Greco v. State
Decision Date | 26 June 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 86,86 |
Parties | VINCENT T. GRECO , JR. v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF- RE-LITIGATION OF ALLEGATION OF ERROR - NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD- Under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, codified in part at § 7-106(c) of the Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Article, a convicted person may obtain the benefit of re-litigating an already-decided allegation of error under a subsequent, more favorable legal standard if a number of conditions are met. Among those conditions are that the standard be "not previously recognized" by law and that the standard "affect the validity of the . . . conviction." The legal standard set forth in Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622 (1988), and Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988), is not new because it does not reflect a square overturning of a prior standard. Moreover, the Hoey and Simmons standard does not affect Petitioner's conviction because Petitioner would not be entitled to move any more evidence into the record based on the Hoey and Simmons standard than he did under the alleged prior rule.
ILLEGAL SENTENCE - A fifty-year term-of-years sentence is an illegal sentence for a conviction of first degree premeditated murder. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, but may result in an increased sentence. Because no term of years sentence is authorized by law for a conviction of first degree premeditated murder, the lawful minimum sentence Petitioner may receive on remand is life imprisonment. The trial court, though, maintains discretion to suspend any portion thereof. Because the trial court previously sentenced Petitioner to fifty years of executed incarceration, that is the maximum length of executed sentence the trial court may impose. In addition, the trial court must also impose a period of probation to retain the characteristics of a split sentence. Petitioner's sentence of fifty years of incarceration for first degree rape, however, did not exceed the maximum sentence of life because it did not in any way hamper Petitioner's opportunity for parole.
Case No. 03-K-81-074022
Opinion by Barbera, J.
This matter stems from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granting Petitioner, Vincent T. Greco, Jr., postconviction relief by vacating his 1982 conviction for first degree premeditated murder and, as we shall see, leaving in place Petitioner's related convictions for felony murder and first degree rape. The Court of Special Appeals reversed that order and reinstated Petitioner's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. State v. Greco, 199 Md. App. 646, 24 A.3d 135 (2011). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari raising several issues and the State filed a conditional cross-petition. We granted both the petition and conditional cross-petition. Greco v. State, 423 Md. 450, 31 A.3d 919 (2011). The questions before us, consolidated and rephrased,1 are: (1) Whether the Court of Special Appeals properly exercised jurisdiction when it decided the State's appeal; (2) whetherPetitioner is entitled to postconviction relief because this Court's decisions in Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 536 A.2d 622 (1988), and Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988), established a new, constitutionally-based rule that was intended to apply retroactively; and (3) whether the sentences are illegal.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief, and the term-of-years sentence he received for first degree premeditated murder, but not the sentence for first degree rape, was illegal and must be corrected on remand.
In 1982, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of first degree premeditated murder, first degree rape, and first degree felony murder. We adopt the summary of the facts of the crimes, which the Court of Special Appeals set forth in its opinion in the matter now before us. Greco, 199 Md. App. at 650-52, 23 A.3d at 137-38.
Petitioner's defense to the charges was that he acted in self-defense and, because he suffered from a blood phobia, misperceived the threat Ms. Larsen posed and overreacted inresponse. Petitioner called an expert witness, Dr. Leonard Rothstein, in support of his theory of imperfect self-defense.2 Petitioner sought to examine Dr. Rothstein regarding Petitioner's phobia as well as the psychiatric effects of both Petitioner's specific phobia and alcohol consumption. Petitioner asserted that such evidence was "admissible to assist the jury in understanding what the effects of alcohol and what the effects of the phobia might have had on Mr. Greco's perception[,] which lends to credibility." Petitioner also sought to demonstrate "how the phobia and other factors affected his mental state at the time and caused him to act and how it is believable and credible that he perceived that he was acting in the manner he says he was."
The trial court ruled that, "[w]ith respect to the proposed expert testimony concerning the mental state of the defendant, that testimony will not be admitted to support the fact that the defendant honestly but unreasonably believed that he was in danger of injury or that the killing was the only way to prevent it." The court explained that its ruling was based on the court's understanding that Petitioner's defense theory was the equivalent of the impermissible defense of diminished capacity. The court added, though, that its "ruling [would] not preclude evidence of intoxication and its effects to negate specific intent." After further discussion about the permitted scope of Dr. Rothstein's testimony, the court clarified its ruling:
[E]xpert testimony from Doctor Rothstein that one: the phobia was combined with alcohol and drug consumption altered the defendant's judgment and impaired the accuracy of his perception causing him to improperly assess the seriousness of the victim's alleged attack and to overreact to the alleged bodily injury, that is specifically excluded. And two, that the defendant did not as a fact premeditate or deliberate, but believed himself to be acting in self-defense, that is still part of what I call the diminished capacity imperfect self-defense defense....
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