Green v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta

• Decision Date: 29 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 64958,64958
• Citation: Green v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, 296 S.E.2d 758, 164 Ga.App. 205 (Ga. App. 1982)
• Parties: GREEN v. The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF ATLANTA.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 758

296 S.E.2d 758

164 Ga.App. 205

GREEN v. The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF ATLANTA.

No. 64958.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Oct. 29, 1982.

Frank P. Samford, III, Decatur, for appellant.

Alfred J. Turk, III, Atlanta, for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

Green has been a tenant at the Techwood-Clark Howell Homes since 1968, and during much of that time he has served as president of the project's tenants' association. On February 4, 1982, a confrontation occurred between a small group of tenants led by Green and his wife, and two crews of workers of a roofing contractor hired by the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta to repair the apartment roofs. Shortly thereafter the Housing Authority notified Green of its decision to terminate his tenancy, on the grounds that Green had violated the lease agreement by threatening personal injury to the roofers if they did not cease working. An eviction proceeding ensued, and at the close of the jury trial the trial court directed the verdict for the Housing Authority.

1. In his first enumeration of error, Green contends that a directed verdict for the Housing Authority was improper because substantial issues of fact existed for jury resolution. Directed verdict is appropriate where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, demands a particular verdict. Code Ann. § 81A-150(a). Where the evidence strongly supports, but does not demand, a certain verdict, the factual determination remains for the jury. Barker v. Atlas Concrete Pools, Inc., 155 Ga.App. 118, 270 S.E.2d 471 (1980). Further, the evidence should be construed in the light most favorable to the respondent to a motion for directed verdict. Francis v. Cook, 248 Ga. 225, 281 S.E.2d 548 (1981). In this case the testimony was conflicting over whether Green and/or his wife threatened the roofing contractors on February 4, 1982. Witnesses for the Housing Authority uniformly testified that threatening statements were made, but Green and his witnesses denied such. Construed under the above standard, the evidence strongly supports but does not demand a verdict that a threat of injury occurred, and the trial court erred in removing that factual determination from the jury.

2. Green also contends that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence as to whether the Housing Authority had a retaliatory motive in seeking the eviction. Specifically, the trial court excluded any evidence offered to show that the Housing Authority evicted Green because of his activity in the tenants' association rather than because of the incident with the roofers. The general rule appears to be that "except where motive is the foundation of a cause of action, motive for bringing the action is immaterial ... If the cause of action is supported in law and fact, extraneous of the motive for bringing the action, the motive of the plaintiff for denying or availing himself of the remedy to redress the wrong is not material." Powell v. Blackstock, 64 Ga.App. 442, 443-444, 13 S.E.2d 503 (1941). Following that ruling, we uphold the trial court's exclusion of any evidence regarding the Housing Authority's motive.

This court is aware that on some occasions evidence of a landlord's motive to evict has been admitted for purposes of impeachment. See Smiths' Properties, Inc. v. RTM Enterprises, Inc., 160 Ga.App. 102, 286 S.E.2d 334 (...