Green v. State

Decision Date29 June 1990
Docket Number4 Div. 543
Citation571 So.2d 356
PartiesWilliam Edward GREEN v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Kathleen M. Nemish, Dothan, for appellant.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Sandra Lewis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of forgery in the second degree and was sentenced to 19 years' imprisonment pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act.

I

The appellant argues that he was denied his rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury, because, he says, the State improperly struck two of the five prospective black jurors. The appellant argues that the State failed to come forward with sufficient race-neutral explanations for these two strikes.

The record indicates that there were 36 potential jurors, five of them black. The prosecutor struck two black females, leaving three blacks sitting on the jury. The record indicates that, after the jury was struck, the trial court held a hearing on the appellant's Batson motion. During the hearing, the appellant alleged that the State had asked only superficial questions during the voir dire and that the two strikes against black veniremembers therefore must have been made for racial reasons. The prosecutor responded that he had struck a jury from the very same panel earlier in the week and that, during the prior voir dire, a number of questions which went into great detail were asked. The prosecutor further alleged that he made note of that fact during the striking and he stated that he was "pretty well familiar with them." The prosecutor further responded that he struck a black female; he said he had represented in a criminal case a person that he believed was a relative of the female prospective juror and that thereafter, when he went to work with the district attorney's office, he had to prosecute the same relative, "for which members of her family called me [the prosecutor] on the phone and were very upset that I would do something like that after I had represented her." The prosecutor stated that although he did not know for certain that the two were related, they had the same last name and "could pass for twins almost."

The prosecutor also stated that he struck the other black female pursuant to questions which he asked of her during voir dire, as to whether or not she was related to Willie Frank Eady. The prosecutor stated that he felt that the court was probably "aware of" that individual and, because the potential juror stated that she was related to him by marriage, he struck her. Thereafter, the trial court denied the appellant's motion. Initially, we note that it is doubtful that the appellant presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination pursuant to Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), or Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); however, because the prosecutor went forward with his reasons for the strikes, we find that the trial court properly held the reasons given by the prosecutor to be sufficiently race-neutral. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987). See Ex parte Lynn, 543 So.2d 709 (Ala.1988); Wilson v. State, 571 So.2d 1237 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). See also Allen v. State, 555 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) (court upheld as race-neutral reasons given by prosecutor for striking black jurors: that juror had the same last name and was believed to be related to a person whom this prosecutor had previously prosecuted and another juror who was known by law enforcement officers to have a bad reputation and was believed to be related to a local criminal with the same last name).

II

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence which was seized pursuant to a warrantless search. The appellant concedes that the officer had the right to stop and question him but argues that the officer did not have the right to search him unless he was under the reasonable belief that the appellant was armed and potentially dangerous. The record indicates that a police officer responded to "a lookout that had been given ... by the communications section" concerning three black men who had twice tried to pass checks, which had been stolen and forged, at a grocery store. The dispatch also contained information describing the perpetrators' clothing and indicated that they were last seen walking in an easterly direction from the store. The officer then proceeded to the grocery store and, en route, observed three black men matching the description. The officer testified that he and another officer who was riding with him stopped their vehicle and approached the men. They identified themselves as police officers and asked the men to place their hands against the police car, which they did. A check which had been stolen and forged, was taken from the pockets of each of the three men as they were searched. On cross-examination, the officer testified that he did not place the appellant under arrest until he discovered the checks in their pockets. The appellant contended that the search was illegal because, although he concedes that the officer had probable cause to conduct a stop or frisk or to arrest the appellant, he argues that the officer did not have the right to conduct the search. The appellant contended that this was not a proper stop and frisk because the purpose of such a limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but rather to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence because of concealed weapons. The State argued that the search was proper because, it argues, the dispatch's indication that the perpetrators were leaving and mobile provided the exigent circumstances for an exception to a warrantless search.

It is clear from the officer's testimony that, in discovering the forged and stolen checks in the perpetrators' pockets, he was not conducting a pat-down for weapons, which is permitted in the stop and frisk situation, but rather was searching the suspects for evidence. See LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(b) (2d ed. 1987) ("Moreover, once the pat-down has determined that the suspect is not armed, the police may not without probable cause once again search the suspect and confiscate the contents of his pockets"). During the officer's testimony at trial, defense counsel asked him, "Why did you not immediately arrest them?" The officer responded, "I wanted to look for the evidence first." The officer's testimony further revealed that he conducted the search because he feared that, if given the opportunity, the perpetrators could have easily destroyed the checks.

In this case we need not determine the probability that evidence would have been found on the appellant's person and that such evidence could have been destroyed, because the search of the appellant was conducted pursuant to a custodial arrest.

"The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment."

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).

In the present case, although precise words were not spoken referring to the appellant's being placed under arrest, until after the search was conducted, the probable cause existed for the arrest prior...

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7 cases
  • Fisher v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 1, 1991
    ...was also struck for sufficiently race-neutral reasons. See Allen v. State, 555 So.2d 1185 (Ala.Cr.App.1989); Green v. State, 571 So.2d 356 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) Holton v. State, [Ms. CR-89-1114, November 30, 1990], 1990 WL 237230 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). "In reviewing the trial court's finding that t......
  • Evans v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • September 29, 2000
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • July 8, 1994
    ...the interest of a veniremember's relative has been held to be a race-neutral reason for striking the veniremember. See Green v. State, 571 So.2d 356, 357 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). As to another female potential juror who was struck because she was young, the prosecutor indicated that the potential......
  • Callahan v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 25, 1994
    ...were "not necessary to support probable cause to arrest." ' "LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 5.4(a) (2d ed. 1987)." Green v. State, 571 So.2d 356, 359-60 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) quoting, in part, Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 41, 88 S.Ct. 1912, 1912, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)). See also United State......
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