Green v. Mattingly

• Decision Date: 21 October 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 08-4636-cv.
• Citation: 585 F.3d 97
• Parties: Sharice GREEN, individually and on behalf of her minor child T.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John B. MATTINGLY, individually and as Commissioner, Benjamin Williams, individually and as supervisor, Russell Banks, individually and as manager, Danielle Saladino, individually and as caseworker, City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

585 F.3d 97

Sharice GREEN, individually and on behalf of her minor child T.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John B. MATTINGLY, individually and as Commissioner, Benjamin Williams, individually and as supervisor, Russell Banks, individually and as manager, Danielle Saladino, individually and as caseworker, City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 08-4636-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: October 7, 2009.

Decided: October 21, 2009.

Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Lansner & Kubitschek, New York, NY, for plaintiff-appellant.

Tahirih M. Sadrieh (Edward F.X. Hart, Elizabeth A. Wells, of counsel) for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, for defendants-appellees.

Before: MINER and CABRANES, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.^*

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Sharice Green ("plaintiff" or "Green") brought this action on behalf of herself and her child claiming that defendants-appellees violated the United States Constitution and New York law when they successfully petitioned the Family Court of the State of New York ("Family Court") for an order temporarily removing plaintiff's child from her custody. The District Court dismissed the bulk of plaintiff's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine on the ground that they complained of injuries caused by a state-court judgment.

We are once against presented with the task of defining the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a bundle of rules named after the Supreme Court's decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). We must determine here whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on allegations of injuries caused by an interlocutory order of the Family Court that temporarily removed plaintiff's child from her custody. Because the Family Court issued a superseding order returning plaintiff's child to her, and because the Family Court proceedings were ultimately dismissed, we conclude that plaintiff was not a "state-court loser[]" and, in addition, her § 1983 claims do not "invit[e] district court review and rejection" of a state court "judgment." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, we hold that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiff's claims in this action.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint or from documents incorporated by reference in the complaint and are, at this stage of the litigation, presumed to be true. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir.2002).

Green lived with her infant child, T.C., in a shelter operated by the New York City Department of Homeless Services. Green and her husband, Alex Claiborne ("Claiborne"), had some domestic disputes, but after his completion of various counseling programs, Claiborne also moved into the shelter with plaintiff and her child. After about three months of peaceful co-habitation, one day while Green was out, Claiborne slapped T.C. in the face. Upon returning to the shelter and learning of Claiborne's actions, Green called the police, and Claiborne was arrested.

Staff at the shelter reported the incident to the State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, and the report was transmitted to defendant John B. Mattingly, Commissioner of the New York City Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"). Mattingly assigned defendant Danielle Saladino, a child protection specialist, and two supervisors, defendants Benjamin Williams and Russell Banks, to investigate. Following their investigation, ACS officials brought child neglect proceedings in the Family Court, on January 31, 2006, naming both Claiborne and Green as respondents.

On that same day, a hearing was held in Family Court in which the Legal Aid Society appeared as appointed law guardian for T.C. and Saladino appeared on behalf of ACS. Green did not attend the hearing. Saladino told the Family Court that she had left messages for Green at the shelter. Green says that she received no messages.

Green alleges that Saladino made false statements in the neglect petition and at the Family Court hearing. Green also alleges that Saladino sought the removal of T.C. from her custody even though Saladino had no probable cause to believe that T.C. was in immediate danger. In any event, the Family Court issued an order temporarily removing T.C. from Green's custody and remanding T.C. to the custody of ACS.

Green immediately petitioned for the return of T.C. and, four days after the initial hearing, a second hearing was held at which Green appeared and testified on her own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Family Court found that "the child should be returned home because no imminent risk to the child's life or health has been demonstrated." The Family Court issued an order returning T.C. to Green, although the neglect proceedings remained open.

After Green moved, unsuccessfully, to dismiss the neglect petition, Green and ACS agreed to adjourn the Family Court proceedings for twelve months and, if Green followed certain conditions over the twelve-month period, to dismiss the neglect petition. The Family Court thus issued an order providing for "adjournment in contemplation of dismissal," and the petition was automatically dismissed twelve months later.

Green then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claiming that defendants had violated the U.S. Constitution and New York law by making false statements to the Family Court and by petitioning for the removal of T.C. without probable cause. She also alleged that defendants were liable for malicious prosecution in instigating and pursuing the Family Court proceedings and that the City of New York was liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), because defendants had sought the removal of T.C. pursuant to a practice or policy of ACS.

After amending her complaint once, Green sought leave to amend her complaint a second time to add claims of willful abuse of civil process under § 1983 and state law, but the District Court (Eric N. Vitaliano, Judge) granted leave to amend only with respect to the state-law claim. The District Court found that an amendment adding a claim of willful abuse of civil process under § 1983 would be futile because such claims are not recognized in this Circuit.

Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the District Court granted the motion in its entirety. With respect to Green's claims relating to the four-day removal of T.C. pursuant to the Family Court's order, the District Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. With respect to Green's claims of malicious prosecution, the District Court found that Green had failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted because she had failed to allege that the Family Court proceedings were terminated in her favor, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim. Finally, the District Court dismissed Green's Monell claims on the ground that she had "failed to state a claim alleging a violation of a constitutional right over which [the District Court had] jurisdiction." The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Green's remaining state-law claims on the ground that no federal claims remained in the litigation.

DISCUSSION

On appeal here, plaintiff argues that the District Court erred by (1) dismissing her claims related to the removal of her child under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) dismissing her claims for malicious prosecution for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (3) declining to grant her leave to amend her complaint to add a § 1983 claim for malicious abuse of civil process, and (4) declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims.

I. Dismissal Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

We review de novo the District Court's dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 83, and conclude that the District Court erred in finding that the Rooker-Feldman barred its jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.

A. The Four Requirements of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

"Underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the principle, expressed by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, that within the federal judicial system, only the Supreme Court may review state-court decisions." Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. There was a time when this Circuit applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "expansively," viewing it as "effectively coextensive with [the] doctrines of claim and issue preclusion." Id. at 84 (citing Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir.1996)). At that time, we held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied both to final state court judgments and to interlocutory state court orders. See Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir.1996) ("It cannot be the meaning of Rooker-Feldman that, while the inferior federal courts are barred from reviewing final decisions of state courts, they are free to review interlocutory orders.").

Much of our prior case law, however, was abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (noting that Exxon Mobil overturned this Circuit's Rooker-Feldman standard). Cautioning that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is meant to occupy "narrow ground," the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil held that the doctrine "is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired...