Green v. State Through Dept. of Institutions

Decision Date26 November 1956
Docket NumberNo. 4308,4308
Citation91 So.2d 153
PartiesLouise GREEN and Alees Green, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF INSTITUTIONS, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

H. Alva Brumfield, Baton Rouge, for appellants.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry Fuller, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TATE, Judge.

Pursuant to special legislative consent, plaintiffs filed suit against the State seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained by them when run into by an automobile negligently operated by one, Edward Renaldson. Plaintiffs contend that the State of Louisiana is responsible for said injuries sustained by them because of the negligence of the employees of the State Industrial Home for Colored Youths in permitting said Renaldson, a 15-year old inmate, to escape therefrom. Following his escape, Renaldson stole and was driving the automobile which injured plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs appeal from judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action.

Plaintiffs' able counsel first argues in his brief that petitioners 'have alleged acts of negligence purporting to be the cause of bodily injury to them. Whether such acts of negligence are in fact the cause of the injury sustained by them is a matter which must be left to the trial on the merits of this case.'

In the case of St. Julian v. State, La.App. 1 Cir., 82 So.2d 85, relied upon by plaintiffs, we held that the plaintiff therein had stated a cause of action and was entitled to a trial on the merits, Accepting the allegations of the petition as true.

An exception of no cause of action is tried on the face of the papers; its function is not to deny the alleged facts, but to test the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's cause of action, even accepting (for purposes of trial of the exception only) the truth of the facts stated by plaintiff's petition. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. v. Saint Denis Securities Co., 225 La. 51, 72 So.2d 257; Outdoor Electric Advertising, Inc., v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375; Verret v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, La.App. 1 Cir., 85 So.2d 646.

The District Court held that the alleged negligence of the State employees in permitting Renaldson to escape (upon which negligence plaintiffs solely base their cause of action) was not a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiffs through Renaldson's negligent operation of an automobile which he had stolen subsequent to his escape. If such determination is correct as a matter of law, then plaintiffs are not entitled to a trial upon the merits to attempt to prove the pleaded facts, which even if fully proven, would not constitute a legal cause of action.

While the custodians of prisoners 'may be held liable for injuries done to a third person by a prisoner in the course of an escape,' 72 C.J.S., Verbo Prisons § 23, i.p. 896; they 'are not liable for injuries inflicted by an escaped prisoner, where the negligent or wrongful acts of such officials are not the proximate cause of the injuries,' 72 C.J.S., Verbo Prisons, § 12, p. 865; citing Moss v. Bowers, 216 N.C. 546, 5 S.E.2d 826, 828, which held that the injury to the third person was not within the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequences of the alleged negligent acts which permitted the prisoner to escape, and that 'the injury complained of is too remote to be referred to the negligence of the defendant as the proximate cause.' See Annotation, 78 A.L.R. 471 at 476.

An institution's duty to restrain a convicted criminal is not based upon the purpose of protecting the general public from all harms that the prisoner might inflict if he were allowed to escape. A convicted person may be as dangerous on the day of his legal release as he was on the first day that he was confined, although the institution may still be under a legal duty to detain or to release him. There is no more reason for the State to be civilly responsible for the convict's general misconduct during the period of his escape than for the same misconduct after a legal...

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37 cases
  • Christensen v. Epley
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1979
    ...and Casualty Co. of New York, 263 F.Supp. 88 (S.D.W.Va.1967); Azcona v. Tibbs, 190 Cal.App.2d 425, 12 Cal.Rptr. 232 (1961); Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153 (La.App.1956); Cappel v. Pierson, 15 La.App. 524, 132 So. 391 (1931); Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La.App.1956); Geiger v. State, 242 So.2......
  • Natrona County v. Blake
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 31, 2003
    ...there is some further causal relationship than the release or escape to the injuries received. Id. at 603 (quoting Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153, 155 (La.Ct.App.1956)). Stated another way, "[t]he State's duty to protect the public from harm at the hands of escaped prisoners or inmates of pub......
  • Adden v. Middlebrooks
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • January 4, 1983
    ...to a plaintiff's case alleging such a cause of action in the Louisiana courts is proof of proximate cause. See, e.g., Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153 (La.App.1956). Although we do not decide the question of proximate cause in the instant case, Adden would have to demonstrate such a causal link......
  • Ajirogi v. State
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • August 30, 1978
    ...crimes, thefts, (and) car stealing". An illustration of the distinction we draw is to be found in the companion cases of Green v. State, 91 So.2d 153 (La.App.1956), and Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La.App.1956). In Webb, the wounding of plaintiff in her home by an escaped prisoner was held ......
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