Green v. McKoy

Decision Date31 March 2023
Docket Number9:22-CV-00044 (LEK/ML)
PartiesSHAWN GREEN, Plaintiff, v. JEFF MCKOY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE E. KAHN United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Shawn Green commenced this civil rights action against various individuals employed by the State of New York (collectively Defendants) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), for violations of Plaintiff's rights secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”) ¶ 1. After Plaintiff filed the Complaint, an attorney from the New York State Attorney General's Office appeared on behalf of Defendants Jeff McKoy, Donald E. Venettozzi, Patrick G. Morrissey, Rachel A. Young, Michael Kirkpatrick, Theodore C. Zerniak, Donita E. McIntosh, Sharon Benson-Perry, Jessica M. Thomas, Angela J. Benware, Christopher Miller, Kenneth B. McKeighan, Marvin E. Hawk, Sean M. Detota, Paul P. Woodruff, Sandra L. Danforth, and Donna J. Mainville (collectively, “State Defendants). Dkt. Nos. 5, 14. Now before the Court are (1) Plaintiff's objections challenging three orders issued by the Honorable Miroslav Lovric, United States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. No. 19 (Plaintiff's Appeal”); and (2) the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Dkt. No. 15 (Motion to Dismiss). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff's Appeal, and grants in part and denies in part the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations

The following allegations are set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, and his attached exhibits, Dkt. No. 1-1, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of deciding the Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (recognizing the “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the [factual] allegations contained in a complaint” when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); see also Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim . . . a district court must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits . . . .” (emphasis added)).

On March 19, 1996, Plaintiff committed robbery in the first degree in Brooklyn, New York. Compl. ¶ 15. “On January 15, 1997[,] Plaintiff received a maximum determinate sentence of 25 years, that included an original conditional release . . . date of August 12, 2017.” Id. ¶ 16.

On December 12, 2016, while he was incarcerated at the Clinton Correctional Facility (“Clinton”), Plaintiff was “involuntarily assigned to” Clinton's Alcohol and Substance Abuse Training Program (“ASAT”) on a temporary basis [un]til it could be . . . determined and confirmed whether he needed the program.” Id. ¶ 21 n.1. However, according to Plaintiff, that determination never came. Id. ¶ 23. Then, on January 22, 2017, Plaintiff was “discharged” from ASAT “due to [his] violation of [ASAT's] treatment standards.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 50.[1]

On April 19, 2017, while still incarcerated at Clinton, Plaintiff appeared before [the] Clinton Time Allowance Committee (‘TAC') . . . to discuss his [conditional release] date status.”

Compl. ¶ 17. After this hearing, “the TAC decided to ‘withhold all good time until [Plaintiff's] completion of ASAT and ART,' i.e., Aggression Replacement Training. Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2). This decision delayed Plaintiff's earliest release date to March 10, 2021. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15. [U]pon completion,' Plaintiff could ‘request reconsideration,' so long as he also ‘maintain[ed] [a] positive disciplinary [record].' Compl. ¶ 18 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2). On April 26, 2017, Kirkpatrick, the Clinton Superintendent at the time, “confirmed the TAC recommendation to withhold all of Plaintiff's good time.” Compl. ¶ 19. On May 12, 2017, an unnamed designee of Deputy Commissioner of Program Services (“DCP”) McKoy-identified by Plaintiff as “Jane/John Doe-also affirmed the TAC recommendation. Id. ¶ 20.

That same day, Plaintiff signed a “program refusal notification,” by which Plaintiff refused to participate in ASAT because Plaintiff had “no such need for a program or any alcohol abuse/drug addiction requiring said program placement.” Id. ¶ 21 (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3). The following month, on June 14, 2017, Plaintiff sent “a formal complaint . . . inquiring into [the] unrequired ASAT program for” conditional release to DCP McKoy. Id. ¶ 24. Two days later, on June 16, 2017, Plaintiff completed ART. Id. ¶ 22 (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5).

On June 28, 2017, Plaintiff “forwarded” additional letters “regarding his need for ASAT” to Deputy Superintendent of Program (“DSP”) McIntosh and Deputy Superintendent of Security (“DSS”) Zerniak. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. On July 27, 2017, “DSP McIntosh informed Plaintiff in “an interdepartmental memorandum” that his letter had “‘been forwarded to [Senior Counselor (‘SC')] Benson-Perry . . . for review and appropriate response.'” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11).

