Green v. State, 10S00-9011-CR-706
| Decision Date | 12 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 10S00-9011-CR-706,10S00-9011-CR-706 |
| Parties | Stephen Franklin GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Vicki L. Carmichael, Chief Public Defender, Jeffersonville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant, Stephen Franklin Green, was convicted by jury of murder and sentenced to 60 years. He raises four issues in this direct appeal:
(1) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction;
(2) Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs;
(3) Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to a prior act of misconduct; and
(4) Whether the jury disregarded the trial court's instructions.
We affirm.
On March 7, 1990, Green found the body of Vernice England, the victim, in the basement of her home and notified the police. The time of death was determined to be the morning of March 2, 1990. The cause of death was from several blows to the head with a blunt instrument, such as a hammer.
Green first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Our standard of review is well known: We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses; instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the The evidence which tends to support the verdict is as follows. Green and the victim were friends and had spent much time together for several months prior to her death. The victim was careful with her money and maintained careful records of her finances, including her checking account. The checking account had never been overdrawn until near the time of her death. Green admitted to having used the victim's automatic teller machine card to obtain over $1000 cash. These transactions were likely the reason for the overdrafts. Green testified that he had been given permission to use the ATM card to obtain cash to pay for materials and labor for repairs he was performing on the victim's home, and that he gave the machine receipts to the victim. The receipts were never found and the transactions were not listed in the victim's checkbook. The victim had never used the ATM card in the past. Immediately before her death, the victim had expressed her concern about the overdraft notices to acquaintances and expressed her intent to discuss this matter with the bank. The victim had also expressed some suspicion that Green might have stolen several hundred dollars from her purse in January. This evidence supports a reasonable inference that Green had a motive for killing the victim, either because he was concerned she might find out about the money or perhaps as a result of a confrontation between them.
verdict and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Fleming v. State (1991), Ind., 579 N.E.2d 73, 74. It is well settled that a conviction for murder may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Moore v. State (1990), Ind., 557 N.E.2d 665, 669. If a reasonable inference can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence presented, the verdict will not be disturbed. Biggerstaff v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 34, 36. On appeal, it is not necessary for the circumstantial evidence to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, it is only necessary that an inference reasonably tending to support the verdict may be drawn from the evidence. Swafford v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 1188, 1192
There was evidence that the victim's neighbor saw Green leaving the victim's yard on the morning of March 2nd carrying something wrapped in a white sheet or towel under his arm. Although the neighbor's statements to the police concerning his observations varied, the inconsistency in his statements was fully presented to the jury and it was for the jury to determine whether to believe the neighbor's in-court testimony. This evidence permits a reasonable inference that Green had the opportunity to commit the murder.
Other evidence tends to connect Green to the crime. He ordered flowers to be sent to the victim's home around noon on March 2nd, but later told police that the victim had announced her intention of going to Kentucky the following day. Although Green saw the victim nearly every day during their relationship, he did not contact her at all between March 2nd and March 7th. Green claimed this was because he knew she was going to Kentucky. However, it was the victim's custom to spend only a day there, and she told no one else she was going out of town. Also, contrary to her usual custom, she had made no arrangements for her papers and mail to be picked up.
On March 7, 1990, when Green went to the victim's home to check on her, he took with him Susan Alexander. Alexander was hesitant to accompany Green to the victim's home because she was under the impression that the victim did not like her. Alexander thought it was odd that Green requested her to go with him.
Additionally, a friend of the victim testified that she saw Green at a club on the night of March 2nd and asked him why the victim was not there. Green told the friend that the victim had partied too much the night before and was not feeling well, although he claimed later that the victim had gone to Kentucky for the weekend.
Green argues that this case is so similar to Manlove v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 70, 232 N.E.2d 874, that the same result should be reached here. We do not agree.
First, the standard applied in Manlove is no longer used by this Court since, at least, Biggerstaff, 432 N.E.2d 34, was decided. Instead, even where all the evidence is circumstantial, we use the same scope of review as for cases where there is direct evidence. Id. at 36. "If a reasonable inference can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence presented, the verdict is not to be disturbed." Id. Second, in Manlove, after reviewing the evidence presented at trial, this Court concluded, "in the final analysis, the State's evidence has succeeded only in proving that the circumstances as a whole throw a degree of suspicion upon the appellant, and demonstrate only that he clearly had an opportunity to [commit the murder]." 250 Ind. at 83, 232 N.E.2d at 881 (emphasis original). In the instant case, however, the State argues that a jury reasonably could infer that Green had stolen money from the victim's checking account, killed her when she confronted him with this accusation, and removed the murder weapon wrapped in a towel.
Unlike Manlove, the evidence here shows more than opportunity. There is evidence from which the jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because Green had motive and opportunity, and was seen in close proximity to the murder scene at or about...
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