Green v. Baca

• Decision Date: 20 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. CV 02-04744 MMM (MANx).,CV 02-04744 MMM (MANx).
• Citation: 306 F.Supp.2d 903
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: W.E. GREEN, Plaintiff, v. Leroy BACA, Michael Antonovich, Yvonne Burke, Deane Dana, Don Knabe, Gloria Molina, Zev Yaroslovsky, and Ten Unknown Named Defendants, Defendants.

306 F.Supp.2d 903

W.E. GREEN, Plaintiff, v. Leroy BACA, Michael Antonovich, Yvonne Burke, Deane Dana, Don Knabe, Gloria Molina, Zev Yaroslovsky, and Ten Unknown Named Defendants, Defendants.

No. CV 02-04744 MMM (MANx).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

February 20, 2004.

Marion R. Yagman, Stephen Yagman, Kathryn S. Bloomfield, Joseph Reichmann, Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann & Bloomfield, Venice Beach, CA, for plaintiff.

Jeremy Warren, David D. Lawrence, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, Glendale, CA, for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MORROW, District Judge.

This action concerns plaintiff's alleged overdetention at the Los Angeles County Jail for a period of seven and a half days in July 2001. Defendant Leroy Baca is the Los Angeles County Sheriff, and has exclusive responsibility for running the County Jail.¹ Plaintiff Billie Earl Green was arrested by his parole officer, Sebastian Minjarez, on June 4, 2001, for violating his parole. He was released from jail in the early morning hours of July 14, 2001. Plaintiff alleges that defendant knew he was entitled to release on July 6, 2001, but, pursuant to Sheriff's Department policy, did not release him until July 14, 2001. Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his federal constitutional rights, and seeks to hold Baca liable pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for partial summary judgment on certain issues.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

On June 4, 2001, plaintiff was arrested by his parole agent, Sebastian Minjarez, for failing to register as a sex offender.³ He was booked into the custody of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ("LASD"), and housed in the Los Angeles County Jail.⁴ Sometime in the morning or early afternoon of July 6, 2001,⁵ a hearing was held inside the jail before the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT"), regarding possible revocation of plaintiff's parole.⁶ A BPT hearing officer declined to revoke plaintiff's parole, finding that there was insufficient evidence that he had violated his parole.⁷ A report of the revocation hearing, signed by the hearing officer, indicates that plaintiff's parole hold was to be released "no later than 7-6-2001."⁸ It is the responsibility of the Department of Corrections to notify the LASD that a parolee is to be released.⁹

On July 6, 2001, the Department of Corrections sent a teletype to LACJ-HPI/III, Attn. Jailer, authorizing plaintiff's release.¹⁰ Plaintiff's parole officer, Minjarez, testified that, where the BPT directs that a parole hold be released, it is his usual practice to fax a message to the Department of Corrections following the hearing advising of this fact.¹¹ He stated that the Department of Corrections then informs the agency holding the parolee of the release order by sending a teletype.¹² Rebecca Hernandez, Minjarez's supervisor at the time of plaintiff's overdetention, explained this process somewhat further. She testified that after a parole hold is released, the parole agent faxes a release form to "Teletype," which "send[s] the release" to the supervisor. If it is in order, the supervisor signs the release, and the parole agent then faxes it to headquarters.¹³ Thereafter, Hernandez stated, a teletype authorizing the release of the parole hold is sent to the county jail on the CLETS system.¹⁴ A parolee is supposed to report to the parole office within twenty-four hours after release from jail.¹⁵ If the parolee does not report, the parole agent contacts the jail to ensure that the parolee has been released; if he has not, the agent completes another release form and sends it to the jail.¹⁶

As noted, plaintiff was ordered released on July 6, 2001. The following day, he was still in jail, and advised the watch sergeant that he had been ordered released.¹⁷ The watch sergeant said he would check on whether plaintiff's parole hold had been released, and told plaintiff that "it takes a while to catch up with the system."¹⁸ Plaintiff also called his parole officer on July 7, 2001, and was told he had been released.¹⁹ Every day thereafter until his release, plaintiff called his parole officer.²⁰ Each time, plaintiff told the parole officer he was still in jail, and the parole officer responded that the parole office had "released" him.²¹ Plaintiff asserts that he also completed a grievance form addressed to "classification" inquiring why he had not been released.²² No copy of the form is in the record, however.²³ Plaintiff further contends he told two LASD deputies that the parole office had released his hold.²⁴

On July 13, 2003, at 12:44 p.m., Rebecca Marbra, a supervising clerk at the Inmate Reception Center ("IRC") of the Los Angeles County Jail, received a facsimile that incorporated a teletype message releasing the hold on plaintiff's parole.²⁵ That same day, Marbra contacted plaintiff's parole agent, Sebastian Minjarez, to confirm that plaintiff's release was authorized.²⁶ Minjarez confirmed that plaintiff should be released,²⁷ and Marbra made a handwritten notation on the facsimile to this effect.²⁸ Plaintiff was released approximately twelve and one half hours after IRC received the facsimile authorizing his release on July 13, 2001.²⁹

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard Governing Motions For Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.PROC. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); FED.R.CIV.PROC. 56(e).

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Electrical Service, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. FED.R.CIV.PROC. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1985); Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979).

B. Plaintiff's Claim Under Monell v. Department of Social Services

By suing defendant in his official capacity, plaintiff has asserted claims against Los Angeles County and/or the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ("LASD").³⁰ See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ("As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity"); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985) ("a judgment against a public servant `in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents"); Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ("official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent"); Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir.2003) ("a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but a suit against the official's office," quoting Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)).

The liability of a public entity under Monell cannot be premised on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 693, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Rather, local governments can be held liable for the actions of their employees only if those employees commit unlawful acts pursuant to a "policy or custom" of the entity. See id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018.³¹

To hold a public entity liable under § 1983, plaintiff must first establish that he has been deprived of a constitutional or statutory right. See Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam) ("If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point"); Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir.1997) ("`the municipal defendants cannot be held liable because no constitutional violation occurred'"); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir.1994) ("While the liability of municipalities doesn't turn on the liability of individual officers, it is contingent on a violation of constitutional rights").³² Second, plaintiff must...