Meanwhile, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to Clinton's Inmate Grievance Program office, which was “filed and assigned log number 71993-17[] on August 17, 2017. Id. ¶ 29.

Plaintiff's exhibits indicate that he filed this grievance for being held beyond his original conditional release date of August 12, 2017. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15. On September 11, 2017, the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (‘IGRC') denied Plaintiff['s] grievance,” Compl. ¶ 31, which he subsequently appealed to Superintendent Kirkpatrick, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13.

On September 8, 2017, Plaintiff received “a standardized interdepartmental letter” from DCP McKoy, informing Plaintiff that “his need for ASAT [had] ‘been reviewed and [was] upheld.' Compl. ¶ 30 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12). Four days later, on September 12, 2017, SC Benson-Perry also responded to Plaintiff's concerns about his participation in ASAT, Compl. ¶ 32, advising that:

The only way to finally determine whether or not you have an ASAT need is for you to accept the program for at least 30 days. During that time frame[,] assessments will be done to make a final decision as to whether or not you need the program. If it is determined that you DO NOT need to continue with ASAT, you are then free to request restoration of your good time. Until then, restoration will not be considered.

Dkt. No. 1-1 at 14.

On October 20, 2017, Superintendent Kirkpatrick denied Plaintiff's grievance appeal regarding Plaintiff's original conditional release date. Compl. ¶ 33 (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15). Three days later, Plaintiff appealed Superintendent Kirkpatrick's denial to the Central Office Review Committee (“CORC”) of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 15.

The following year, in July 2018, Plaintiff signed another “program refusal notification,” but this time for a “Transitional Services Phase II” class led by Counselor Benware. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 16. However, Plaintiff alleges that when he signed this form, Counselor Benware “concealed the fact [that] said class would satisfy Plaintiff's Transitional Services Phase [II] requirement prior to his release from DOCCS custody.” Compl. ¶ 27.

On January 16, 2019, the CORC ‘unanimously denied' Plaintiff's grievance on appeal, id. ¶ 34 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 18), noting that the TAC's “recommendation in April 2017 for loss of all available good time due to the grievant's non-completion of ASAT and ART was affirmed by [DCP McKoy's] designee on 5/8/17,” and “that TAC decisions are considered non-grievable in accordance with Directive #4040, 701.3 (e) (2),” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 18. The CORC reiterated earlier advice “that upon completion of ART and ASAT [Plaintiff] may write to the TAC Chairman to request reconsideration of his loss of good time.” Id.

On February 8, 2019, Plaintiff sent “a letter of inquiry as to Plaintiff's ASAT need” to ASAT Supervisor Morrissey. Compl. ¶ 35 (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19). On February 26, 2019, ASAT Director Young responded in a letter asserting that Plaintiff's ‘established need to participate in substance abuse treatment is correct,' Id. ¶ 36 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 20), and further noting that Plaintiff's “record indicates a self-admitted history of marijuana abuse,” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 20. On March 4, 2019, Plaintiff responded to Young's letter in a March 4, 2019, letter, seeking ‘documentary proof of [his] “self-admitted history of marijuana abuse.”' Compl. ¶ 37 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 21). Young responded again with a letter dated March 11, 2019, stating that [t]his issue was addressed in previous correspondence from this office dated, February 2[6], 2019.' Id. ¶ 38 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 22).

Two months later, Plaintiff was transferred to Upstate Correctional Facility (“Upstate”). Following a new assessment at Upstate on May 29, 2019 Plaintiff's need for ASAT was deemed to have been an error in judgment.” Id. ¶ 39 (citing Dkt. No. 1-1 at 23). In light of this change, Plaintiff wrote to the Upstate Inmate Records Coordinator (“IRC”) Mainville “to be rescheduled for reconsideration of good time allowance. Id. ¶ 40. IRC Mainville replied in an “interdepartmental memo,” informing Plaintiff that “his whole record [would] be reviewed at the June [2019] TAC meeting, ‘which [would] not require [Plaintiff's] presence.' Id. ¶ 41 (quoting Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25). At a meeting held on June 19, 2019, the Upstate TAC “recommended” that “only one year of [P]laintiff's previously withdrawn good-time . . . [be] restor[ed].” ...

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