Green v. Polyester Fibers, LLC
| Decision Date | 09 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-00234-SA-DAS |
| Parties | COURTNEY GREEN PLAINTIFF v. POLYESTER FIBERS, LLC DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Plaintiff Courtney Green commenced this personal injury action against Defendant Polyester Fibers, LLC, alleging that he sustained severe injuries on Defendant's premises as a result of its negligence. Before the Court now are two motions for summary judgment [123, 125]. After considering the motions, responses, rules, and authorities, the Court finds as follows:
Factual and Procedural Background
In Spring 2012, a temporary staffing agency, Snelling, LLC, assigned Plaintiff to work at Defendant's Tupelo, Mississippi division, which produces fiber batting used in the manufacture of furniture. There is conflicting testimony about Plaintiff's duties on Defendant's premises. By one account, Plaintiff provided only basic cleanup services at the plant. By another, Plaintiff was a member of a production crew and was training to operate a garnett machine, which processes raw polyester fiber into the rolls of fiber batting.
On April 25, 2012, Plaintiff entered past a tall, yellow guard surrounding the perimeter of a garnett machine, apparently attempting to clean fiber located underneath the machine. Plaintiff became caught in the "in-running nip point" between the "lickerin" cylinder and the "main breaker" cylinder of the machine. There are incomplete and contradicted versions of why Plaintiff traveled past the yellow guard and whether the machine was operating when he did so. Regardless, Plaintiff suffered significant injury and has initiated this action to recovercompensatory and punitive damages. He alleges "negligence and/or wantoness and/or gross negligence[.]"
Defendant makes three arguments in the pending motions for summary judgment.1 First, it contends that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff negligently contributed to his own injuries, and that his recovery should be offset by a percentage to be determined by the jury. Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims are completely barred by a Mississippi statute that prevents independent contractors and their employees from recovering under certain circumstances. Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is not supported by the evidence. The Court considers each issue in turn.
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "set forth 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). In reviewingthe evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Importantly, conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments have never constituted an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1997); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Damages for personal injuries under Mississippi law "shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured" when the Defendant establishes that the Plaintiff is "guilty of contributory negligence." MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15. Contributory negligence functions as an "affirmative defense and the burden of proving it is upon the defendant." Johnson v. Howell, 56 So. 2d 491, 492 (Miss. 1952); Chickaway v. United States, 4:11-CV-22-CWR, 2012 WL 2222848, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 14, 2012). Negligence, as defined by Mississippi courts, is "doing what a reasonable, prudent person would not do, or failing to do what a reasonable, prudent person would do, under substantially similar circumstances." West v. Drury Co., 412 F. App'x 663, 667 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Glover ex rel. Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So. 2d 1267, 1276-77 (Miss. 2007)).
There is little dispute that Plaintiff voluntarily moved past the yellow perimeter guard into the area around the garnett machine. Although there were no bystanders witnessing the injury, and although Plaintiff cannot remember the details of the incident, the various experts generally agree that Plaintiff crawled under the guard, climbed over the guard, or traveledthrough a hole in the guard. Aside from this fact, however, the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's injury are less than clear.
A primary point of contention in this regard is whether Plaintiff was instructed to clean the garnett machine by Mike White, one of Polyester's line operators. White testified in his deposition that he never instructed Plaintiff to clean the subject garnett machine. In contradiction, one of Defendant's experts, Eugenia Kennedy, stated that White "was asking [Plaintiff] . . . to clean under the Garnett . . . machine."2
In any event, Defendant argues that Plaintiff was prohibited from entering inside the guard to clean the machine. It contends that Plaintiff should have instead remained outside the guard and used a hose or "wand" to blow the fiber out from under the machine. Plaintiff testified, however, that he received no instruction from Defendant on how to perform the cleaning. And according to various sources, Defendant provided no training to Plaintiff on lockout/tagout procedures associated with servicing and maintenance of the garnett machine. Plaintiff also explained that per Snelling's directions, he was not "supposed to touch the air hose . . . [he was] just supposed to just keep that broom in [his] hand."
It is similarly unclear whether the subject garnett machine was operating at the time Plaintiff entered past the perimeter guard. According to White, he turned off the feeder rolls of the machine, but the machine was still operating. The medical records, on the other hand, indicate that the machine was not operating until after Plaintiff began cleaning the machine.3 For example, the nurse's note lists Plaintiff's chief complaint as "cleaning of polyester back/foam machine at a factory and machine turned on[.]" Similarly, the history of present illness,documented by Dr. Wesley Woods, states that Plaintiff "was working at a local plant cleaning out a polyester machine when it turned on . . . ."
Therefore, at a minimum, the record contains factual questions of whether Plaintiff (a) was instructed to clean the subject machine, (b) had been told not to pass the perimeter guard, (c) received instruction about using the "wand" to clean under the machine, and (d) entered the protected area while the machine was already running.
The Fifth Circuit has cautioned that "[s]ummary judgment is ordinarily (but not always) inappropriate when the issue involves negligence or contributory negligence." Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 703 F.2d 921, 925 (5th Cir. 1983) (). That is, "even when there is no dispute as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to decide whether the conduct in question meets the reasonable man standard." Id. Thus here, where there is significant dispute over the facts relevant to Plaintiff's conduct, the Court finds summary judgment to be unwarranted.
The Court previously found that Plaintiff's status as Defendant's employee is a factual question for the jury to resolve. Defendant argues that if Plaintiff is not Defendant's employee, then he was necessarily an employee of its independent contractor, Snelling. Plaintiff has not disputed this classification for summary judgment purposes.
Thus, Plaintiff may face an additional potential bar to recovery found in Mississippi Code Section 11-1-66. This statute prevents an "owner, occupant, lessee or managing agent of property" from being liable for personal injuries of "an independent contractor or theindependent contractor's employees resulting from dangers of which the contractor knew or reasonably should have known."4 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-66.
The application of Section 11-1-66 becomes somewhat unclear when the alleged independent contractor, here Snelling, assigns its employee to the worksite. Under one reading of the statute, immunity would exist only if Snelling knew or should have known of the dangers at hand, regardless of Plaintiff's knowledge. After all, the statute specifies that an "independent contractor" or the "independent contractor's employees" are barred from recovering, but only if the "contractor" knew or should have known of the injury-producing danger. Id.; see also Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 3:12-CV-21-CWR, 2013 WL 395975, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 31, 2013) (). Under a different reading, the term "contractor" could be a general...
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