Green v. Layden
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-18-0025-R |
| Parties | BOBBY ALLAN GREEN, Plaintiff, v. DENNIS LAYDEN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Before this Court are the Motions to Dismiss of Defendants Dennis Layden, Adam Roll, Matthew Strayer, and William Sharpe (collectively, "Defendants"), Docs. 7, 13. Plaintiff Bobby Allan Green filed this suit on January 9, 2018. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff failed to timely serve Defendants. On June 19, 2018, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause by June 29, 2018, why service had not been timely made. See Order, Doc. 4. Plaintiff, in lieu of showing cause, requested issuance of summonses on June 26, 2018. See Doc. 5. The summonses were returned executed as to Defendants. See Doc. 8-9, 11-12. Defendants Layden and Roll moved to dismiss this suit on August 1, 2018, Doc. 7, and Defendants Strayer and Sharpe moved to dismiss on September 10, 2018. Doc. 13. Though Plaintiff has not responded to either motion, the Court's duty to consider these motions persists. See Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2003) ( .
While Defendants move to dismiss for untimely service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), they also move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. As all Defendants have ultimately received service, though untimely, the Court bypasses Defendants' procedural arguments and DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court treats Plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, as Plaintiff is pro se, the Court "liberally construe[s] [his] pleadings." Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff brings numerous claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from two incidents in January 2016. The Court will consider each alleged incident in turn.1
According to the complaint, Plaintiff pulled into a Lowe's Home Improvement parking lot in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at around 10:40 p.m. on January 9, 2016, because "[he] was getting t[ir]ed behind the wheel." Doc. 1, at 2. Plaintiff "passed out" in the parking lot; despite the night being "so cold," Plaintiff turned off his vehicle because the windows were rolled up and "[he] had [his] trench coat on." Id. Around 3:40 a.m. the next morning (January 10, 2016), Dennis Layden and Adam Roll, Oklahoma City police officers, knocked on Plaintiff's car window ("for no reason," says Plaintiff) and "shout[ed] at [him]." Id. Plaintiff's narrative deteriorates after these allegations, but, liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Officers Layden and Roll forced him out of his vehicle—presumably through their knocking and shouting. Id. at 2-3. The officers searched Plaintiff's vehicle without consent—Plaintiff surmises that this search was "illegal," a legal conclusion the Court may disregard—and, at some point, observed a "clear baggie containing marijuana" in plain view. Id.2
Plaintiff then describes a colloquy in a state court preliminary hearing on August 18, 2016. Id. at 3.3 At this hearing, Officers Layden and Roll testified that they either saw or concluded that Plaintiff was smoking marijuana in his car. Id. They based this conclusion on Plaintiff's green-tinted tongue and raised taste buds, which indicated to the officers, in light of their policing experience, that Plaintiff had recently been smoking. Id. In answeringquestions from Plaintiff's attorney, the officers testified that the car did not smell of marijuana and that they observed no drug paraphernalia inside the car. Id. Following the officers' testimony, Plaintiff was bound over for trial, but the state dismissed the charges. Id.
Plaintiff alleges the following counts against Officers Layden and Roll under Section 1983: the officers (1) unlawfully seized Plaintiff and searched his car in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) falsely imprisoned Plaintiff in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (3) subjected Plaintiff to excessive force in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
At around 2:45 a.m., Plaintiff was driving in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, when he was pulled over by police. Id. Plaintiff was not ticketed for a traffic violation, but the police did administer a field sobriety test, which Plaintiff passed. Id. Plaintiff then declined a blood test and breathalyzer. Id. at 3-4. Again, Plaintiff's narrative becomes less clear, but somehow Plaintiff eventually found himself in the back of a police car. Id. at 4. At some point after this, Officer Matthew Strayer, employed by the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department, arrived, placed Plaintiff in the back of his car, and transported him to Oklahoma County jail. Id. Officer Strayer later testified at Plaintiff's preliminary hearing as to what the officers at the scene had told him. Id. Plaintiff was bound over for trial, but, as with the first incident, the state dismissed the charges.4
Plaintiff alleges the following counts against Officers Strayer and Sharpe under Section 1983: the officers (1) subjected Plaintiff to excessive force in violation of hisFourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and (2) falsely imprisoned Plaintiff in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A plaintiff's complaint need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).5 Operationalizing the Rule, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" to survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard "is 'a middle ground between heightened fact pleading . . . and allowing complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)). That is, the plaintiff's complaint "need only give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 1192 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While assessing plausibility is "a context-specific task . . . requir[ing] . . . court[s] to draw on [their] judicial experience and common sense," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, complaints "'plead[ing] factual content that allows the court to . . . reasonabl[y] infer[] that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged'" are facially plausible. See S.E.C. v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Where, as here, a plaintiff brings claims under Section 1983, "it is particularly important . . . that thecomplaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom," as "state actors may only be held liable under § 1983 for their own acts, not the acts of third parties." Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250-51.
In considering a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the Court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013). And though the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's pro se complaint, it "will not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues." Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) ( ; Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) .
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 "Section 1983 provides that a person acting under color of state law who 'subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizenof the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2017) (ellipsis original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). "The core inquiry under any § 1983 action . . . is whether the plaintiff has alleged an actionable constitutional violation." Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 2007). Defendants here have asserted qualified immunity defenses, see Doc. 7, at 7; Doc. 13, at 6, which add an additional layer to the Section 1983 analysis. "[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal...
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