Green v. Ameritech Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-2176,98-2176
• Citation: 200 F.3d 967
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2000) Daniel V. Green, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ameritech Corporation and Ameritech Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 967

200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000)

Daniel V. Green, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ameritech Corporation and Ameritech Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 98-2176

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Argued: October 26, 1999

Decided and Filed: January 6, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint, No. 93-40535--Paul V. Gadola, District Judge.

Rudy J. Huizenga, HUIZENGA & HERGT, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.

Thomas G. Kienbaum, Noel D. Massie, KIENBAUM, OPPERWALL, HARDY & PELTON, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellants.

Before: JONES, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal defendants-appellants Ameritech Services, Inc. and Ameritech Corp. (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Ameritech") challenge an order of the district court vacating an arbitral award and remanding the case to a new arbitrator to be selected by the parties. The underlying arbitration involved plaintiff-appellee Daniel Green's state law claims of age and race discrimination and retaliation. The district court found that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers by failing sufficiently to explain his decision with respect to each of the plaintiff's theories, as the arbitration agreement required, and it therefore vacated the award. Finding no ambiguity in the award, the district court refused to remand the matter to the original arbitrator for clarification, and instead remanded to a new arbitrator.

We conclude that although the arbitrator's opinion was minimal, it was nevertheless adequate to satisfy the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for reinstatement of the arbitral award. Furthermore, we note that if the arbitrator's explanation had been inadequate, the proper remedy would have been a remand to the same arbitrator for clarification.

I. BACKGROUND

This case originated as a suit brought in state court by Daniel V. Green, Rhoda A. Giebel, Ruth A. Boyd, and Linda L. Vincenti against their former employer, Ameritech Services, Inc., and its parent corporation, Ameritech Corp., alleging discrimination under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2101 et seq. (West 1985 & Supp. 1999). Ameritech removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan based on diversity of citizenship.

Before trial, the parties entered into an arbitration agreement. The following provisions of the arbitration agreement are particularly relevant to this appeal:

1.DISMISSAL OF CASE:

A stipulation dismissing Case No. 93-CV-73764-DT with prejudice shall be filed after (1) this Agreement has been executed and (2) Plaintiffs have filed briefs in opposition to all of Defendants' motions now pending before the Court.

2.SELECTION OF ARBITRATOR:

The parties agree that George Googasian of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, shall be retained as the arbitrator.

. . . .

10. TIME FOR AWARD: The arbitrator shall issue an award within twenty-one (21) days from the date set for filing of post arbitration briefs (if such briefs are filed) or within twenty-one (21) days from the last date of testimony. The arbitrator's award shall be accompanied by an opinion which explains the arbitrator's decision with respect to each theory advanced by each Plaintiff and the arbitrator's calculation of the types of damages, if any, awarded to each Plaintiff.

11. AWARD FINAL AND BINDING: The award of the arbitrator shall be considered final and binding and judgment upon the award may be entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. Any challenge to the award shall be made only for the reasons enumerated in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act [(hereinafter "FAA")], 9 U.S.C. §10, and must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the award. If a party challenges the award and its challenge is rejected by federal courts, that party shall pay costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred by the opposing party in defending the challenge. Nothing in this section implies that the arbitrator's factual findings or rulings on admission of evidence shall be grounds for challenging the award.

. . . .

14. APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: This Agreement is made pursuant to and is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.

Joint Appendix (hereinafter "J.A.") at 25-29 (Arbitration Agreement). On July 25, 1996, in accordance with the arbitration agreement, the district court dismissed the action with prejudice, and the case proceeded to arbitration. When the arbitration began, all four plaintiffs were parties to the proceeding; within a few days, however, all plaintiffs except Green settled.

