Green v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

Decision Date27 June 2019
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 16-1492 (EGS)
Citation392 F.Supp.3d 68
Parties Matthew GREEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Brian M. Willen, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Kathryn L. Wyer, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Emmet G. Sullivan, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Matthew Green, Andrew Huang, and Alphamax, LLC seek to engage in certain activities for which they fear they will be prosecuted under the "anti-circumvention" provision and one of the "anti-trafficking" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). Accordingly, they have brought a pre-enforcement challenge to those two provisions alleging that they violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution facially and as applied to their proposed activities. They additionally claim that the Librarian of Congress's failure to include certain exemptions from the reach of the anti-circumvention provision in a 2015 final rule promulgated under a rulemaking procedure created by the DMCA violated the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). They seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

Defendants—the United States Department of Justice, Attorney General William Barr, the Library of Congress, Librarian of Congress Carla Hayden, the United States Copyright Office, and Register of Copyrights Karyn Temple Claggett1 —have moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Upon consideration of defendants' motion, the response and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART .

I. Background
A. Statutory Background

Congress enacted the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. , in 1998 to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and the World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998). In implementing those treaties via the DMCA, Congress was primarily responding to "the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously." Id. at 8. In short, Congress was concerned with the pirating of copyrighted works in the digital world. Three of the DMCA's central provisions respond directly to that concern.

The first— section 1201(a)(1)(A) —is an "anti-circumvention" provision. It prohibits a person from "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [Title 17, governing copyright]." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). A "technological measure"—often referred to as a "technological protection measure" ("TPM"), Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 18"effectively controls access to a work" if it, "in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work," 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B). To "circumvent a technological measure" means "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner." Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). Section 1201(a)(1)(A) thus prohibits persons from bypassing technological barriers put in place to prevent access to copyrighted works.

The second and third provisions— sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) —are "anti-trafficking provisions." That is, instead of prohibiting the circumvention of TPMs, they prohibit the dissemination of the technological means that enable such circumvention. The anti-trafficking provision at issue in this case, section 1201(a)(2), prohibits, in relevant part, a person from "manufactur[ing], import[ing], offer[ing] to the public, provid[ing], or otherwise traffic[king] in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work." Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).2

The DMCA also includes certain fine-grained permanent exemptions, some of which apply to the anti-circumvention provision and to both anti-trafficking provisions, see, e.g. , id. § 1201(e) (broadly exempting official law enforcement activity); some of which apply to the anti-circumvention provision and only one of the anti-trafficking provisions, see, e.g. , id. § 1201(j) (exempting security testing "solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability"); and some of which apply only to the anti-circumvention provision see, e.g. , id. § 1201(d) (exempting nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions that seek to circumvent TPMs to determine whether to purchase a copyrighted product).

Additionally, cognizant of its "longstanding commitment to the principle of fair use," H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 35 (1998) ("Commerce Comm. Rep."), Congress sought to balance its efforts to curtail digital piracy with users' rights of fair use by putting in place a triennial rulemaking process to exempt certain noninfringing uses of certain classes of copyrighted works from the anti-circumvention provision for three-year periods. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E). Accordingly, every three years, the Librarian of Congress, "upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce and report and comment on his or her views in making such recommendation, shall make the determination in a rulemaking proceeding ... of whether persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by the [anti-circumvention provision] in their ability to make noninfringing uses under [Title 17] of a particular class of copyrighted works." Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C). To make the relevant determination, the Librarian must consider: "(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate." Id.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Matthew Green is a computer science professor at Johns Hopkins University. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 75. Plaintiff Andrew Huang is a Singapore-based electrical engineer who owns and operates several technology-related business entities, including plaintiff Alphamax, LLC. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 88. Plaintiffs seek to engage in certain activities that they fear will run afoul of section 1201(a)(1)(A)'s circumvention prohibition and section 1201(a)(2)'s trafficking prohibition, exposing them to potential civil liability under the DMCA's private right of action, 17 U.S.C. § 1203, and potential criminal liability under the DMCA's criminal offense provision, 17 U.S.C. § 1204. Id. ¶¶ 86-87, 109-10.

Specifically, Dr. Green "investigates the security of electronic systems," and "[h]e would like to include detailed information regarding how to circumvent security systems" in a forthcoming book, id. ¶ 75, but he "has declined to investigate certain devices due to the possibility of litigation based on [s]ection 1201," id. ¶ 80. Dr. Green requested an exemption to cover his security research as part of the 2015 triennial rulemaking process, but the exemption that the Librarian of Congress finally put in place was not broad enough to cover all of his proposed research. Id. ¶¶ 78-79, 84-85.

Mr. Huang and Alphamax are the creators of "NeTV," a device for editing high-definition digital video. Id. ¶ 89. They seek to create an "improved" NeTV—a "NeTVCR"—that would allow its users "to save content for later viewing, move content to a viewing device of the user's choice, or convert content to a more useful format." Id. ¶¶ 90-91. To create the NeTVCR, Huang and Alphamax have to circumvent the TPMs—High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection ("HDCP")—that restrict the viewing of High-Definition Multimedia Interface ("HDMI") signals. Id. ¶¶ 92-93. They have been deterred from doing so because of the risk of prosecution under section 1201. Id. ¶¶ 109-10. Although Huang and Alphamax did not apply for any exemptions to the anti-circumvention provision in the 2015 triennial rulemaking, they allege that if the Librarian of Congress had granted "several" exemptions proposed by other parties, they "would be able to circumvent HDCP as necessary to use the NeTVCR, without violating the anti-circumvention provision of [s]ection 1201." Id. ¶ 108.

Wanting to engage in activity that would qualify as prohibited circumvention and trafficking but fearing criminal prosecution if they do so, Dr. Green, Mr. Huang, and Alphamax have brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the two relevant provisions of the DMCA on First Amendment grounds. See generally id. ¶¶ 111-49. Specifically, they claim that both provisions are facially overbroad, id. ¶¶ 111-20; that the anti-circumvention provision amounts to an unconstitutional speech-licensing regime, id. ¶¶ 121-28; and that both provisions are unconstitutional as applied to their proposed activities. Id. ¶¶ 129-49. They also contend that the Librarian of Congress's denial of exemptions that "would have applied to [Dr.] Green's security research," id. ¶ 155; and that "would have applied to [Mr.] Huang and Alphamax's creation and use of NeTVCR,"...

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