Court of Chancery in Frey v. Nielson, 99 N.J.Eq. 135, 132 A. 765, 768 (Ch. 1926), in which the court decided that 'our statute of descent precludes inheritance by any except children born in wedlock, and that the modification by statute permitting adopted children to inherit applies only to children adopted under the provisions of the New Jersey statute.'

Plaintiffs' argument concerns itself with the impropriety of the decision in Frey v. Nielson, supra, as well as the harshness of the law as there enunciated. As sympathetic as this court may feel to the position of the plaintiffs, I am bound to recognize the opinion of this court above cited.

We are here confronted with the doctrine of stare decisis. It is to be noted that the opinion in Frey v. Nielson, supra, was filed March 26, 1926. From then to date, as far as research has disclosed, it has stood unreversed as the law of the State. Although Vice Chancellor Fielder appears to have expressed some doubt as to the propriety of the result in Frey v. Nielson, supra in Re Finkenzeller's Estate, 105 N.J.Eq. 44, 146 A. 656 (Prerog. 1929), the question of descent of real estate was not before him, the sole problem there involved being the distribution of personalty.

It has long been a recognized principle that a rule of law having once been deliberately adopted and declared, ought never be disturbed by the same court except for very urgent reasons and upon a clear manifestation of error.

In Bowman v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Essex County, 73 N.J.L. 543, the court said at page 547, 64 A. 1010, at page 1011 (E. & A. 1906): "When a decision upon a point of law, has been made upon solemn argument, and upon mature deliberation, the community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions by it. When a rule has once been deliberately adopted and declared, it ought never to be disturbed by the same court, except for very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error.' 1 Kent Com. 475. Most of the present members of this court have been appointed since the promulgation of the two decisions referred to, and, perhaps, if the question presented by this writ of error was one of novel impression a different conclusion might be reached. But this fact affords no ground for our refusal to accept and enforce the rule which our predecessors have established. As has already been said, nothing short of an absolute conviction of its unsoundness would justify such action on our part.'

In Colligan v. 680 Newark Ave. Realty Corp., 131 N.J.L. 520, the court said at page 532, 37 A.2d 206, at page 212 (E. & A. 1944):

'A principle so deeply rooted, long and recently supported, with ramifications that are not immediately discernible, ought not be overthrown. It involves property rights and duties set up in leases and other undertakings made in reliance thereon. I submit that the overruling of it would be contrary to sound policy. When the law on a subject has been clearly stated by the courts and long adhered to, people form their plans, make their engagements and enter upon their ventures in reliance thereon, rightfully and necessarily so. It is highly disturbing for the court suddenly to reverse its conception of the law, particularly when that reversal relates to...