Green v. Sunday River Skiway Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 99-58-P-C. |
| Parties | Michael GREEN, Plaintiff, v. SUNDAY RIVER SKIWAY CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
D. Michael Noonan, Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, Dover, NH, for plaintiff.
Evan M. Hansen, Robert O. Newton, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, LLC, Portland, ME, for defendant.
Currently before the Court is Defendant Sunday River Skiway Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") (Docket No. 9). The one remaining count in Plaintiff's Complaint1 (Docket No. 1a), Count I, alleges that Sunday River Skiway Corporation negligently placed an unpadded snow-making hydrant in an obscured location.2 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion.
On January 13, 1997, Plaintiff was injured after colliding with a snow-making hydrant while skiing at the Sunday River ski resort owned and operated by Defendant. Defendant's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1 ("DSMF") (Docket No. 10); Plaintiff Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1 ("PSMF") (Docket No. 13). Plaintiff, an expert skier, was skiing on the far left side of the "American Express" trail at the time of the collision. DSMF ¶¶ 1, 6; PSMF at 3. Plaintiff was skiing on the left side of the trail because skiers were congregated on the right side of the trail where a ski lift operates. DSMF ¶¶ 4, 5; PSMF at 3. Plaintiff saw the snow-making hydrant from approximately twenty to thirty feet away. PSMF ¶ 9.3 Plaintiff determined that he could not ski to the right of the hydrant and attempted to ski to the left of the hydrant. DSMF ¶¶ 11, 12; PSMF ¶¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff had slowed down and was skiing under control, but he was unable to avoid colliding with the hydrant. PSMF ¶ 11. The hydrant was two inches in diameter and approximately two to three feet high, unpadded, and either black or gray. PSMF at 3, 4, 5. The hydrant was not on a groomed portion of the trail. DSMF ¶ 8; PSMF ¶ 8.4
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party has come forward identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any" which "it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," the adverse party may avoid summary judgment only by providing properly supported evidence of disputed material facts that would require trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551-52, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The trial court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). The court will not, however, pay heed to "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences [or] unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990). The role of the trial judge at the summary judgment stage "is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
After carefully reviewing the written submissions of the parties on Defendant's Motion, and determining that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion will be granted because the Maine Skiers' and Tramway Passengers' Responsibility Act ("the Act"), 32 M.R.S.A. § 15217, provides Defendant with immunity from Plaintiff's claim. Many states have passed statutes providing ski areas with limited liability from tort actions. These statutes fall into two categories: specific and general.
Specific statutes list the risks which are considered inherent in the sport of skiing. These nonexclusive lists include items for which the skier expressly assumes, or shall be considered to have voluntarily assumed, the risk of loss or damage and for which there can be no recovery. General statutes provide that inherent dangers exist in the sport of skiing and that skiers are deemed to have assumed the risk of such dangers. No list of what constitutes an inherent danger is included in these more general statutes.
Sanchez v. Sunday River Skyway Corp., 810 F.Supp. 17, 18 (D.Me.1993) (citations omitted).
When this Court last visited the issue of ski area liability, Maine had a general statute. See id. The statute did not include a list of dangers inherent in the sport of skiing. See id. Since that time, however, the Maine Legislature has amended the Act.5 In large part, the new statute closely resembles a specific statute. The operative language of the Act states that
each person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts, as a matter of law, the risks inherent in the sport and, to that extent, may not maintain an action against or recover from the ski area operator, or its agents, representatives or employees, for any losses, injuries, damages or death that result from the inherent risks of skiing.
The statute defines "inherent risks of skiing" to include a laundry list of natural and man-made hazards. For the purposes of this case, the relevant portion of the statute reads as follow:
"Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions that are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to: ... hydrants, water or air pipes, snow-making and snow-grooming equipment ... and collisions with or falls resulting from such man-made objects.
The statute does not provide absolute immunity for ski areas, however. The statute concludes with the caveat that 32 M.R.S.A. § 15217(8). There is no dispute that this amended version of the Act applies to the facts of this case, because the Act became effective October 1, 1996, and the events giving rise to this litigation occurred January 13, 1997.
Having established the facts and the law, Defendant's argument for summary judgment becomes self-evident: Plaintiff collided with a snow-making hydrant; the Act expressly bars an action against a ski area operator for injuries suffered from, among other things, a collision with a snow-making hydrant; ergo, as a matter of law, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff's attack on Defendant's seemingly unavoidable logical conclusion is intriguing. Plaintiff relies heavily on the final provision of the Act, which provides that suits may still be maintained for "the negligent operation or maintenance of the ski area." 32 M.R.S.A. § 15217(8) Plaintiff argues that this language creating an exception to the immunity provided to ski area operators must be read to include an action alleging the negligent operation or maintenance of snow-making equipment. In other words, Plaintiff contends that the Maine Legislature did not intend to grant ski area operators blanket immunity from any claims arising out of the operation or maintenance of snow-making equipment. To read the statute to provide such immunity, Plaintiff argues, would to be to reach an absurd result where § 15217(8) would be meaningless. Plaintiff contends, therefore, that the negligent operation or maintenance of this hydrant is the cause of Plaintiff's injuries, and under § 15217(8), summary judgment is therefore inappropriate, because the allegation of negligence creates a question for the factfinder to determine.
It is a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation that the intent of the legislature, as evidenced by the language of the statute, controls. Central Maine Medical Center v. Maine Health Care Finance Comm'n, 644 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Me. 1994). The language of the statute must be construed "to avoid contradictory or illogical results." Rubin v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 577 A.2d 1189, 1191-92 (Me.1990). "Thus we consider the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved." Melanson v. Belyea, 1997 Me 150, ¶ 4, 698 A.2d 492, 493 (1997). But if the statutory language is ambiguous, the Court must look beyond the language and "examine other indicia of legislative intent, including legislative history." Id.
The question is, therefore, squarely raised. To the extent that § 15217(1)-(2) provides broad immunity to ski area operators in many areas that relate to operation and maintenance, does § 15217(8) conflict in such a way as to create ambiguity within the plain meaning of the statute? The Court concludes that the conflict between § 15217(1) -(2) and § 15217(8) does indeed create an ambiguity in the statute. Accordingly, the Court turns to the legislative history of the Act for guidance in resolving this question.7
A Court's endeavor to discern legislative intent by reviewing legislative history is necessarily a journey fraught with pitfalls. Keeping these pitfalls in mind, the Court will review the legislative history of this Act. In 1979 the Maine Legislature enacted a general liability statute for ski area operators. 26 M.R.S.A. § 488. At the time of its enactment, the Maine Legislature rejected an alternative specific liability statute which included a long list of specific risks inherent in skiing. Sanchez, 810 F.Supp. at 18-19 (). Between the enactment of 26 M.R.S.A. § 488 and its repeal and replacement by 32 M.R.S.A. § 15217 in 1995, this Court decided Sanchez, 810 F.Supp. 17 (D.Me. 1...
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Chapter § 4.04 LIABILITY OF HOTELS AND RESORTS FOR COMMON TRAVEL PROBLEMS
...Peak, Inc., 2001 WL 872991 (D. Mass. 2001) (ski area must be operated in a reasonably safe manner); Green v. Sunday River Skiway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Me. 1999) (skier collides with snow-making hydrant). Second Circuit: Paulus v. Holimont, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 292 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (......