Green v. Vermilion Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-30782,97-30782 |
| Parties | Sam GREEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VERMILION CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Robert K. Tracy, New Iberia, LA, Lee A. Archer, Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John Blackwell, Gibbens, Blackwell & Stevens, New Iberia, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before WISDOM, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
We are called to interpret a heretofore unconstrued provision of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, viz., the "club/camp" exclusion delineated at 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(B). Our reading of the statute and its legislative history compels us to conclude that Green falls into the category of employees for which Congress drafted the "club/ camp" exception. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying LHWCA coverage to Green. We REVERSE the judgment of the district court dismissing Green's general maritime negligence and unseaworthiness claims and REMAND for further proceedings.
The Vermilion Corporation employed Green at a "duck camp" it operated pursuant to its contract with the Bayou Club. The camp is located on marsh land near a private canal off a bayou. Besides a duck camp, Vermilion uses the post as a "headquarters" for its operations in this area, which include harvesting and selling alligator eggs, trapping and selling alligators, fur trapping, shrimping, and rice farming.
During duck season, which is approximately three months long, Green worked as both a cook and watchman at the camp. During the rest of the year, Green served as a watchman, performed general maintenance on the camp and usually cooked a lunch meal for any Vermilion employees working in the area. Green worked only at the camp and was required to stay there from Monday at 8:00 a.m. to noon on Friday, except for duck season when his hours were longer. Green got to the camp via a boat and usually brought a week's worth of groceries with him on Monday morning. Green also occasionally assisted in mooring and unloading supply boats that docked at the camp.
On May 10, 1994, Lee Guidry, a Vermilion employee, was piloting THE M/V GADWALL, a vessel under eighteen tons net. Guidry radioed Green at the camp and asked him to assist in tying up the vessel and in unloading supplies and equipment. While mooring the vessel, Green boarded THE M/V GADWALL, slipped and fell on the deck. Green sustained injuries to his neck and back.
Green filed suit against Vermilion alleging claims under the LHWCA and general maritime law for negligence and unseaworthiness. The district court first granted Vermilion's motion for summary judgment dismissing Green's LHWCA claim because Green fell under the "vessel under eighteen tons net" employee exception. Then, after further briefing by the parties, the district court granted Vermilion's motion for summary judgment and reconsideration, holding that Green was excluded from LHWCA coverage by the "club/camp" employee exception. The district court dismissed the remainder of Green's claims on the grounds that the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act was his exclusive remedy.
Green timely appealed the district court's judgments. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo applying the same standard as did the district court. Dawkins v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 109 F.3d 241, 242 (5th Cir.1997).
In order to qualify for coverage under the LHWCA, a worker must pass both a situs and a status test. Director v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 314, 103 S.Ct. 634, 645, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983). Green satisfies the situs test since he was injured upon navigable waters. See id. With respect to the status test, we will assume arguendo that Green was engaged in "maritime employment", see 33 U.S.C. § 902(3); Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 897 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 994, 115 S.Ct. 498, 130 L.Ed.2d 408 (1994), since we think it clear that he falls within the "club/camp" exclusion from LHWCA coverage.
There are exceptions to the term "employee" under the LHWCA. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(A)-(H). In particular, § 902(3)(B) provides:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, ... but such term does not include--
....
(B) individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational operation, museum, or retail outlet;
if individuals described in clauses (A) through (F) are subject to coverage under a State workers' compensation law. 1 Id.
Interpretation of this provision is an issue of first impression in this circuit.
The district court held that Green fell within the "club/camp" exclusion because he performed all of his duties at the duck camp. The lower court found unpersuasive Green's argument that he was employed "by" the Vermillion Corporation, not a camp, since that construction of § 902(3)(B) renders the exception meaningless in today's world of business organizations.
Green repeats this argument to us. Green contends that interpretation of § 902(3)(B) is controlled by the nature of the employer's business and not the employee's activities. For support, Green points to the House Document accompanying the 1984 Amendments that added the "club/camp" exception to the LHWCA. The House Document states that the "exclusions from the definition of 'employee' contained in the amendments ... are intended to be narrowly construed" and that paragraph (B) excludes employees "because of the nature of the employing enterprise, as opposed to the exclusions in paragraph [ (A) ], which are based on the nature of the work which the employee is performing." H.R.Doc. No. 98-570, Part I 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1639) 2734, 2736. Because Vermillion is involved in sundry business ventures, including maritime activities, Green claims that his employer was a multi-faceted corporation, not a "camp."
