Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Christodoulakis, 14–CV–2037 (SJF)(AYS).

• Decision Date: 29 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–CV–2037 (SJF)(AYS).,14–CV–2037 (SJF)(AYS).
• Parties: GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC, Plaintiff, v. Nicholas CHRISTODOULAKIS, Alexandra Christodoulakis, and Olga Christodoulakis, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

136 F.Supp.3d 415

GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC, Plaintiff,

v.Nicholas CHRISTODOULAKIS, Alexandra Christodoulakis, and Olga Christodoulakis, Defendants.

No. 14–CV–2037 (SJF)(AYS).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Sept. 29, 2015.

Michael J. Siris, Solomon & Siris, Garden City, NY, for Plaintiff.

James Misiano, Melville, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge.

I. Introduction

On March 31, 2014, plaintiff Green Tree Servicing LLC ("plaintiff") commenced this action against defendants Nicholas Christodoulakis ("Nicholas"), Alexandra Christodoulakis ("Alexandra") and Olga Christodoulakis ("Olga") (collectively, "defendants"), pursuant to this Court's diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), asserting claims seeking (1) to recover on a certain promissory note, and (2) damages for fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of warranty of title. Pending before the Court are: (1) defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's third and fourth (unjust enrichment) causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim for relief or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's third and fourth (unjust enrichment) causes of action pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ; (2) plaintiff's cross motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment on its first, third and fourth causes of action (claims to recover on a certain promissory note and seeking damages for unjust enrichment, respectively); and (3) defendants' applications, inter alia, to vacate the dismissal of their first through fifth affirmative defenses. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part and defendants' applications to vacate the dismissal of their affirmative defenses are denied.

II. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware, with its principal place of business in Rapid City, South Dakota. (Amended Complaint ["Am. Compl."], ¶ 1).

Nicholas and Alexandra are spouses; Olga is their daughter; and, at all relevant times, they resided together at 19 Highfield Drive, Dix Hills, New York 11746. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 3–5; Affidavit of Alexandra Christodoulakis dated November 7, 2014 ["Alexandra Aff."], ¶ 1).

By deed dated June 15, 1981 ("the 1981 Deed"), Nicholas and Alexandra acquired title to the premises located at 2022 Mill Avenue, Brooklyn, New York ("the subject premises"). (Affirmation of Michael J. Siris, Esq. ["Siris Aff."], Ex. A). The 1981 Deed was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York on July 8, 1981 in Reel 1249, Page 893. (Id.; see the Automated City Register Information System ("ACRIS") of the New York City Department of Finance at https://a836–acris.nyc.gov/DS/DocumentSearch/BBLResult?page=2).

On or about October 22, 2003, Nicholas and Alexandra borrowed three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) from New Century Mortgage Corporation, secured by a mortgage on the subject premises ("the 2003 Mortgage"), which was recorded on January 26, 2004 under City Register File Number ("CRFN") 2004000048383. (Siris Aff., Ex. B).

By quitclaim deed dated April 10, 2008 ("the Christodoulakis Deed"), Nicholas and Alexandra conveyed the subject premises to themselves and Olga, as tenants in common, for no consideration. (Siris Aff., Ex. C). According to Alexandra, that conveyance was required by BU; the mortgage broker, First Fidelity; the title company, Stewart Title Insurance Company ("STIC"); and/or the attorneys of those entities in order for her and Nicholas to refinance their existing mortgage. (Alexandra Aff., ¶ 22). The Christodoulakis Deed was recorded on May 9, 2008 under CRFN 2008000189297. (Id. )

Approximately one (1) month later, by deed dated May 22, 2008 ("the Olga Deed"), defendants conveyed the subject premises to Olga. (Am. Compl., ¶ 10; see Alexandra Aff., ¶¶ 22–23). According to Alexandra, that conveyance was also required by BU, First Fidelity, STIC and/or their attorneys in order for her and Nicholas to refinance their existing mortgage, so defendants "executed the deed effectuating that transfer, and delivered it to [STIC] at the Closing table, [ ] asking no questions but simply complying with the requirements of the bank, as conveyed to [them] by [First Fidelity] [.]" (Alexandra Aff., ¶ 22) (emphasis omitted). Alexandra asserts that "by the time [defendants] reached the closing, [they] were told that what [they] had thought to be a simple refinance mortgage * * * had now been converted into the charade of a sale of the property from [Nicholas] and [Alexandra] to [Olga] * * *." (Id. ) (emphasis omitted).

