Green v. Pro Football, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. PJM 13–1961. |
| Citation | 31 F.Supp.3d 714 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
| Parties | Barrett GREEN, Plaintiff v. PRO FOOTBALL, INC. d/b/a the Washington Redskins, et al., Defendants. |
Bruce M. Plaxen, Plaxen and Adler PA, Columbia, MD, Michael J. McAllister, Michael J. McAllister PA, Miami Beach, FL, Seth Miles, Grossman Roth PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff.
Craig F. Ballew, Robert Lawrence Ferguson, Jr., Ferguson Schetelich and Ballew PA, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.
Between the years 2000 and 2004, Barrett Green (“Green”) was a professional football player with, among others, the New York Giants team of the National Football League (“NFL”). Pro Football, Inc. (“Pro Football”) at all relevant times was the owner of the Washington Redskins team.1 Green claims that Pro Football, through at least one of its coaches, established and/or tolerated a bounty program wherein its team's players were given financial rewards for deliberately injuring opposing players. Green sued Pro Football and Robert Royal, a former player on the Washington team, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, alleging state law torts Green says he suffered as a result of this bounty program during a game between the New York and Washington teams.
Pro Football removed the case to this Court on the basis of purported federal question jurisdiction, and subsequently filed the present Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 11). Royal has also filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 16), joining Pro Football's arguments. Green moved to remand the case to state court, but thereafter withdrew his Motion, asserting jurisdiction in this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship.2 Supplemental briefing having concluded, the Court now rules on Pro Football's and Royal's Motions. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS–IN–PART and DENIES–IN–PART their Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.
According to the Complaint, on December 5, 2004, Green, who was a defensive linebacker for the New York Giants, was playing in a game with the Washington team at the Washington team's Maryland stadium. Compl. ¶ 13. Royal was playing for the Washington team as an offensive tight end. Id. ¶ 15.
According to the Complaint, the Washington team deemed Green a “disruptive presence” in his team's prior win against the Washington team on September 19, 2014, after Green stopped Washington's running game and recovered a fumble, returning it for a touchdown. Id. ¶ 12. The Giant's next game against the Washington team was the December 5, 2004 encounter. Id. ¶ 13. Green was listed on the injury report for the week as “questionable” by reason of a knee injury
he sustained several weeks before. Id. ¶ 14. Nevertheless, Green was able to and did play on December 5. In the third quarter of the game, Royal lined up as a receiver for Washington. Id. ¶ 15. After the ball was snapped to the Washington quarterback, Royal allegedly ran towards Green, who was defending for the Giants, lowered his helmet and at full speed dove into Green's knees. Id. ¶ 20. The referee ruled Royal's action an illegal “crackback” block under the rules of the game and penalized the Giants.3
Id. ¶ 22. As a result of the hit, Green was immediately disabled and had to be assisted off the field. He was later determined to have torn his anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”). Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Although Green underwent surgery when the season ended, he never recovered his form and his football career was effectively over. Id. ¶ 26.
At the time of the hit, Green was suspicious that he might have been purposely targeted and told his head coach of his suspicion. Id. ¶ 35. He also told the New York Post that he thought Royal's hit was intentional. Id. ¶ 36. Green's head coach, however, told him it was not possible that the injury was intentional. Id. ¶ 37. Green says he relied on this statement, believing that an investigation had been, or would be made. Id. ¶ 38. He also relied on Royal's own representations, after Green's press statement, that the injury was unintentional. Id. ¶ 39.
At that time and for some time thereafter, however, Green says he was not aware that as of the time of the hit by Royal, the Washington team had a bounty program in place whereby, according to Green, its players would receive financial rewards for deliberately injuring opposing players. It was not until March 3, 2012, when the Washington Post published an article entitled “NFL to investigate Redskins over bounty allegations under [Coach] Gregg Williams,” which reported that the team's defense under Williams may have had a system to reward players with cash for hits that knocked opponents from games, that Green became aware of the program. Id. ¶¶ 40–41. Also, at about the same time, the NFL announced its findings, after investigation, that when serving as Defensive Coordinator for the New Orleans Saints team, Williams was determined to have implemented a bounty program of the same type allegedly in effect with the Washington team. Id. ¶ 42.
Once Green learned of the bounty program, he brought his suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Pro Football, Royal, and Williams (who has since been dismissed from the suit), alleging that Royal's career-ending hit on him in 2004 was made pursuant to the Washington team's bounty program. His suit proceeds on the following counts: Count I for Battery against Royal; Count II for Vicarious Liability against Pro Football; Count III for Negligence against Royal; Count IV for Negligence against Pro Football, and Count VI for Negligent Supervision against Pro Football.4
In their Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Pro Football and Royal argue that Green's claims are barred by the statute of limitations and, in any case, are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In this regard, they argue that Green's claims are covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) in effect between the National Football League, its owners, and players, and that Green failed to exhaust his remedies as provided in the CBA.
The Court considers these arguments.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than ‘a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’ ” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). “It requires the plaintiff to articulate facts, when accepted as true, that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief, i.e., the ‘plausibility of entitlement to relief’ ”Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
In considering such a motion, the court ordinarily accepts the complaint's factual allegations and draws any reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Companies, Inc., 679 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir.2012).
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) ; Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports, 149 F.3d 253, 260–61 (4th Cir.1998).
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must view the facts and all inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “A mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. There must be Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).
Pro Football and Royal argue first that all of Green's claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Complaint, they say, was brought after Maryland's three year statute expired, see Ford v. Douglas, 144 Md.App. 620, 799 A.2d 448, 449 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.2002) (); Md.Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–101 (), and submit that no exception tolled the three year period. Because, they say, Green concedes he was immediately aware of his potential battery claim at the time of Royal's hit, he was charged with promptly investigating all his potential claims. In opposition, Green argues that his claims are indissolubly linked with the bounty program, the existence of which he could not reasonably have discovered until the program was revealed in the press and by the NFL in 2012. He further argues that his claims were tolled by the fraudulent concealment doctrine.
Pro Football and Royal next argue that Green's claims, all of which are predicated on state law, are...
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Green v. Pro Football, Inc.
...31 F.Supp.3d 714Barrett GREEN, Plaintiffv.PRO FOOTBALL, INC. d/b/a the Washington Redskins, et al., Defendants.Civil No. PJM 13–1961.United States District Court, D. Maryland.Signed July 7, 2014Filed July 8, Motion granted in part and denied in part. [31 F.Supp.3d 717] Bruce M. Plaxen, Plax......