Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat

Decision Date24 August 1999
Citation736 A.2d 851,250 Conn. 488
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesGREEN ROCK RIDGE, INC., ET AL. v. JAMES KOBERNAT ET AL. GREEN ROCK RIDGE, INC., ET AL. v. JAMES KOBERNAT ET AL.

Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Katz, McDonald and Peters, JS. F. Woodward Lewis, Jr., pro se, the plaintiff in error. Vincent T. McManus, Jr., for the defendants in error.

Opinion

BORDEN, J.

These two cases involve two writs of error1 brought by F. Woodward Lewis, Jr., the plaintiff in error (Lewis), against the defendants in error, James Kobernat and Vicki Kobernat (Kobernats), and Vincent T. McManus (McManus). The issues raised by these two writs are whether: (1) the trial court, Levin, J., improperly imposed monetary sanctions against Lewis for failing to comply with a discovery order of that court; and (2) the trial court, Levine, J., improperly disqualified Lewis from representing Green Rock Ridge, Inc. (Green Rock),2 in its case against the Kobernats, and their attorney, McManus. We dismiss both writs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without reaching the merits of either.

Underlying these two writs of error are two pending Superior Court cases that Green Rock currently is litigating as the plaintiff. The first trial court case involves a counterclaim brought by the Kobernats against Green Rock (Green Rock I).3 That case underlies the first writ of error before this court. The second case is an action by Green Rock, in which it, as landlord, seeks: (1) damages from the Kobernats for nonpayment of rent, failure to repair, and preventing Green Rock from making repairs; and (2) damages from the Kobernats and McManus for fraud and abuse of process (Green Rock II).4 The second writ of error was taken from an order of the trial court, Levine, J., disqualifying Lewis from representing Green Rock in the latter case.

I
A Green Rock I

The facts that we have gleaned from the appeal papers and the trial courts' files are as follows. Green Rock is a New Hampshire corporation. Lewis is an attorney and the president of Green Rock. His wife, Linda Lewis, is also an officer of Green Rock.

Green Rock owned a single-family dwelling in Wallingford, which it leased to the Kobernats for the period from June 1, 1995, through May 31, 1996. At the time that Green Rock and the Kobernats entered into the lease, the house was occupied by another tenant.

The Kobernats moved into the house before June 1, 1995, although they did not have a key. Upon the Kobernats' moving, it was discovered that the house had been damaged. James Kobernat then contacted Green Rock regarding the damage to the house. Thereafter, a representative of Green Rock and the Kobernats inspected the house. Green Rock then asked the Kobernats to move out, which they declined to do.

Green Rock then brought a summary process action against the Kobernats based on nonpayment of rent.5 While the summary process action was pending, Green Rock also filed an action for money damages against them. In that action, Green Rock claimed: that it had suffered damages because it had been denied access to the house and, therefore, was unable to make repairs; that the Kobernats had not provided for insurance as required by the lease; and that they had not paid rent.

In their answer in that action, the Kobernats set forth a special defense and a counterclaim. In their counterclaim, the Kobernats alleged violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes §§ 42-110a and 42-110b.6 In support of their special defense and counterclaim, the Kobernats alleged that the house did not comply with the Wallingford housing code,7 and that the damage to the house made it uninhabitable.8 The Kobernats alleged, therefore, that no rent was due to Green Rock.

Sometime between June and the end of September, 1995, Green Rock made some, but not all, of the needed repairs to the house. Green Rock did not, however, obtain a certificate of compliance9 from the town of Wallingford for the house until December 12, 1995. Green Rock then withdrew its complaint, but the counterclaim survived.

Lewis was Green Rock's trial attorney in this action from September 19, 1995, through September 11, 1997. On September 11, 1997, the trial court disqualified Lewis from representing Green Rock in that case pursuant to rule 3.7 (a)10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, on the ground that Lewis would be a material witness at the trial. Thereafter, attorney Bruce A. Chaplin represented Green Rock.

