Green v. Lajitas Capital Partners, LLC

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: LISA J. SOTO, JUSTICE
• Docket Number: 08-22-00175-CV
• Decision Date: 28 April 2023
• Citation: Green v. Lajitas Capital Partners, LLC, 08-22-00175-CV (Tex. App. Apr 28, 2023)
• Parties: SHERRI GREEN, Appellant, v. LAJITAS CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, MCREYNOLDS LAJITAS INTERESTS, LLC, QUINT DAVIS, JOHN PRICE and LOGAN KNAPP, Appellees.

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SHERRI GREEN, Appellant, v. LAJITAS CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, MCREYNOLDS LAJITAS INTERESTS, LLC, QUINT DAVIS, JOHN PRICE and LOGAN KNAPP, Appellees.

No. 08-22-00175-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth District, El Paso

April 28, 2023

Appeal from the 394th Judicial District Court of Brewster County Texas (TC# CVB21565)

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LISA J. SOTO, JUSTICE

Appellant filed a lawsuit against Appellees claiming their negligence caused her to be injured when she fell from a horse during a trail ride at a resort. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant's lawsuit was barred by a release agreement that she signed prior to the ride and by the Texas Equine Act. The trial court granted the motion. Because we conclude that Appellant signed a valid release agreement waiving her right to sue Appellees for their alleged negligence, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual And Procedural Background

A. The accident

In June 2020, Appellant Sherri Green (Sherri), along with her husband, Hall Green (Hall), and other family members paid to participate in a sunset trail ride at the Lajitas Resort (the Resort) in Lajitas, Texas. The ride began and ended at the Lajitas Stables (the Stables) at the Resort. The ride consisted of six guests, including Sherri and her family members, as well as a guide-Appellee Quint Davis-and his teen-aged daughter. On their return to the Stables, the horses were traveling along a path next to the Resort's golf course when a set of underground sprinklers activated, making a "hissing" sound that "spooked" the horses. According to Davis, most of the horses turned suddenly and sped up for a few steps, which caused Sherri and another guest to fall from their horses.^[1] Sherri and her husband contend that Sherri's horse "bucked wildly" and violently threw Sherri to the ground. The parties agree that Sherri fractured her wrist and was bruised in the fall. Sherri was treated at a nearby hospital.

B. The lawsuit

Sherri filed her lawsuit against the various Appellees affiliated with the Lajitas Resort (the Lajitas Defendants) claiming she was an invitee at the Resort and their negligence caused her injuries.^[2] In particular, Sherri alleged the sprinklers constituted a "dangerous latent condition of land" and the defendants negligently failed to guard against the danger by allowing the horses to come close to the sprinklers knowing the sprinklers were scheduled to activate.^[3]

Following a discovery period, the Lajitas Defendants filed a traditional motion for summary judgment contending Sherri's claims failed as a matter of law due to (1) a release agreement Sherri signed prior to the ride that released them from liability for alleged negligence (the Release Agreement); and (2) the Texas Equine Act, which, among other things, shield an individual from liability for personal injury arising from a "farm animal activity" when an injury results from the animal's unpredictable reaction to a sound or object or from "certain land conditions and hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions."^[4] The Lajitas Defendants attached to their motion the Release Agreement Sherri signed and Sherri's admission that she signed the form.^[5]

Sherri contended, among other things, that the Release Agreement did not bar her claim for two reasons. First, the Release Agreement only applied to occurrences arising from the "elements of nature," and this incident arose from a man-made rather than a natural condition. Second, the Release Agreement was "insufficiently specific to constitute a valid waiver under Texas Law."

Sherri argued that the Texas Equine Act did not bar her claim, as it does not apply when the "injury or death was caused by a dangerous latent condition of land for which warning signs, written notices, or verbal warnings were not conspicuously posted or provided to the participant" and where the landowner or its agents "knew of the dangerous latent condition." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.004(3). And, she argued, the Lajitas Defendants were aware of the danger the sprinklers posed and admittedly failed to warn her about it. ^[6]

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Lajitas Defendants' motion for summary judgment without identifying which ground it relied upon in doing so. This appeal followed.

II. Issues on Appeal

Raising two issues on appeal, Sherri argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the Release Agreement was unenforceable, as it was overly broad, did not meet the fair notice requirements imposed on such agreements, and did not specifically cover her particular claim of negligence for accidents resulting from man-made conditions on the premises; and (2) questions of fact remained on whether her claim fell within the Texas Equine Act exceptions for dangerous latent conditions on the land. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Release Agreement validly released the Lajitas Defendants from liability for Sherri's negligence claim. As such, we need not address whether the Texas Equine Act also bars her claim.

III. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021) (citing Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2013)). In a traditional summary judgment motion, the moving party must show that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact such that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c)). A defendant may obtain a summary judgment by conclusively establishing an affirmative defense, such as the existence of a valid release agreement. Id. (citing Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010)).

We review the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Id. (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. 2007)). And we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories the movant advances is meritorious. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989); see also Garcia v. J.J.S. Enterprises, Inc., 225 S.W.3d 57, 64 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.).

IV. Release Agreements and the Fair Notice Rule

A release is a contractual arrangement whereby one party assumes the liability inherent in a situation and relieves the other party in advance of liability for its own negligence. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 507-08 (Tex. 1993). "It operates to extinguish the claim or cause of action as effectively as would a prior judgment between the parties and is an absolute bar to any right of action on the released matter." Id. (citing Hart v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 189 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1945)). Accordingly, a release is an affirmative defense to liability. Id. (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 94 (categorizing a release as an affirmative defense)).

To be enforceable, a release of liability for future negligence must satisfy the two prongs of the "fair notice requirements." See Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Tex. 2004). The first prong is the "express negligence doctrine," which provides that the intent to release a party to a contract from any future negligence claims "must be specifically stated in the four corners of the contract." Id. (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987); see also Permian Corp. v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 770 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ) (discussing the requirements of the "express negligence doctrine"). The second prong is the "conspicuousness" component, which requires "that something must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract the attention of a reasonable person" to the release provisions in the contract. See Reyes, 134 S.W.3d at 192 (citing Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 508). This prong may be satisfied when the release language in the contract appears in larger type, capital letters, contrasting colors, or otherwise "call[s] attention to itself." Id. (citing Littlefield v. Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272, 274-75 (Tex. 1997)); Garcia, 225 S.W.3d at 63-64; see also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201.^[7]

Whether a release agreement complies with the fair notice requirements is a question of law for a court to decide. Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 509; see also David v. Howeth, No. 02-20-00078-CV, 2020 WL 6165298, at *6 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 22, 2020, pet. denied) ("The interpretation of a release is a question of law to be decided by the trial court and reviewed de novo on appeal"); Reyes, 134 S.W.3d at 192 (recognizing that a "contract which fails to satisfy either of the fair notice requirements when they are imposed is unenforceable as a matter of law").

V. The Adequacy of the Release Forms

A. The release agreement

The Release Agreement Sherri signed prior to the trail ride was labeled in bold, capitalized letters as follows:

HORSE RENTAL, EQUISTRIAN, GUIDE & OUTFITTER SERVICES AGREEMENT, LIABLITY RELEASE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK AGREEMENT (FOR INDIVIDUALS).

The agreement contained several paragraphs, each of which Sherri initialed, including:

C. INHERENT RISKS/ASSUMPTION OF RISKS: I/WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT: Horseback riding is classified as [a] RUGGED ADVENTURE RECREATIONAL SPORT ACTIVITY

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