Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.

Citation19 Cal.4th 66,960 P.2d 1046,78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16
Decision Date31 August 1998
Docket NumberNo. S060370,S060370
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 960 P.2d 1046, 136 Lab.Cas. P 58,448, 14 IER Cases 449, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6792, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9379 Richard GREEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RALEE ENGINEERING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent

Oshman, Brownfield & Smith, North Hollywood, George E. Brownfield, Los Angeles, Quackenbsh & Quackenbush and William C. Quackenbush, San Mateo, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Joseph Posner, Encino, and James P. Stoneman II, Claremont, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Nemecek & Cole, Jonathan B. Cole, Sherman Oaks, Scott C. Pape and Craig G. Staub, Santa Monica, or Defendant and Respondent.

Latham & Watkins, Wayne S. Flick and M. Michelle Alvarez, Los Angeles, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

CHIN, Justice.

May administrative regulations be a source of fundamental public policy that limits an employer's right to discharge an otherwise at-will employee? Although our Legislature has determined that an employment contract is generally terminable at either party's will (Lab.Code, § 2922), 1 we have created a narrow exception to this rule by recognizing that an employer's right to discharge an at-will employee is subject to limits that fundamental public policy imposes. (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (Tameny ).) In Tameny, we drew from Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Petermann ) to hold that at-will employees may recover tort damages from their employers if they can show they were discharged in contravention of fundamental public policy. (Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 177, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) Both Tameny and Petermann relied on substantial public policy concerns to limit the employer's discharge right, and subsequent cases have recognized similarly narrow public policy violations for discriminatory or retaliatory termination. (Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 172, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330; Petermann, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d at p. 188, 344 P.2d 25 [perjury]; Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157 (Stevenson ) [age discrimination]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 90-91, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373 [sex discrimination].)

Following Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, this court explained that employees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are "tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions." (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 We continue to believe that, aside from constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to declare the public policy of the state. (See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 818, 824, fn. 10, 274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253; see also Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 297, 188 Cal.Rptr. 159 [Courts must not "mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law."].) Recognizing this important distinction, however, does not allow us to ignore the fact that statutorily authorized regulations that effectuate the Legislature's purpose to ensure commercial airline safety are "tethered to" statutory provisions.

                [960 P.2d 1049] P.2d 680 (Gantt ).)   Here, we address a related, albeit narrow issue.  We must decide whether particular administrative regulations implementing the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1301 et seq., now § 40101 et seq.), a public safety statute that created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), should be included as a source of fundamental public policy that limits an employer's right to discharge an at-will employee.  Like the Court of Appeal, we conclude they should
                

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment in favor of Richard Green (plaintiff) and against Ralee Engineering Company (defendant), and we remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this judgment.

DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Rules

Because the case arises out of a summary judgment motion that the trial court originally granted, we initially note that under the 1992 and 1993 amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, a defendant moving for summary judgment "has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the [plaintiff's] cause of action ... cannot be established...." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) 2 Once the defendant satisfies this obligation, the burden shifts to the plaintiff "to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)

Both the trial courts and the appellate courts apply these principles in resolving summary judgment motions. "On appeal, however, the appellate court conducts an independent review of the trial court's resolution of questions of law. [Citations.]" (Davis v. Consolidated Freightways (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 354, 360, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 438.) Keeping these rules in mind, we turn our attention to defendant's appeal.

B. Facts

The principal facts alleged are these: Defendant manufactures fuselage and wing components for military and civilian aircraft. It supplies those parts to major airline assembly companies such as Boeing and to major war plane assembly companies such as Northrop. In 1968, defendant hired plaintiff as a quality control inspector. Plaintiff was an at-will employee, and, as such, could be discharged at any time, and for any reason not otherwise prohibited by law. (§ 2922.) By the early 1990's, plaintiff was in his 50's and working the night shift as part of a 4-member team inspecting aircraft parts before defendant shipped them to Boeing, Northrop, and other aviation companies.

Beginning in 1990, plaintiff allegedly noticed defendant was shipping some airplane parts even though, according to plaintiff, they failed the inspections his team performed. On several occasions over the next two years, plaintiff objected to defendant's practice to supervisory and management personnel and to the company president. Plaintiff made all of his complaints internally, and at no time did he complain to outside government sources.

According to plaintiff, his complaints met with varying results. Defendant corrected its practices to conform to Northrop's contractual In March 1991, defendant shut down its night shift, citing a downturn in orders for the parts it produced. Defendant then discharged plaintiff along with other night shift employees. At the same time, defendant retained several other night shift inspectors, some with less experience than plaintiff.

[960 P.2d 1050] requirements. Nonetheless, defendant continued to ship allegedly defective parts to Boeing. In an effort to provide proof of the ongoing practice, plaintiff began photocopying the inspection reports, including some reports concerning parts destined for Boeing.

Plaintiff filed a timely wrongful termination action against defendant. He alleged defendant terminated him in retaliation for his complaints about its inspection practices. Plaintiff also claimed his complaints served a broad public policy favoring aviation safety, entitling him to tort damages even though he was an at-will employee.

Defendant sought summary judgment against plaintiff. Defendant observed it was entitled to discharge plaintiff, an at-will employee, even if it was motivated by his objections to its inspection and shipping practices, because no statute or constitutional provision specifically prohibited these practices. Defendant claimed that plaintiff could not establish his cause of action for wrongful termination as a matter of law (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2)) because "[p]laintiff's termination was not in violation of any fundamental public policy embedded in either a statute or constitutional provision." Defendant noted that plaintiff cited to the entire Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1301 et seq., now § 40101 et seq.) to support his Tameny claim; he cited no specific statute or constitutional provision to support the claim. 3

The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor. It stated that plaintiff was an at-will employee whom defendant could discharge without cause. (§ 2922.)

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. After engaging in independent research, the court identified several key federal regulations involving airline safety on which plaintiff now relies and requested supplemental briefing on whether those regulations could form the basis for plaintiff's public policy claim. The court considered defendant's contention that during the pretrial discovery phase plaintiff failed to produce the appropriate statutes to support his assertion at the summary judgment stage, but concluded that plaintiff had adequately identified several relevant FAA regulations as part of his opposition to summary judgment. Finding airline safety so closely tied to the statutory and regulatory purpose, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had established a sufficient connection between the public policy favoring safe manufacture of passenger aircraft and federal law to satisfy our rule that the public policy be based on either a statute or constitutional provision.

Defendant argues principally that, even if we assume it did everything plaintiff claimed, its conduct violated no public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision. Consequently, defendant argues, plaintiff's discharge fails to qualify as a wrongful discharge justifying a...

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