On that same date, Olga borrowed three hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($385,000.00) from BU ("the BU Loan"), (id., ¶ 11; Answer ["Ans."], ¶¶ 3–4; Siris Aff., Ex. E), secured by a mortgage on the subject premises ("the 2008 Mortgage") executed by Olga, designating the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), "acting solely as a nominee for [BU] and [BU's] successors and assigns" as the "mortgagee of record," (Siris Aff., Ex. D at 1), and accompanying note payable to BU ("the Note"). (Id.; see Attachment to Letter from Michael J. Siris to Court dated January 26, 2015 ["1/26/2015 Ltr."] ). Section eighteen (18) of the 2008 Mortgage provides, in relevant part, that BU

"may require Immediate Payment in Full of all Sums Secured by this Security Instrument if all or any part of the [subject premises], or if any right in the [subject premises], is sold or transferred without [BU's] prior written permission. * * * If [BU] requires Immediate Payment in Full under this Section 18, [it] will give me a notice which states this requirement. The notice will give me at least 30 days to make the required payment. The 30–day period will begin on the date the notice is given to me in the manner required by Section 15 of this Security Instrument [in writing, by first class mail or actual delivery to Olga's "notice address"]. If I do not make the required payment during that period, [BU] may act to enforce its rights under this Security Instrument without giving me any further notice or demand for payment."

(Siris Aff., Ex. B at 11, sec. 18). The Note contains a virtually identical provision. (1/26/2015 Ltr. Attachment).

Moreover, the 2008 Mortgage expressly provides, in relevant part, that Olga

"[1] promise[d] that: (A) [she] lawfully own[ed] the [subject premises]; (B) [she] ha[d] the right to mortgage, grant and convey the [subject premises] to [BU]; and (C) there [were] no outstanding claims or charges against the [subject premises], except for those which [were] of public record[;]

[2] * * * g[a]ve a general warranty of title to [BU][,] * * * mean[ing] that [she] [would] be fully responsible for any losses which [BU] suffer[ed] because someone other than [her]self ha[d] some of the rights in the [subject premises] which [she] promise[d] that [she] ha[d][;][and][3] promise[d] that [she] [would] defend [her] ownership of the [subject premises] against any claims of such rights."

(Siris Aff., Ex. D at 4). According to plaintiff, BU relied upon the Olga Deed, and the representations and covenants therein that the subject premises were conveyed to, and owned solely by, Olga, in entering into the BU Loan agreement. (Am. Compl., ¶ 11).

From the proceeds of the BU Loan, BU paid the sum of two hundred ninety-five thousand two hundred ninety-eight dollars and thirty-eight cents ($295,298.38) to Countrywide Home Loans, which was then holding and/or servicing the 2003 Mortgage, in satisfaction of the 2003 Mortgage. (Siris Aff., Ex. E). A "Satisfaction of [the 2003] Mortgage," dated June 17, 2008, was recorded on July 2, 2008, under CRFN 2008000263495.(Id. ). According to Alexandra, BU received full consideration for the BU Loan, insofar as it received the 2008 Mortgage and Note securing the full amount of the BU Loan from Olga at that time. (Alexandra Aff., ¶¶ 27–28).

The 2008 Mortgage was not recorded until May 28, 2013, under CRFN 2013000210810, (id., Ex. D), and the Olga Deed was never recorded. (Am. Compl., ¶ 14). According to Alexandra, defendants did not know until 2013, when Olga sought to sell the subject premises, that the Olga Deed and 2008 Mortgage had never been recorded. (Alexandra Aff., ¶ 25).

On or about April 1, 2009, the Note "was physical [sic] delivered, surrendered, and conveyed to Plaintiff, along with all right, title and interest in and thereto, upon service transfer to [plaintiff] * * *." (Affidavit of Jamie Larson in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated August 11, 2014, ["Larson Aff."], ¶ 3 and Ex. I).

On or about March 8, 2013, defendants conveyed the subject premises to Michael D. and Donna Carter (collectively, "the Carters") for the sum of three hundred fifty-four thousand dollars ($354,000.00) ("the Carter conveyance"). (Am. Compl., ¶ 16; Ans., ¶¶ 5–6; Siris Aff., Ex. F). According to Alexandra, her and Nicholas's "involvement in [the Carter conveyance] was solely to provide signatures to remedy an error by the title company 5 years earlier, and [they] were not actual sellers, nor * * * entitled to the proceeds of the sale." (Alexandra Aff., ¶ 26). Alexandra contends that any proceeds she and Nicholas received from the Carter conveyance "were at the behest and choice of [their] daughter Olga." (Id.; see also id., ¶ 29). However, it is undisputed that a check in the amount of two hundred sixty thousand one hundred eighty-two dollars and forty-one cents ($260,182.41), payable to Nicholas and Olga, was issued from the proceeds of the Carter conveyance. (Plaintiff's "Statement of Material Fact [sic] Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1" ["Plf. 56.1 Stat."], ¶ 7; "Defendants' Statement [sic] under Local Rule 56.1(b)" ["Def....