THOMAS, Judge.
Michael Joe Green, Johnny James Brown, and Aletha Johnson (hereinafter referred collectively to as “the claimants”) appeal from a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of the City of Montgomery and J.J. Allen and Henry Davis, officers employed by the Montgomery Police Department (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the defendants”). We reverse and remand.
This is the second time this matter has been before this court. We recited the underlying facts and procedural history of this case in Green v. City of Montgomery, 55 So.3d 256 (Ala.Civ.App.2009),1 thusly:
“On December 6, 2006, Montgomery police officers stopped the claimants as they were traveling through Montgomery on Interstate 65. While issuing the claimants a speeding ticket, the officers smelled a strong marijuana odor and noticed a large amount of cash in a bag on the floorboard behind the passenger seat. When asked how much money was in the bag, the claimants responded, ‘about $20,000.’ The officers asked for permission to search the vehicle, and the claimants did not respond. The officers ordered a K–9 unit to the scene to conductan open-air search. The search resulted in a positive identification of marijuana in the passenger door. The officers then conducted a full search of the vehicle that produced a small amount of marijuana and additional cash. The officers seized the marijuana and all the cash, totaling $32,353. Johnny James Brown, the claimant closest to the marijuana, was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana in the second degree, a misdemeanor. See§ 13A–12–214, Ala.Code 1975.
“The difference between first-degree and second-degree unlawful possession is whether the marijuana is for personal use. Id. Despite having charged Brown with the lesser, personal-use offense, the City [of Montgomery] transferred the seized currency to the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (‘DEA’) pursuant to an arrangement whereby the City would receive 80% of the money and the DEA would retain 20% of the money as a fee. This process is known as ‘adoptive seizure.’ See21 U.S.C § 881 (2002).
“The adoptive-seizure process begins when state or local authorities seize property as part of a criminal investigation or arrest. Generally, the state or local officials either make a determination that forfeiture is not possible under state law or conclude that it is advantageous to them to transfer the matter to federal authorities for a federal administrative forfeiture proceeding. See I.R.S. Manual 9.7.2.7.3 (July 25, 2007); Asset Forfeiture Law, Practice, and Policy, Asset Forfeiture Office, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, Vol. I (1988) at 38 (cited in Johnson v. Johnson, 849 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Alaska 1993)). Once state or local officials have determined that an adoptive seizure is advantageous, they file a request with federal authorities. The appropriate federal agency then decides whether to accept or reject the request. If the adoptive-seizure request is accepted, the property is taken into the custody of federal agents and federal administrative forfeiture proceedings begin. At the successful conclusion of those proceedings, usually 80% of the forfeited property is given back to the state or local agency.
“In the present case, the seizure occurred on December 6, 2006. The City filled out the requisite forms to begin the adoptive-seizure process on December 27, 2006. During the time that the United States Department of the Treasury was reviewing the City's adoptive-seizure request, the claimants filed a ‘Complaint and Motion for Release and Return of Seized Money’ in the Montgomery Circuit Court on December 29, 2006. The DEA formally adopted the seizure on January 11, 2007, and United States Marshals took custody of the money on January 23, 2007.
“One week later, the City removed the claimants' circuit court action to federal court to address the claimants' Fourteenth Amendment claim. The claimants subsequently amended their complaint, deleting the Fourteenth Amendment claim and asking that the case be remanded to the Montgomery Circuit Court. The case was remanded on April 17, 2007. However on February 7, 2007, while the case was still in federal court, the claimants were notified of the DEA forfeiture proceeding and made no response.
“With the case back in the Montgomery Circuit Court, the claimants filed on April 26, 2007, a motion to dismiss their case; the circuit court granted the motion the same day. Arguing that they had made a clerical error in the caption and that the motion should have been styled as a motion for a summary judgment consistent with the substance of the motion, the claimants convinced the circuit court to reinstate the case on August 3, 2007. In the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement of the claimants' action, the DEA deposited the seized currency in the Asset Forfeiture Fund.
“On April 24, 2008, the City filed a motion for a summary judgment, arguing that the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction over the seized currency. The circuit court granted the City's motion on May 13, 2008. The claimants filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the circuit court denied on September 3, 2008. The claimants filed a timely notice of appeal with this court on October 15, 2008.”
55 So.3d at 258–59.
In Green, this court held that “[t]he claimants' action in state court was an in rem or quasi in rem action, and it invoked state in rem jurisdiction before the federal government attempted to acquire jurisdiction.” Id. at 265. Accordingly, because we held that the Drug Enforcement Agency (“the DEA”) had never acquired jurisdiction over the currency, we reversed the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the defendants and remanded the cause to the trial court “so that the claimants may assert any and all defenses to the seizure and forfeiture under state law.” Id.
On remand, the claimants moved the trial court for a summary judgment, arguing (1) that the defendants had lacked probable cause to seize the currency and (2) that the State had failed to promptly file a forfeiture action regarding the currency,2 thereby, the claimants said, requiring the defendants to return the currency to the claimants. The defendants opposed the claimants' motion for a summary judgment, arguing that the currency had been validly seized pursuant to § 20–2–93, Ala.Code 1975, and that the action filed by the claimants met the requirement under that statute that the State file a forfeiture proceeding because, the defendants argued, the action sought disposition of the currency. The trial court denied the claimants' summary-judgment motion.
The trial court later held a hearing on the claimants' complaint, at which it heard ore tenus evidence. Following the hearing, on January 26, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. In its judgment, the trial court determined that the defendants had had probable cause to seize the currency. The trial court also determined that the seized currency had been transferred from the City to the DEA, that the currency had then been taken into custody by the United States Marshals Service, and that the DEA had conducted an administrative-forfeiture proceeding, resulting in the forfeiture of the currency.
The claimants filed a postjudgment motion, arguing that the trial court had not addressed the issue whether the State had promptly filed a forfeiture action. The claimants' postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law. SeeRule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. The claimants subsequently appealed to this court.
The trial court entered its judgment after hearing ore tenus evidence.
“ ‘ “ ‘[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, its findings on disputed facts are presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.’ ” ' Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977 So.2d 440, 443 (Ala.2007) (quoting Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So.2d 429, 433 (Ala.2005), quoting in turn Philpot v. State, 843 So.2d 122, 125 (Ala.2002)). ‘ “The presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where there is insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its judgment.” ’ Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Ala.2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So.2d 77, 79 (Ala.1985)). ‘Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a presumption of correctness a trial judge's conclusions of law or the incorrect application of law to the facts.’ Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d at 1086.”
Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf Club, Inc., 985 So.2d 924, 929 (Ala.2007). Additionally, this court reviews questions of law de novo. See Wright v. Childree, 972 So.2d 771, 778 (Ala.2006) (“This Court accords the trial court's ruling no presumption of correctness as to a question of law.”).
On appeal, the claimants argue that the trial court erred by not ordering the return of the currency because, the claimants say, the State failed to promptly institute forfeiture proceedings pursuant to § 20–2–93. 3 We agree.
The trial court did not specifically state in its judgment whether the State had promptly filed a forfeiture action or whether the currency had been forfeited under state law; however, the trial court did state that the currency had been forfeited through the DEA's administrative-forfeiture proceedings.
In Green, we determined that, when the claimants filed their complaint...
