Green v. Green

• Decision Date: 01 September 1984
• Docket Number: No. 1342,1342
• Citation: 494 A.2d 721,64 Md.App. 122
• Parties: , 46 A.L.R.4th 661 Barbara GREEN v. Michael I. GREEN. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 122

64 Md.App. 122

494 A.2d 721, 46 A.L.R.4th 661

Barbara GREEN v. Michael I. GREEN.

No. 1342, Sept. Term, 1984.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

July 8, 1985.

Joel Marc Abramson and Eliot G. Striar, Columbia (Talkin & Abramson, Columbia, on brief), for appellant.

Ann M. Turnbull, Baltimore (Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before BISHOP, ADKINS and KARWACKI, JJ.

KARWACKI, Judge.

On July 26, 1984, the Circuit Court for Howard County entered a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii terminating the 14 year marriage of Barbara Green, the appellant, and Michael Green, the appellee. Custody of the parties' two minor children was awarded to the appellant. The trial court made a determination and valuation of marital property, and then granted the appellant a monetary award of $134,376.95. The court also determined the ownership of certain items of personal property not considered to be marital or family use property. The appellee was ordered to pay to the appellant child support of $400 per week, alimony of $200 per week for a period not to exceed three years, and a $5,000 contribution to her attorney's fees and litigation costs.

The parties were married on November 28, 1970 in Newton, Massachusetts. Each had recently graduated from Boston University. Shortly thereafter they moved to Columbia, Maryland as Mr. Green had earlier accepted an offer of employment with the federal government at the Department of Defense. Both parties also engaged in graduate studies at Johns Hopkins University. Mrs. Green eventually obtained a Master's Degree in computer science. Mr. Green earned a Master's Degree in mathematics.

Mr. Green initially worked for the Defense Department as a mathematician, and later as a computer systems analyst. Mrs. Green worked for some time as a school teacher before she too became employed at the Department of the Defense. The parties' daughter, Jaime Rebecca, was born in October, 1976. After Jaime's birth the appellant continued to work part-time and, as Jaime grew older, worked full-time for a brief period. A son, Jason, was born in May 1979, and after a six month period at home, the appellant returned to work on a part-time basis at the Defense Department. In January of 1979, the appellee left his government job and began work as a salesman for Network Systems, a computer company specializing in high technology computer products.

Throughout the marriage the parties shared the financial, household and child care responsibilities. Until 1979 their standard of living was modest; Mrs. Green testified that at the time her husband left the Defense Department he was earning $26,000 and her income was approximately $22,000. At Network Systems Mr. Green's income increased dramatically; in 1983 he earned $179,900 through salary and commissions. Both parties testified that they continued to live on their combined salaries, and that they invested the appellee's commissions, which comprised approximately 80% of his annual income.

At about the time Mr. Green made his career change, the family situation became less harmonious. The couple suffered several family crises including the death of the appellee's father and the illness of his mother. Their son, Jason, developed spinal meningitis. The appellee's job required that he travel, and this apparently added to the pressures upon the family. In 1981 the parties sought professional counseling in an effort to resolve their personal and marital problems, but their relationship continued to decline.

In September of 1982, the appellee moved out of the marital home and purchased a condominium in College Park where he took up residence. The testimony of the parties indicates that they hoped at the time that the separation would be temporary. At the time of the separation, the parties informally agreed to maintain their finances and investments at the "status quo." The appellee was to deposit money out of his base salary into a household account and the appellant would pay all the household expenses and bills out of this account. The appellee would retain his commissions to meet his expenses. This amicable trial separation came to an abrupt end, however, when in November the appellee withdrew $20,000 from the parties' joint account and deposited those funds in a newly opened account held in his own name. At that time he also limited his support payments for the appellant and their children to $900 per month. ¹ On July 26, 1983 he took possession of a home he purchased in Vienna, Virginia, where he thereafter lived with Ms. Diane Sass and her children.

