Green v. State

Decision Date08 July 1981
Docket NumberNo. 880S337,880S337
Citation422 N.E.2d 1190
PartiesGarry Michael GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

R. Cordell Funk, Hammond, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

Appellant, Garry Michael Green, was convicted in a trial by jury of unlawful deviate conduct while armed, a class A felony, pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-42-4-2; confinement while armed, a class B felony, pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3(a)(2); and theft, a class D felony, pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2. For such offenses, appellant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of fifty years, twenty years, and four years, respectively. He appeals contending that there were errors in sentencing and in the admission of evidence at trial.

At 10:00 p. m. on June 1, 1979, the prosecutrix was shopping at a Jewel Food Store in Dyer, Indiana. After driving out of the lot appellant emerged from the back seat of the car, held a large knife to her throat and required her to drive about, finally stopping in a dark area, where continuing to threaten her with the knife, he forced her to completely disrobe. He then kissed and fondled her, performed cunnilingus upon her, and required her to manipulate herself and masturbate him. During a pause in which he demonstrated some interest in the food she had purchased she ran naked from the car. He then drove off in her car. She ran to a house, and unable to get a speedy response broke into the house. The persons there got up and she was safe thereafter.

1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing wherein it augmented the standard sentences for the three individual offenses of unlawful deviate conduct, confinement, and theft and further concluded that such sentences be served consecutively rather than concurrently. In reviewing sentences this Court will enforce compliance by the trial court with the statutorily required procedures for sentencing, Abercombie v. State, (1981) Ind., 417 N.E.2d 316, and will affirm the sentence or sentences given unless in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender we are convinced that no reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate, Ind.R.App.Rev.Sen. 2(2).

The sentencing court considered a pre-sentence report, and made statement of its reasons for selecting the sentences imposed which generally tracks the statutory list of aggravating circumstances favoring imposition of augmented sentences and consecutive terms. Ind.Code § 35-4.1-4-7(c). Among the reasons stated the trial court said that appellant is beyond hope of reclamation, was on parole for armed robbery at the time of the offense, and that the female victim was physically infirm.

Appellant contends the pre-sentence report was skeletal, perfunctory, and incomplete in that it failed to include psychological evaluation and parole reports from penal institutions, and failed to comply with Ind.Code § 35-4.1-4-3, which sets the scope for such reports. He also contends that the sentencing court failed to give due regard to that fact that appellant's past felony convictions do not include any sex offenses. He also argues that the trial court misinterpreted Ind.Code § 35-4.1-4-7(c)(6), in concluding that the fact that the victim was a female is an aggravating factor favoring imposition of consecutive sentences.

These challenges were not made at any point to the trial court. The record reflects no effort by the defendant to raise these issues during the formulation of the pre-sentence report, during the sentencing hearing, or in the motion to correct errors. Appellant had ample opportunity to complain about the accuracy and completeness of the pre-sentence report, to add his own information to it and to persuade the trial court that the gravity of his past criminal activity should be lessened for the purposes of these sentences by reason of the absence therefrom of any convictions for sexual attacks. He could have persuaded the trial judge to abandon his view of the legal "infirmity". He had a responsibility and ample opportunities to bring matters favorable to him to the attention of the court. Gardner v. State, (1979) Ind., 388 N.E.2d 513. He did not take advantage of that opportunity.

The trial court based its sentencing decision upon the presentence report and the evidence presented at trial. Appellant's past criminal activity resulted in a burglary conviction in 1968, an armed robbery conviction in 1971, and another armed robbery conviction in 1976. He is thirty-two years old. At the time of these present offenses from which this appeal is being taken, he was on parole for the 1976 armed robbery, after having spent three years in prison. Appellant has developed a pattern of behavior over an eight-year period which dictates to him that he may take what he wants from fellow human beings through the use of deadly weapons and the threat of deadly force. These offenses involved repeated display of and threats by the use of a knife. They involved repeated onslaughts upon the person of this victim. She escaped further attacks only by effecting her escape, at great peril to herself.

It cannot be gainsaid, that as contended by appellant, the victim escaped without serious physical injury, that the entire criminal episode lasted only about one-half hour, and that the total of seventy-four years to which these three sentences amount is greater than the maximum sentence for murder and can be viewed within the same range as the sentence permitted under the habitual offender statute. However, even placing these matters in the balance, and adding thereto a misinterpretation by the court regarding infirmity of the victim, the trial court's findings of four aggravating circumstances militating in favor of the imposition of augmented and consecutive sentences remain so strongly supported here, that we are unable to say that no reasonable person could find these...

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6 cases
  • Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 11, 1982
    ...not permitted to give an opinion where the jurors are as well qualified to form an opinion based on the facts presented. Green v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1190; Reburn v. State, (1981) Ind., 421 N.E.2d 604. The converse circumstances, of course, provide the raison d'etre for expert wi......
  • Forrester v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1982 contradict or correct the trial court's finding concerning his being on parole at the time of the offenses charged. Green v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1190, 1192; Cox v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 737, 740. Under these circumstances, which consist of more than the Prosecutor's b......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1982
    ...and to give opinions where the jurors are as well qualified to form an opinion upon the facts as the witness." Green v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1190, 1193; Reburn v. State, (1981) Ind., 421 N.E.2d 604. The constitutionality of the pretrial identification procedures was not at issue; ......
  • Covelli v. State, 20A03-9101-CR-25
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 7, 1991
    ...not be permitted to make comparisons and to give opinions where the jury is as well qualified to do so as the witness. Green v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1190, 1193. Thus, it was the jury's function to decide how the witnesses did or did not testify. The judge did not leave the bounds ......
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