Green v. Mobis Ala., LLC

Decision Date05 February 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 2:12–cv–277–MEF.
Citation995 F.Supp.2d 1285
PartiesNoria C. GREEN, Plaintiff, v. MOBIS ALABAMA, LLC, Jeremy Powers, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles Edward Guerrier, Alicia Kay Haynes, Gina Elaine Pearson, Kenneth Drew Haynes, Haynes & Haynes PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Frank McRight, Kristen Bryance Metheny, Amy Katherine Jordan, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, Henry Clay Barnett, Jr., Patricia Romano Osuch, Capell Howard PC, I.M. (Mike) Winter, Jr., Winter Legal Strategies LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

Plaintiff Noria Green (Green) brings suit against MOBIS Alabama, LLC (MOBIS), asserting claims based on Title VII for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation, as well as violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (Doc. # 42). Green also asserts various state law tort claims against MOBIS and Defendant Jeremy Powers (Powers). Green's claims arise out of alleged sexual harassment by Powers and her termination based on what MOBIS claims were falsified doctor's notes Green submitted in connection with requests she made for FMLA leave. Now before the Court is MOBIS's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 58). Powers has not moved for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, MOBIS's motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to all counts.

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 1343(a)(3); and 1367. The parties do not dispute that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and the Court finds adequate allegations supporting both.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-movingparty has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by their own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotations omitted). To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that it can establish the basic elements of its claim, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, because “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value” at the summary judgment stage. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

III. Facts

The Court has carefully considered the submissions of the parties in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, taken in the light most favorable to Green, the non-moving party, establish the following material facts:

MOBIS operates a manufacturing plant in Montgomery County, Alabama that, among other things, supplies plastic bumpers to Hyundai Motors Manufacturing Alabama, LLC. Green, an African–American female, began working for MOBIS on February 21, 2005. At the times relevant to this lawsuit, Green worked in the Paint Department at MOBIS. Her duties were to ensure that the bumpers manufactured for Hyundai vehicles matched the color of the vehicles to which they would be attached.

In December 2010, Powers, an African–American male, transferred to the first shift in the Paint Department (3:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.), which was also Green's shift. At the time of his transfer, Powers was a Team Leader, which is an hourly-paid, non-supervisory position. Green claims that in January 2011 Powers began sexually harassing her. Powers sent Green inappropriate text messages (e.g., “Wanna come hold it ... ha ha,” “U look cute ...,” “kiss kiss”), including a picture of his erect penis, which he referred to as “Big Willie.” These text messages were sometimes sent outside of work hours. Powers would stare at Green's breasts and said to her on at least one occasion that her nipples were hard. Green also claims that Powers touched her inappropriately. Powers would press himself against Green from behind and say that his penis was erect, grab Green's buttocks, and on two occasions grabbed Green's breasts. Green states that Powers did these things “very often” and “many times” over the course of several months beginning in January 2010.1 (Doc. # 60–1, at 42–43.)

MOBIS has a sexual harassment policy, and it is undisputed that Green received a copy of this policy on more than one occasion and also attended annual sexual harassment sessions. MOBIS's policy defines sexual harassment, prohibits, and includes the following statement on reporting sexual harassment:

Reporting and Investigation

Anyone who feels that he or she has been subjected to conduct that violates this policy has a duty to immediately report the matter. MOBIS provides multiple avenues for reporting harassment to the aggrieved Team Member's Supervisor, Department Manager, Team Relations Department, or HR. If you do not receive prompt acknowledgment of your complaint from Team Relations or HR, notify HR immediately. Early reporting and intervention have shown to be one of the most effective methods of resolving actual or perceived incidents of harassment. MOBIS will make every effort to stop alleged harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive, but can only do so with your cooperation.

Every report of perceived harassment will be fully, promptly, and impartially investigated and corrective action will be taken where appropriate. Confidentiality will be maintained throughout the investigatory process to the extent consistent with adequate investigation and appropriate corrective action. Violation of this policy will result in disciplinary action, up to and including discharge.

(Doc. # 60–4, at 56.) Power Point slides used in MOBIS's sexual harassment training also stress an employee's duty to report sexual harassment as soon as possible, stating:

• If comfortable, tell the perpetrator to stop, say NO!

• If inappropriate behavior continues, notify the chain of supervision.

• If it still persists, contact human resources officials for appropriate administrative procedures.

(Doc. # 60–7, at 15.)

As stated above, the policy directs employees to report sexual harassment to their “Supervisor, Department Manager, Team Relations Department, or HR.” Green's Supervisor throughout her employment with MOBIS was Don Crosley (“Crosley”), and he was generally present every day throughout Green's shift. Human Resources was located in a separate building. Team Members had to schedule an appointment with Human Resources and could not access the building without the security badge of a Team Leader or someone in a more senior position. Team Relations existed to bridge the gap between Human Resources and Team Members by being present throughout the plant on every shift. Team Relations were responsible for taking any concerns or documents from Team Members during their shift to the Human Resources Department.

In February 2011, Green first complained of Powers's sexual harassment to Coy Kendrick (“Kendrick”). Kendrick was a Team Leader on a different shift, but Green had worked with him in the past and felt comfortable talking to him. Team Leaders like Kendrick, however, are not among the members of management specified in MOBIS's sexual harassment policy to whom employees are directed to report sexual harassment.

On April 6, 2011, approximately three months after Powers's sexual harassment began, and during which time Green says she was sexually harassed “on almost a daily basis,” (Doc. # 77–1, ¶ 7), Green placed an unsigned, anonymous complaint in an UPLINK box. UPLINK boxes were a means of communicating with management instituted by MOBIS. MOBIS placed several locked UPLINK boxes throughout their facilities. Employees were encouraged to place written comments in the boxes, which were then removed by members of Team Relations and taken to Human Resources. The UPLINK comments would go to Curt Bennett (“Bennett”), who was assistant manager of Team Relations and later manager of Human Resources. Bennett would typically type the handwritten comments from the UPLINK boxes, add a typed response from management, and post...

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