Grebow v. City of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 17 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 277,277
• Citation: 217 Md. 333,142 A.2d 554
• Parties: Maurice J. GREBOW v. CITY OF BALTIMORE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 333

217 Md. 333

142 A.2d 554

Maurice J. GREBOW v. CITY OF BALTIMORE.

No. 277.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 17, 1958.

Martin Beerman, Baltimore, for appellant.

Shirley Brannock Jones, Asst. City Sol., Baltimore (Thomas N. Biddison, City Sol., and Hugo A. Ricciuti, Deputy City Sol., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

HENDERSON, Judge.

This case presents a narrow question of statutory construction. The Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City denied an application of the appellant for permission to retain two non-illuminated advertising signs painted on the side brick wall of his building at 2242 Druid Hill Avenue, which constituted a non-conforming use in a residential district. He applied to the Zoning Commissioner for such permission, after he received notice to remove the painted signs from the surface of the wall. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the Baltimore City Court. The basis of the Board's decision was that the signs fell within the terms of the Baltimore City Ordinance No. 711, sec. 13(d), which provides: 'Billboards and poster boards situated in Residential and Office Use Districts and Residential Use Districts shall be removed by April 5, 1955 * * *.'

The appellant contends that the language of the Ordinance is so clear as to leave no room for construction. The term 'billboard' is in common use, and has been judicially defined as 'an erection annexed to the land, in the nature of a fence, for the purpose of posting advertising bills and posters, * * *.' Cochrane v. McDermott Advertising Agency, 6 Ala.App. 127, 60 So. 421, 422; Randall v. Atlanta Advertising Service, 159 Ga. 217, 125 S.E. 462, 463. It has also been said that 'poster boards * * * are thin walls or screens having a sheet iron surface over a wooden framework with supports set in the ground.' General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799, 809. Neither definition would seem to be broad enough to include an advertising sign which is simply painted upon the wall of a building without any structural support that could properly be described as a 'board'. There was also uncontradicted testimony in the instant case that the terms 'billboard' and 'poster board' are known in the trade as structures erected for the sole purpose of displaying paper posters pasted thereon. Ordinarily, billboard operators do not employ sign painters. In other jurisdictions having ordinances aimed at the removal of outdoor advertising, such ordinances are usually more comprehensive, and include the words 'sign or other advertising device', 'advertising sign', or 'other advertising surface'. Cf. Murphy, Inc., v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177, 156 A.L.R. 568, and Criterion Service v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio App., 88 N.E.2d 300, appeal dismissed 152 Ohio St. 416, 89 N.E.2d 475. And see notes 72 A.L.R. 453 and 156 A.L.R. 581. In the recent case of Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363, we sustained the constitutionality of the Ordinance now before us, but the question of the extent of its application was not presented or considered. However, we pointed out (212 Md. at page 305, 129 A.2d at...