During their marriage the parties accumulated various assets including stocks, mutual funds, public tax shelters, real estate partnership shares, bank accounts, stock options, real estate, and tangible personal property. Some of these assets are held individually by the parties; others are held jointly.

Upon appeal of the trial court's decision, the appellant raises numerous issues for our consideration. She contends that:

I. The court erred in failing to include various items in its list of marital property;

II. The court erred in failing to value the marital property as of the date of the decree of absolute divorce;

III. The court erred in failing to determine the proper valuation of various items of marital property;

IV. The court erred in making certain deductions from the value of the marital property in deciding on the monetary award;

V. The court erred in failing to make an appropriate monetary award to adjust the equities concerning the marital property between the parties;

VI. The court erred in failing to award the appellant a contribution for funds she expended toward maintaining and repairing the marital home and automobile;

VII. The court abused its discretion by failing to order a partition of the personal property owned by both of the parties;

VIII. Md.Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-6A-03 and 3-6A-04 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which prohibit the court from ordering a partition of property titled in the name of only one party, violate the appellant's right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment;

IX. The court erred in failing to award the appellant a chinese vase as her personal property;

X. The court erred in making an unfair and inequitable award of alimony to the appellant for an arbitrarily fixed limited period rather than for an indefinite period XI. The court abused its discretion in failing to provide a fair and equitable award of child support to the appellant; and

XII. The court abused its discretion in granting insufficient attorneys' fees and costs to the appellant.

Preliminarily, the appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. As grounds for his motion he asserts that: 1) in her brief the appellant's statement of the facts grossly distorts the record, in violation of Md.Rule 1031 c. 4.; and 2) the record extract is arranged incoherently, in contravention of Rule 1028 a. Although we acknowledge some validity to the appellee's complaints, we do not consider the appellant's violations sufficiently grave so as to warrant the sanction of dismissing her appeal, and we will deny his motion.

I. The Marital Property

The appellant argues initially that certain assets should have been declared by the trial court to be marital property, pursuant to Md.Code (1984), § 8-201(e) of the Family Law Article. ² We will address each of those items specifically.

A. Stock Options

Under two separate stock option plans offered by his employer, the appellee, during the marriage, acquired the right to purchase 1,000 shares of Network Systems: 500 shares at $25 per share and 500 shares at $15 per share. ³ As the result of two subsequent stock splits, these options were expanded to the right to purchase a total of 20,000 shares: 10,000 shares at prices ranging from $1.25 to $2.50 per share, and an additional 10,000 shares at prices ranging from $.75 to $1.50.

The options are irrevocable and unassignable. The plans provide that the rights may be exercised over a period of five years in increments of 25% of the total shares on each anniversary date. The plans further provide that the appellee must be an employee of the company at the time he exercises his options. Nevertheless, the options may be exercised by the appellee, even if his employment has been terminated, provided such termination occurs not more than 90 days before the date of exercise. The options may also be exercised by the appellee's estate.

As of the date of the close of evidence in the trial below, Mr. Green had exercised his right to purchase 10,000 shares of stock under the January 31, 1979 plan, and 5,000 shares under the August 27, 1980 plan. These shares were treated by the trial court as marital property and valued at approximately $20 per share. As to the options on the remaining 5,000 shares, 2,500 were exercisable at the time of trial, but had not been exercised, and 2,500 were not exercisable until after trial (August 27, 1984). With respect to these unexercised stock options, the trial court made the following determination:

The [appellee] has stock options for 5,000 shares of Network Systems stock which cannot be exercised at this time. The [appellant] contends that these options are marital property and have value. The [appellee] contends that the stocks have not been acquired and thus, something not acquired during the marriage cannot be marital property. He further contends that these options carry no value until exercised and can only be exercised while employed by Network. These options are personal to the employee and cannot be assigned or sold. Further, the option to exercise has not yet arrived. Under these circumstances, the [appellant's] expert witness opined that the options had no fair market value. The Court is of the same opinion.

Mrs. Green argues that these options should have been...