Green v. State

• Citation: 168 Ala. 90,53 So. 286
• Parties: GREEN v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 06 July 1910
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

53 So. 286

168 Ala. 90

GREEN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

July 6, 1910

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tallapoosa County; A. H. Alston, Judge.

John Green was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed and remanded.

See also, 160 Ala. 1, 49 So. 676.

James W. Strother, for appellant.

Alexander M. Garber, Atty. Gen., for the State.

MAYFIELD J.

Defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife, was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to the penitentiary for seven years.

The evidence was undisputed that deceased was killed by a gunshot wound, and that the gun was in the hands of the defendant when it was fired. The defense was that it was an accidental killing; that deceased and defendant were walking down a hill or slant, deceased being in front and defendant a few steps in the rear; that while so walking defendant stumbled and came near falling, and in his endeavor to regain his equilibrium the gun was accidentally discharged, the load entering the body of deceased about her shoulders and neck. The state proved quite a number of prior statements by the defendant as to how the killing occurred, many of which were not materially different from his present version as to how it happened; others were slightly different in details; but all of these statements as to how the killing occurred tended to exculpate defendant or to show that the killing was an unavoidable accident. There was, however, proof of some statements by him which were in the nature of threats, and of one statement (made to a woman) that he just killed his wife to get her out of the way. The defense objected to the proof of these various statements by the defendant, on the ground that they were confessions and were not shown to be voluntary. All the circumstances tend strongly to show that they were all voluntary, and this overcame the prima facie presumption of law that they were involuntary. See former appeal, 160 Ala. 1, 49 So. 676. The court overruled each of defendant's objections, to which ruling the defendant excepted, now assigning the same as error.

Each of these rulings thus excepted to has been separately considered; and we find no reversible error as to any one. But few of the statements were confessions of guilt. They were nearly all explanatory statements, and favorable to the innocence of the defendant--just such statements as we would expect the defendant to prove if permitted so to do. A few of them tended, however, to contradict his own evidence as to how the killing occurred, but only as to matters of detail. They all tended to show that the killing was an unavoidable accident. But if they were all confessions or statements in the nature thereof, we could not say that the court erred in allowing proof thereof. While the preliminary proof, if not as abundant as it might have been to rebut the presumption that the confessions were involuntary, yet we are not willing to say that the court erred in any instance in admitting the proof of the declarations. In fact, we feel sure that they were all voluntarily made. There is no direct proof to show that defendant was under any mental duress when he made any of the statements. There is no evidence of any threats or persuasion on the part of any one to induce or compel the statements. They were shown to be wholly gratuitous on the part of defendant. While some of the statements were answers to questions, in each instance the defendant had volunteered to tell how the accident occurred, and, as before stated they were nearly all exculpatory; and, but for the fact that they were called for by the state, they would be self-serving declarations for the defendant. There is no direct proof, and no circumstance, to show that any one of these statements was not voluntary.

"Confessions to be admissible, must be voluntary, and that they were voluntary must appear. This is usually shown by an examination voir dire as to promises and threats, etc. Where, however, the facts and circumstances under which they were made affirmatively show that there were no improper influences proceeding from the person to whom they were made, or from any other person, or from the surrounding circumstances, the confessions are prima facie free and voluntary, and are admissible; and the same is true where an inducement involves 'only a collateral benefit.' Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 64, 10 So. 522; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114; Washington's Case, 106 Ala. 58, 17 So. 546."

"The law undoubtedly requires that a confession should be shown prima...