On March 9, 1998, the Kobernats served Lewis with a subpoena to appear for a deposition on the next day. In response, Green Rock filed a motion to quash, and a motion for a protective order, citing, among other reasons, the attorney-client privilege. The trial court ordered Lewis to appear for a deposition in McManus' office, and also ruled that it would not "rule on matters of privilege in advance," but that it would "do that on a question by question basis." Lewis then appeared in McManus' office for a deposition, during which he refused to answer nearly every question that he was asked by McManus, claiming the attorney-client privilege.11 The Kobernats then filed a motion for sanctions against Green Rock and Lewis. Subsequently, Chaplin moved to withdraw as Green Rock's counsel, stating, among other reasons, that the "difficulties between the two attorneys [had become] insurmountable." Chaplin's motion was granted. The trial court granted the motion for sanctions, ordered Lewis, "individually or as an officer of" Green Rock, to pay McManus the sum of $750.90,12 and to appear in McManus' office for another deposition on June 16, 1998 at 10 a.m. Lewis paid the $750.90 to McManus, but did not appear for another deposition on June 16, 1998, as ordered.

On June 12, 1998, Lewis filed the first writ of error in this court, in which he seeks to have us review and set aside the trial court's order compelling him to appear for a deposition, and to order McManus to return the $750.90 to him. Thereafter, the defendants in error moved to dismiss this first writ of error. We denied that motion without prejudice subject to being reviewed and reconsidered when the writ was argued before us. In addition, we ordered the parties to address several questions, among them the following: "Is the order requiring the witness F. Woodward Lewis to attend a second deposition an interlocutory order that cannot be reviewed at this time?"

Subsequently, Lewis filed a motion for supervision of procedure in this court, in which he sought to have this court stay all the trial court actions pending the outcome of his first writ of error, and to disqualify McManus from continuing to represent the Kobernats, both in the trial court and in this court. In addition, Lewis sought to have this court impose sanctions on McManus for repeatedly attempting to depose him while his writ of error was pending in this court. We denied these motions and, sua sponte, dismissed "that portion of the writ of error that seeks review of the order requiring F. Woodward Lewis to testify at an upcoming deposition and to bring with him all documents previously ordered by the court or otherwise subpoenaed." Accordingly, we also modified our previous order by eliminating the question noted previously. We were informed at the oral arguments on the merits of these writs that Lewis has since been deposed to the satisfaction of the defendants in error.

B Green Rock II

In April, 1998, Green Rock brought another civil action against the Kobernats and McManus. Initially, Lewis represented Green Rock in that action. The Kobernats moved to disqualify Lewis from representing Green Rock as its attorney in that action. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify Lewis. Lewis then filed the second writ of error in this court seeking reversal of the trial court's order disqualifying him as Green Rock's attorney.

II

In his first writ of error, Lewis claims that the trial court improperly: (1) ordered him to attend another deposition; and (2) imposed monetary sanctions on him. We dismiss this writ of error for lack of jurisdiction.

First, we conclude that any claim regarding the propriety of the order of the trial court directing Lewis to appear for another deposition is moot. "[Mjootness implicates the jurisdiction of the court." Goodson v. State, 228 Conn. 106, 114, 635 A.2d 285 (1993). "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.... In the absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate... the courts of this state may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law ... and where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 436, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981). "When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 378, 660 A.2d 323 (1995).

The controversy in the present case arises out of a discovery order, which, according to Lewis, would have led him to violate the attorney-client privilege by compelling him to disclose, to Green Rock's adversaries, information that he had obtained through his professional relationship with Green Rock. We dismissed this aspect of the writ prior to the oral arguments. Consequently, Lewis has been deposed to the satisfaction of the defendants in error. To the extent, therefore, that the writ of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Orange
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 10, 2001
    ...moot.... Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 378, 660 A.2d 323 (1995)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488, 497, 736 A.2d 851 (1999). First, the controversy in the present case arises out of the intended implementation of the project plan. The i......
  • Woodbury Knoll, LLC v. Shipman & Goodwin, LLP
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 31, 2012
    ...the objections ... to the appeal process based upon ... the absence of finality in the judgment’).” Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488, 498, 736 A.2d 851(1999). “ ‘An order issued upon a motion for discovery ... ordinarily ... does not constitute a final judgment, at least in......
  • State v. Peeler
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 12, 2004
    ...academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488, 497, 736 A.2d 851 (1999). In the present case, prior to the commencement of trial, Lee waived her attorney-client privilege regarding t......
  • OFFICE OF GOV. v. SELECT COMMITTEE OF INQ.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 18, 2004
    ...of a subpoena or discovery order ordinarily must have been found in contempt of the subpoena.18 See Green Rock Ridge, Inc. v. Kobernat, 250 Conn. 488, 498, 736 A.2d 851 (1999) (recognizing principle that finding of contempt is jurisdictional pre-requisite for appellate review of both discov......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT