Green v. City of Jacksonville, CA 02-917.

• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Terry Crabtree
• Citation: Green v. City of Jacksonville, 110 S.W.3d 323, 82 Ark. App. 39 (Ark. App. 2003)
• Decision Date: 30 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. CA 02-917.,CA 02-917.
• Parties: Jim GREEN and J. Green Development Co. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE.

110 S.W.3d 323

Jim GREEN and J. Green Development Co. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE.

No. CA 02-917.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division III.

April 30, 2003.

Eichenbaum, Liles & Heister, P.A., by Christopher 0. Parker, Little Rock, for appellants.

J. Denham, North Little Rock, and Robert Bamburg, Jacksonville, for appellees.

TERRY CRABTREE, Judge.

Appellant, Jim Green, is a developer whose final plat for a subdivision was accepted by the Jacksonville City Council on the condition that appellant comply with an ordinance requiring the installation of sidewalks. This is an appeal from an order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and dismissing appellant's complaint, based on the conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain appellant's cause of action challenging the council's decision. For reversal, appellant contends that the action of the city council was ultra vires, and thus the trial court had jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of the ultra vires act. We reverse and remand.

In 1999, appellant began the development of Phase II of the Collenwood Subdivision in Jacksonville, Arkansas. On November 8, 1999, the city's planning commission approved the preliminary plat that appellant submitted, which did not include sidewalks. Subsequently, on January 20, 2000, the city council passed Ordinance 1130, titled the "Master Sidewalk Plan," which required the construction of sidewalks. On December 11, 2000, the planning commission approved appellant's final plat. The minutes of the planning commission meeting reflect that the sidewalk ordinance was discussed but that it was agreed that appellant would not be required to comply with the ordinance since the process of developing the subdivision predated its enactment.

On February 1, 2001, the final plat was presented to the city council in accordance with Ordinance 17.12.100, which provides:

Before the final plat is recorded in the Office of the Circuit Court and ex officio recorder, the subdivider shall submit the plat to the City Council ... for [its] acceptance of public dedications. Until the public dedications and improvements have been accepted by the ... City Council, any plat shall not be eligible to be recorded.

The city council voted to accept the subdivision's public dedications, but it conditioned its acceptance upon appellant's compliance with the sidewalk ordinance.

Appellant did not take an appeal to circuit court pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Rep1.1998). Instead, on May 22, 2001, he filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the city council's action was ultra vires because it had no authority to condition the acceptance of dedications by requiring compliance with the ordinance. In response, appellee denied that the city council exceeded its authority and took the position that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because appellant had not pursued a timely appeal of the city council's decision. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted appellee's motion and denied appellant's motion. In so ruling, the court did not determine whether the city council's action was ultra vires because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to make that determination since appellant had not appealed the council's decision. The trial court's ruling was in error.

Appellant's complaint was based on the theory that the city council's...