Green v. Haggett
| Decision Date | 31 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | 9:13-CV-0016 (GLS) |
| Parties | LAMOUNT GREEN, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM HAGGETT, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
LAMOUNT GREEN
Petitioner, pro se
Coxsackie Correctional Facility
Box 999
Coxsackie, NY 12051
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
120 Broadway
New York, NY 10271
OF COUNSEL
JOANNA R. HERSHEY, AAG.
GARY L. SHARPE
Chief United States District Judge
Petitioner Lamount Green, appearing pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, along with supporting papers and exhibits. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet.") at 2; Dkt. No. 1-2, Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury of Lamount Green ("Dec."); Dkt. No. 1-3, Exhibits A-C; Dkt. No. 1-4, Memorandum of Law ("Mem."). Respondent filed ananswer to the petition and the relevant state court records, and petitioner has filed a reply. Dkt. No. 16, Answer; Dkt. No. 16-1, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ( ); Dkt. No. 17, State Court Records; Dkt. No. 21, Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Reply").
For the reasons that follow, the petition is denied and dismissed.
Petitioner challenges a 2008 judgment of conviction in Albany County Court, following a non-jury trial, of second degree criminal possession of a weapon (N.Y. Penal Law §265.03(3)). Pet. at 2; R. Mem. at 1. The Appellate Division, Third Department, briefly summarized the facts of this case:
Police in the City of Albany stopped an automobile that had been reported stolen and ordered its three occupants, including [petitioner] who was in the front passenger seat, out of the vehicle. The vehicle was then searched and a loaded semiautomatic .380 caliber handgun was recovered beneath a mat on the floor in front of the back seat. [Petitioner], who was wearing a bulletproof vest, was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the third degree. After a nonjury trial, County Court found [petitioner] guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree[.]
People v. Green, 84 A.D.3d 1499, 1500 (3d Dep't. 2011). The specific facts are known to the parties and will be repeated only to the extent necessary to address petitioner's claims.
Prior to sentencing, petitioner moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §330.30. He claimed that a post-verdict affidavit from his co-defendant, Phillip Wilson, would have changed the outcome of his trial. Dkt. No. 17-3, Affirmation/Memorandum of Law, at 1-3; see Dkt. No. 1-3, Exhibit C, Wilson affidavit. Specifically, petitioner stated that in the Wilson affidavit, signed two weeks after petitionerwas found guilty, Wilson stated the gun was his alone and that petitioner had no knowledge of its existence before the Albany Police Department found it. Dkt. No. 17-3, Affirmation/Memorandum of Law, at 1-3. Petitioner argued that the Wilson affidavit would have negated the presumption that all occupants of the vehicle equally possessed the gun. Id. at 3. He also argued that since Wilson was under indictment for possessing the same gun, but had not yet been tried at the time of petitioner's trial, Wilson's affidavit could not have been produced before Wilson pled guilty. Id. at 3-4.
On August 13, 2008, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the Wilson affidavit could have been obtained with due diligence prior to petitioner's trial, and the affidavit "merely contradict[ed] the compelling evidence introduced at the trial." Dkt. No. 17-3, Decision and Order, Herrick, J., Aug. 13, 2008 at 2. Petitioner was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to serve 12½ years in prison, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Green, 84 A.D.3d at 1500; Dkt. No. 17-19, Sentencing Tr., Aug. 13, 2008 at 7-8.1
Petitioner appealed to the Appellate Division, Third Department, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient because the prosecutor did not prove that petitioner possessed the gun outside his home or business; and (2) the trial court erred when it introduced into evidence a photograph of petitioner wearing a bullet proof vest. Dkt. No. 17-1, Brief and Appendix at 3-9. The Appellate Division ruled that petitioner failed to preserve his legal sufficiency claim because it was not raised in his "motion to dismiss[.]" Green, 84 A.D.3d at 1500. The court rejected petitioner's claim that he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission into evidence of the photograph because petitioner was not tried by a jury, and thetrial judge, "by reasons of . . . learning, experience and judicial discipline, is uniquely capable of distinguishing the issues and of making an objective determination based upon appropriate legal criteria, even if presented with evidence which should not have been admitted." Id. at 1500 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the Appellate Division ruled that the photograph, along with petitioner's statement to police that he "could have made it ugly [and] could have gone out and started shooting," was relevant to establish that petitioner "knew a loaded firearm was in the vehicle." Id. at 1500-1501. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 7, 2011, and denied reconsideration on March 13, 2012. Green, 17 N.Y.3d 953 (2011), recon. den. 18 N.Y.3d 958 (2012).
Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, dated March 23, 2012, in which he argued appellate counsel failed to: (1) present the Appellate Division with proof that petitioner preserved his legal sufficiency claim; and (2) argue that the trial court improperly denied petitioner's CPL §330.30 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Dkt. No. 17-11, Notice of Motion for a Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis with Supporting Affidavit ("Writ"). On May 18, 2012, the Appellate Division denied the writ, and on December 27, 2012, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Dkt. No. 17-12, Decision and Order on Motion; Dkt. No. 17-13, Order Denying Leave.
Petitioner also filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant CPL §440.10 in the Albany County Court, in which he argued that the People failed to prove he did not possess the gun in his home or place of business. Dkt. No. 17-14, Affidavit in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment, at 2-4. The People opposed the motion. Dkt. No. 17-15, Affirmation in Opposition. On August 20, 2012, the Albany County Court denied the motion pursuant to CPL §440.10(2)(a) because the claim was previously heard on direct appeal. Dkt. No. 17-16,Decision and Order, Herrick, J., Aug. 20, 2012. The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal on November 19, 2012. Dkt. No. 17-18, Decision, Spain, J., Nov. 19, 2012.
Petitioner raises the following grounds for habeas relief: the evidence was legally insufficient, and he is innocent, because the People failed to plead or prove that he possessed the gun outside his home or business (Grounds One and Four); the trial court erred by denying his CPL §330.30 motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing based on the Wilson affidavit (Ground Two); and appellate counsel was ineffective (Ground Three). Pet. at 5-6; Dec. at 1-7; Dkt. No. 1-3, Exhibits; Mem. at 1-16.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if, based upon the record before the state court, the state court's decision: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2); Cullen v. Pinholster, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 1400 (2011); Premo v. Moore, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). This standard is "highly deferential" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Felkner v. Jackson, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1305,1307 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that "a federal habeas court may overturn a state court's application of federal law only if it is so erroneous that 'there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with th[e Supreme] Court's precedents.'" Nevada v. Jackson, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)); see Metrish v. Lancaster, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013) () (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87)).
Additionally, AEDPA foreclosed "'using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.'" Parker v. Matthews, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2149 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Renico, 559 U.S. at 779). A state court's findings are not unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) simply because a federal habeas court reviewing the claim in the first instance would have reached a different conclusion. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). "The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473. Finally, federal habeas cou...
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