Green v. State
Decision Date | 01 December 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 490 Sept. Term, 2015,490 Sept. Term, 2015 |
Citation | 149 A.3d 1159,231 Md.App. 53 |
Parties | John W. Green, III v. State of Maryland |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Jeffrey M. Ross (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief) all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Gary E. O'Connor (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief) all of Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
A jury in the Circuit Court for Cecil County convicted appellant, John W. Green, III, of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and unlawfully wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun. The court sentenced appellant to life, all but eighty years suspended, on the murder conviction, thirty years, consecutive, on the conspiracy conviction, and twenty years, consecutive to the murder count, for the convictions of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun.
On appeal, appellant presents the following two questions for this Court's review:
For the reasons set forth below, we answer these questions in the negative, and therefore, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
On October 23, 2013, Jeff Meyers was shot and killed in the driveway of his Cecil County residence while sitting in his pickup truck. During the ensuing seven-day trial against appellant, the State presented numerous witnesses indicating that the shooting was related to stolen money and drugs.
Appellant admitted at trial that he and Jonathan Copeland drove a Ford Mustang to Mr. Meyers' house on Principio Road the day of the murder, where they confronted Mr. Meyers about the theft of money and drugs belonging to Mr. Copeland.1 An altercation ensued, and Mr. Meyers was shot and killed.
Thus, it was not disputed that appellant was present at the time of the murder, and that Mr. Copeland, who was taller and skinnier than appellant, was the only other person with appellant at the time of the shooting. The contested issue was the identity of the shooter.2
Doris Carter testified that she was driving on Principio Road when she observed a Mustang blocking Mr. Meyers' truck. She observed that the door of the Mustang “was open on the driver's side, and someone was standing there with one foot in the car, one foot out of the car, and there was another person standing off to [her] left.” Ms. Carter described the person “standing at the car” as “tall and thin,” wearing a black hat “with white design, [which] seemed to be like snowflakes.”3 She described the other person as a “short stouter male,” who was wearing a “hoodie” and appeared to be a “white male.”4 As she drove past the Mustang, Ms. Carter observed “the short stout person shooting into” Mr. Meyers' truck.5
Near the end of the State's direct examination of Ms. Carter, the prosecutor asked her if she could identify the “taller skinnier” man if she saw him. Ms. Carter responded: “I think so.” After a lengthy conference with the court and opposing counsel, discussed in more detail, infra , the prosecutor brought Mr. Copeland into the courtroom. Ms. Carter then identified Mr. Copeland as the “taller thin” person who was “wearing the hat” and standing next to the black Mustang.
As indicated, appellant was convicted of murder and related crimes. This appeal followed.
Appellant first contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing Ms. Carter to identify Mr. Copeland in court as the “taller thin” man that she saw standing outside the driver's side of the Mustang “wearing the hat.” He asserts that, by “failing to provide [him] with complete and accurate information regarding the extent to which [Ms.] Carter could identify [Mr.] Copeland, both in court and photographically,” the State “violated its discovery obligations under Maryland Rule 4–263.” He contends that the court should have precluded the identification procedure, and the failure to do so was an abuse of discretion and reversible error.
The State responds in several ways. Initially, it argues that appellant's claim of a discovery violation is unpreserved for this Court's review. Even if preserved, the State contends that there was no violation of the discovery rules, and therefore, appellant's claims are without merit. Finally, the State argues that, even if it did fail to satisfy its discovery obligations, any prejudice to appellant was limited, and cross-examination, not exclusion of the evidence, was the proper remedy.
Maryland Rule 4–263 sets forth the discovery obligations of prosecutors in circuit court criminal trials.6 The provisions at issue in this appeal are subsections (d)(3), (6), (7), and (9). In this regard, the Rule provides as follows:
In Williams v. State , 364 Md. 160, 171, 771 A.2d 1082 (2001), the Court of Appeals explained that the State's compliance with these rules is not discretionary. The Maryland Rules of Procedure, which have the force of law, “are not mere guides but are ‘precise rubrics' to be strictly followed.” Id. In determining whether a discovery violation has occurred, the courts look first to the plain meaning of the rule. Id. Accord Johnson v. State , 360 Md. 250, 264–65, 757 A.2d 796 (2000) ( ).
The Court further explained:
[T]he scope of pretrial disclosure requirements under Maryland Rule 4–263 must be defined in light of the underlying policies of the rule. Inherent benefits of discovery include providing adequate information to both parties to facilitate informed pleas, ensuring thorough and effective cross-examination, and expediting the trial process by diminishing the need for continuances to deal with unfamiliar information presented at trial. Specific to the mandatory disclosure provisions of Rule 4–263(a), the major objectives are to assist defendants in preparing their defense and to protect them from unfair surprise. The duty to disclose pre-trial identifications, then, is properly determined by interpreting the plain meaning of the Rule with proper deference to these policies.
Id. at 172, 771 A.2d 1082 (citations omitted).
The testimony at issue on appeal occurred on the third day of trial, when the State called Ms. Carter, the only eyewitness to the shooting. After she testified regarding what she saw, including the “tall and thin” person standing by the driver's door of the car and the “short stout person shooting into the truck,” the following occurred:
The court then permitted counsel to approach. The jury left the courtroom, and the following colloquy ensued:
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Green v. State
...or transporting a handgun. Green noted an appeal.The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. See Green v. State, 231 Md.App. 53, 56, 149 A.3d 1159, 1161 (2016). The Court of Special Appeals held "that the State's discovery obligations pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 4–263(d)(7) [ (B)......
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Green v. State
...or transporting a handgun. Green noted an appeal. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. See Green v. State, 231 Md. App. 53, 56, 149 A.3d 1159, 1161 (2016). The Court of Special Appeals held "that the State's discovery obligations pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 4-263(d)(7)[(B)......
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