Green v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., Case No. 14-11125
| Decision Date | 13 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-11125 |
| Parties | JAMES GREEN, Petitioner, v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Hon. Gerald E. Rosen
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISSIn an administrative complaint filed with the federal Occupational Safety & Health Administration ("OSHA") in August of 2012, Petitioner James Green alleged that Respondent Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company ("GTW") unlawfully retaliated against him in violation of the Federal Rail Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., by terminating his employment with GTW in response to his request for medical treatment. By decision dated April 12, 2013, the Secretary of Labor dismissed Petitioner's administrative complaint, finding that Petitioner was not engaged in protectedactivity at the time of his termination and, in addition, that any such protected activity was not a contributing factor in GTW's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. Dissatisfied with this decision, Petitioner sought review of the Secretary's findings by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").
In the course of the administrative proceedings, GTW requested access to Petitioner's medical records under the theory that Petitioner had placed his medical condition at issue through his claim of retaliatory discharge. Petitioner, in turn, asked the ALJ to enter a protective order that would shield these records from discovery. In an order dated September 3, 2013, the ALJ largely granted GTW's request to compel the disclosure of Petitioner's medical records. Petitioner then filed a petition with the Respondent Administrative Review Board ("ARB") of the U.S. Department of Labor seeking immediate review of the ALJ's discovery order, but the ARB issued a February 7, 2014 order denying this petition, reasoning that Petitioner had "neither obtained the ALJ's certification of the discovery question at issue[] nor . . . demonstrated exceptional circumstances sufficient to invoke the Board's interlocutory review of this discovery issue." (Respondent GTW's Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 5, ARB 2/7/2014 Order at 2.)
In response to the ARB's order denying review, Petitioner filed a pro se petition with this Court on March 17, 2014, seeking de novo judicial review of the ARB's decision. This petition concludes with a prayer for relief in which Petitioner evidently asks this Court to (i) declare that the ARB applied improper procedures in determining whether to grant review of the ALJ's discovery order, (ii) rescind the ARB's order, (iii)grant Petitioner's request for a protective order barring access to his medical records, and (iv) remand this matter to the ALJ for further administrative proceedings. Alternatively, Petitioner suggests that this Court may proceed directly to the merits of his underlying dispute with GTW and award the relief of reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory damages.
By motion filed on April 10, 2014, Respondent GTW now seeks the dismissal of Petitioner's petition for review on the grounds (i) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner's attempt to appeal from the ALJ's discovery order or the ARB's denial of interlocutory review of this order, (ii) that Petitioner has failed to state a viable claim that would entitle him to the relief sought in his petition, and (iii) that Petitioner has failed to properly serve GTW with a copy of his petition in accordance with the applicable law.1 Petitioner filed a pro se response in opposition to GTW's motion on May 13, 2014, and GTW, in turn, filed a May 27, 2014 reply brief in further support of its motion.
Having reviewed the parties' briefs in support of and opposition to GTW's motion,as well as their accompanying exhibits and the remainder of the record, the Court finds that the pertinent facts, allegations, and legal issues are adequately presented in these written submissions, and that oral argument would not assist in the resolution of this motion. Accordingly, the Court will decide GTW's motion "on the briefs." See Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan. This opinion and order sets forth the Court's rulings on this motion.
In the present motion, Respondent GTW challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding and argues, in the alternative, that Petitioner has failed to state a viable claim for the relief sought in his petition. The first of these challenges is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), which governs a party's assertion of the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addressing this jurisdictional challenge, the Court "takes the allegations in the [petition] as true," inquiring whether these allegations establish a basis for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Gentek Building Products, Inc. v. Steel Peel Litigation Trust, 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). Yet, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice" to withstand a properly supported Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 376 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In addition to questioning the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, GTW seeks the dismissal of the petition in this case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state aclaim upon which relief can be granted.2 When considering a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff — or, here, Petitioner — and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). Once again, however, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Moreover, "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted). Rather, to withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint's factual allegations, accepted as true, "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 1974. "A claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
In his petition in this case, Petitioner invites the Court to conduct a de novo review of the ARB's February 7, 2014 order denying his request for interlocutory review of an ALJ's order compelling Petitioner to provide Respondent GTW with copies of his medical records. As the principal argument advanced in its present motion to dismiss, GTW contends that there is no jurisdictional basis upon which the Court may review the ARB's order. As discussed below, the Court agrees.
It is well settled that the "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and that "[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994) (citations omitted). Accordingly, "[i]t is to be assumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S. Ct. at 1675 (citations omitted). Here, this burden falls on Petitioner, who, as a pro se litigant, has unsurprisingly struggled in his effort to identify a ground upon which this Court may exercise jurisdiction to consider his petition for relief from the ARB's order.
Nonetheless, both sides agree that an appropriate starting point in locating apotential source of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction is the FRSA, the statute that conferred on Petitioner both the substantive protection against retaliatory discharge, see 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)-(c), and the right to file his August 27, 2012 complaint with the Secretary of Labor — or, more accurately, the Secretary's designate, OSHA, see 29 C.F.R. § 1982.103(c) — alleging that Respondent GTW violated this prohibition against retaliatory discharge, see 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(1). And, indeed, this statute expressly provides two paths to the federal courts: (i) de novo review by a federal district court of a complaint filed with the Secretary of Labor, see 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3), and (ii) an appeal of a final order issued by the Secretary of Labor in response to a complaint filed under 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(1) alleging an unlawful adverse employment action, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 20109(d)(4), 42121(b)(3)-(4). The question, then, is whether either of these avenues is available to Petitioner here.
At first glance, the latter avenue for judicial review appears to be more applicable here, as the pertinent statutory provision speaks of appeals by a "person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued pursuant to" the procedures governing the Secretary of Labor's review of a complaint. 49 U.S.C....
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