The parties filed their post-arbitration briefs on May 5, 1997. On May 20, 1997, Arbitrator Googasian wrote a letter to Green's counsel stating that he had reviewed the case and "would request the opportunity to discuss the matter with each counsel privately before we move forward." J.A. at 86 (Letter from Googasian to Huizenga). In his district court action seeking to vacate the arbitrator's decision, Green explained that in July of 1997, Arbitrator Googasian "indicated to the Plaintiff he wanted to settle the case, he had not yet made a decision in the case but was having a hard time finding discrimination." J.A. at 58 (Appeal of Arbitrator's Ruling). In a letter dated January 14, 1998, Green's counsel wrote to Arbitrator Googasian, stating that the defendants had indicated that they were not interested in settling and inquiring when a decision would issue. J.A. at 94 (Letter from Huizenga to Googasian). The arbitrator did not respond to this letter, nor did he respond to subsequent letters by both parties. On May 1, 1998, Green filed a "Motion to Remove Arbitrator and Reinstate Case to Federal Court." In the motion, Green alleged that Arbitrator Googasian's failure to issue a timely opinion was a breach of the arbitration agreement, and he requested that the district court remove Arbitrator Googasian and appoint a new arbitrator, or in the alternative reinstate the case and allow it to proceed to trial.

Before the district court ruled on Green's motion, Arbitrator Googasian rendered his opinion in favor of Ameritech. The opinion itself is six pages long. It sets forth the plaintiff's claims of age and race discrimination and retaliation, and it focuses primarily on a description of the "Corporate Resizing Process," or "CRESP" process, which allegedly operated in a discriminatory manner. The opinion concludes as follows:

AGE DISCRIMINATION Considering all the evidence, the Arbitrator finds that Plaintiff Daniel Green has not met his burden of proof that the decision to terminate his employment in November of 1992, constituted age discrimination in violation [of the] Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

RACE DISCRIMINATION Considering all the evidence, the Arbitrator finds that Plaintiff Daniel Green has not met his burden of proof that the decision to terminate his employment in November of 1992, constituted race discrimination in violation [of the] Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

RETALIATION Considering all the evidence, the Arbitrator finds that Plaintiff Daniel Green has not met his burden of proving, in accordance with the standards set under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, that retaliation for protected activity was a factor which made a difference in the decision to terminate his employment in November of 1992. The Arbitrator finds no evidence to support the Plaintiff's position that retaliation was, in any way, a factor in Plaintiff Daniel Green's termination.

J.A. at 44-45 (Arbitrator's Op.).

On June 9, 1998, Green filed an "Appeal of Arbitrator's Ruling" in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan¹ under the same case number as the original action. Green asked the district court to vacate Arbitrator Googasian's ruling pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) and (4)² on the grounds that: (1) Arbitrator Googasian's decision was in breach of the agreement because it was not issued within twenty-one days of the filing of post-arbitration briefs; (2) Arbitrator Googasian exceeded his powers by issuing a decision after being notified that he was in breach; and (3) Arbitrator Googasian breached the agreement by not explaining the decision with respect to each theory advanced by the plaintiff.

On August 6, 1998, the district court issued an opinion vacating Arbitrator Googasian's award. With regard to Green's first claim, the district court found that Green had waived his right to object to the timeliness of Arbitrator Googasian's opinion because he went along with Arbitrator Googasian's settlement plans, and found in the alternative that Green was not prejudiced by the delay. As to Green's claim that Arbitrator Googasian improperly issued a decision in favor of Ameritech after Green's motion for removal, the district court found that the arbitrator was not biased against Green. The court went on to state: "In fact, it seems to this court that if the arbitrator was biased at all, he was biased in favor of the plaintiff. The arbitrator took the unusual step of attempting to obtain a settlement for the plaintiff after the arbitration proceedings." J.A. at 128 n.2 (Dist. Ct. Op.). The district court did find merit, however, in Green's third claim that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by failing to explain his decision.³ The court reasoned: "Here, the arbitrator did not 'explain' his decision with respect to each one of plaintiff's theories, as the term 'explain' is commonly understood. Rather, the arbitrator merely announced his decision with respect to each one of plaintiff's theories. The arbitrator's opinion is totally conclusory and insufficient according to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement." J.A. at 129 (Dist. Ct. Op.). The district...