"As with any statutory question, we begin with the language of the statute." In re Greenway, 71 F.3d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1244, 116 S.Ct. 2499, 135 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996). Green makes much of Congress's use of "by" in the statute and notes that Congress did not use the phrase "employed at a club [or] camp." Contrary to Green, we do not think that the word "by" bears such weight. Rather, the key words in the provision are those designating the concerns the employees of which are excluded from LHWCA coverage (e.g., club, camp, restaurant, museum). Under this focus, it is evident that Green worked exclusively to further an operation which comports with the plain meaning of the terms "camp" and "club." The Vermillion facilities had all the trappings of a typical southern Louisiana hunting camp. See R. Vol. 2 at 281. Though it used the camp throughout the year, the primary reason Vermillion maintained the facility was to fulfill its contractual obligation to the Bayou Club to provide a duck camp for the waterfowl hunting season. In fact, a Vermilion officer testified that but for the lease to the Bayou Club, Vermillion would not have conducted any of its operations from this site and would not have had any need for Green's services. See R. Vol. 2 at 287-88. Since Green was employed solely to render services to promote and maintain a duck camp, we hold that he is excluded from LHWCA coverage under § 902(3)(B).
Green's reliance upon the legislative history of the 1984 Amendments does not alter our conclusion. Unlike Green, we do not believe that in construing the "club/camp" exception, we are limited to considering only the nature of the employer's enterprise. The House Document to which Green refers expressly states that businesses falling under paragraph (B) may have employees that should remain covered under the Act "because of the nature of the work which they do, or the nature of the hazards to which they are exposed." H.R.Doc. No. 98-570, Part I 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1639) 2737. By the same token, we believe the opposite is true--clubs and camps may employ individuals who should not be covered under the LHWCA because their job responsibilities do not, or only minutely, involve maritime activities and they are not exposed to hazards associated with traditional maritime activities. The record reflects that Green's duties were to be a cook, watchman, and general repairman of the camp buildings. We do not consider Green to be an employee for which LHWCA benefits were intended.
Even if he is not entitled to LHWCA benefits, Green argues that the district court erred in dismissing his general maritime claims against Vermilion for negligence and unseaworthiness. Vermilion disagrees based on its belief that the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act is Green's exclusive remedy.
The first step in our analysis of this issue is to determine whether there is admiralty jurisdiction. Admiralty jurisdiction requires that the tort have a maritime locality and that "the facts and circumstances of the claim must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841, 846 n. 14 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2820, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979). The situs test is met because Green was injured while on navigable waters. See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1991, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974). To determine whether there is a sufficient nexus to maritime activity, we examine four factors: the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and the type of injury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. See Kelly, 485 F.2d at 525. In applying this test, we have noted that "[a]dmiralty has traditionally been concerned with furnishing remedies...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bienvenu v. Texaco, Inc.
...Relatedly, Judge DeMoss argues that our opinion in this case conflicts with this Court's recent opinion in Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332 (5th Cir.1998). In Green, we held that a worker in a hunting camp was not covered under the LHWCA. The distinction between the two cases is paten......
-
Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore
... ... Dr. Haskell was a plaintiff in Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.Supp. 1051 (S.D.Ohio 1995), aff'd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir.1997), cert ... ...
-
BP Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Cashman Equip. Corp.
...uniformity is not to be sacrificed to accommodate state law is a fundamental premise of admiralty jurisdiction." Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir.1998), citingJohnBaizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222, 50 S.Ct. 306, 74 L.Ed. 819 (1930), and Grant Gilmore & Charles L. ......
-
Berge Helene Ltd. v. GE Oil & Gas, Inc.
...superseded by statute on other grounds, Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1424; Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.1998) ( “[T]he constant theme of these Supreme Court opinions is that the uniformity of admiralty law must be preserved and ......
-
The vagueness of partial-birth abortion bans: deconstruction or destruction?
...4, at B3. (218) See supra Part III.B. See also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998). (219) Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 332. See also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp.2d 795, 811-19 (E.D. Va. 1998).(220) 144 F.3d at (221) The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, ......
-
SIERACKI'S REVIVAL: SEAMAN-STATUS FOR PILOTS MAKING WAVES IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
...L.J. 209, 234 n. 152 (1998) (citing 33 U.S.C. [section] 905(b), Perini, 459 U.S. at 306). (106) Id. (citing Green v. Vermillion Corp., 144 F.3d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)); see also Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. (107) DeGravelles, supra note 105, at 234 n. 152......
-
Brief of the Attorney General of the State of Nebraska in Stenberg v. Carhart(*).
...are particularly important when considering partial-birth abortion statutes. See Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d 857; Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 332; Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187,212 (6th Cir. 1997) (Boggs, dissenting) ("The Supreme Court has reminded us time and again that......