Green v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

• Decision Date: 17 March 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 14722-79.
• Citation: 78 T.C. 428
• Parties: JOHN W. GREEN and REGINA R. Z. GREEN, PETITIONERS v. COMMISSIONER of INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT
• Court: U.S. Tax Court

78 T.C. 428

JOHN W. GREEN and REGINA R. Z. GREEN, PETITIONERS

v.COMMISSIONER of INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

Docket No. 14722-79.

United States Tax Court

Filed March 17, 1982.

Petitioner worked as an account executive managing seven condominiums for a real estate development corporation. His duties included supervising a resident manager and dealing with the board of directors of each condominium. He maintained an office in his home to handle frequent after-office-hours telephone calls. Held, under sec. 280A, I.R.C. 1954, petitioner is entitled to a deduction for the cost of maintaining his home office; the office was exclusively and regularly used, for the convenience of his employer, by his employer's clients. John W. Green and Regina R. Z. Green, pro se.

Thomas G. Schleier, for the respondent.

FEATHERSTON , Judge:

Respondent determined a deficiency in the amount of $986.44 in petitioners' Federal income taxes for 1976. After various concessions by respondent, ¹ the sole issue for decision is whether petitioners are entitled, under sections 162(a) and 280A,² to a deduction of $840 as the cost of maintaining an office in their home

FINDINGS OF FACT

At the time the petition was filed, petitioners John W. Green (petitioner) and Regina R. Z. Green, husband and wife, were legal residents of Kailua, Hawaii. They timely filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1976 with the Internal Revenue Service.

During 1976, petitioner John W. Green was an employee of Dillingham Land Corp. (Dillingham), a real estate development firm in Hawaii. He worked as an account executive for the property management division, and was responsible for the administrative and physical management of seven condominiums. Each of these buildings had a resident manager of whom petitioner was the immediate supervisor; petitioner in turn was responsible to the board of directors of each building. From the seven buildings, petitioner dealt with approximately 49 people on a weekly, if not daily, basis.

Dillingham provided petitioner with an office in which he spent approximately 20 percent of his 8-hour workday. There, he attended to paperwork, and had a secretary who did typing, mailings, and took telephone messages. The remaining 80 percent of petitioner's workday was spent outside the office, in the “field,” at jobsites, and at meetings with contractors and, occasionally, with board members.

Because he could not be reached during much of the day and because many of his callers could not themselves make telephone calls during the day, petitioner was required (as a condition of his employment) to receive a substantial number of telephone calls from Dillingham clients at his home after his regular working hours, averaging 21;4 hours a night, 5 nights a week. The calls came from condominium board members, resident managers, and others who wished to consult with him. Many of these individuals could not call him from their regular places of employment during office hours; others were themselves out in the field or engaged in construction or other nonoffice work during the day. Also, he would sometimes return calls from his home, responding to messages received during the day by his secretary.

To assist in servicing the Dillingham clients who called in the evenings, petitioner converted one bedroom of his three bedroom house into an office. In this home office, petitioner kept a telephone, which he used “strictly for incoming calls from board members, resident managers, et cetera, * * * that couldn't get * * * [him] during the day”; he also maintained some files to which he might need to refer during a telephone conversation, such as files of financial statements and upcoming meeting agendas. He did no routine paperwork in his home office.

In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the claimed deduction.

OPINION

Section 280A³ denies certain deductions, otherwise permissible under section 162,⁴ with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is the taxpayer's residence. Ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in the use of a dwelling unit are allowable, however, if a taxpayer shows that the item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is “exclusively” used on a “regular basis” as either (A) the taxpayer's “principal place of business” for any of his trades or businesses, (B) a place of business “used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business,” or (C) is a separate structure; in the case of an employee, the exclusive use must also be for “the convenience of his employer.” These criteria were enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to provide definitive rules to govern the allowability of deductions with respect to the use of a portion of a personal residence for business purposes; the rules were intended to replace the subjective section 162(a) “appropriate and helpful” standard employed in such cases as Newi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-131, affd. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), revd. 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975); and later in Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), affd. per curiam 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978). See S. Rept. 94-938, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 182-188.

* * *

Petitioner contends that he has met the requisite tests by showing that his home office was regularly and exclusively used either as his principal place of business or as a place for meeting or dealing with clients in his normal course of business, and that the use was for his employer's convenience. Respondent argues that petitioner has failed to meet the “exclusive use” test, the “principal place of business” test, and the “regular use by clients * * * in meeting or dealing” with the taxpayer test. Respondent does not contest the reasonableness of the $840 office expense allocation. In effect, he has conceded that, if we find for petitioners, the $840 is deductible in full.

Both parties agree, at least implicitly, that the $840 expense was an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162, and we concur in that view. We also find that petitioner used his home office exclusively and on a regular basis for meeting or dealing with clients and that this use was for the convenience of his employer. Accordingly, we hold that petitioners are entitled to the disputed deduction.

To establish exclusive use for business purposes, petitioner testified that the bedroom was “converted” into an office and that the telephone in the room was used “strictly” for business purposes. Respondent did not produce any evidence showing personal use, nor did his cross-examination undermine petitioner's credibility on this issue. There is no evidence of record to suggest that the room was used for any purpose other than to handle petitioner's business telephone calls. Petitioner also established the regularity of this use, as he testified that he used the room approximately 21; 4 hours, 5 nights a week. We find that petitioner has sustained his burden of proof by showing the exclusive and regular use of the home office. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Rule 142(a).

Petitioner must show, in addition, that he meets one of the three specific use tests set forth at section 280A(c)(1)(A), (B), or (C), summarized above. Petitioner argues that he has met both (A), the principal place of business test, and (B), the meeting or dealing with clients test; respondent argues that petitioner fails both tests.⁵ We do not think he has met the principal place of business test, but we conclude that petitioner has complied with the section 280A(c)(1)(B) test.

Petitioner urges that, because he spent approximately equal amounts of time in his Dillingham and home offices, both offices should qualify as his principal places of business. There can be, however, but one principal place of business for each business. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696, 700 (1981); Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109 (1980);⁶ Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 776 (1980), on appeal (9th Cir., Nov. 24, 1980). Moreover, the number of hours of use alone does not necessarily determine whether an office qualifies as the taxpayer's principal place of business. The test is whether the office is the “focal” point of the taxpayer's particular trade or business. Jackson v. Commissioner, supra at 700; Baie v. Commissioner, supra at 109; see Curphey v. Commissioner, supra at 776. We think that the Dillingham office meets that test. That office was provided by Dillingham, and Dillingham employed a secretary who worked there under petitioner's supervision and who took telephone messages for him when he was working in the field. In that office, petitioner did all the requisite paperwork connected with his employment. His home office was used mainly to receive and make telephone calls which were important to his business but which, as a practical matter, could not be handled in the office provided by Dillingham. Even though he spent about the same amount of time in both of his offices, we think the Dillingham office was the focal point of his employment and thus petitioner fails to meet the principal-place-of-business test prescribed by section 280A(c)(1)(A).

Respondent contends that petitioner also fails to qualify under section 280A(c)(1)(B) because the clients' use in meeting or dealing with petitioner was “incidental or occasional” rather than “regular” as required by section 280A(c)(1). Jackson v. Commissioner, supra at 700.⁷ It is true that petitioner testified that only three or four times in 1976 did clients personally come to his house, but we do not think that testimony is dispositive. The clients contacted petitioner by telephone on Dillingham business on a nearly nightly basis. Petitioner maintains that such contact constitutes “meeting or dealing” with him in a practical business sense within the meaning of section 280A(c)(1)(B).

We find...