Green v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 55.,55.
• Citation: Green v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 907 N.E.2d 700, 12 N.Y.3d 342, 879 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. 2009)
• Parties: Lisa C. GREEN, Respondent, v. WILLIAM PENN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

907 N.E.2d 700

12 N.Y.3d 342

Lisa C. GREEN, Respondent, v.WILLIAM PENN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

No. 55.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 5, 2009.

Bleakley Platt & Schmidt, LLP, White Plains (Robert D. Meade of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas Torto, New York City, and S. Edmund Resciniti, Roslyn Heights, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, J.

The Appellate Division held that an attempt to prove a death was caused by suicide must fail as a matter of law, unless suicide is the only reasonable finding permitted by the evidence.We hold that the Appellate Division misconstrued the presumption against suicide.It is a guide for the factfinder, not a rule that compels a result.

I

Alan Green died on February 20, 2002.His life was insured by defendant under a $500,000 policy issued December 3, 2001.The policy provided: "If the insured dies by suicide within two years from the Date of Issue of this contract, the only death benefit will be the sum of premiums paid."Plaintiff, Mr. Green's widow, made a claim for the face amount of the policy.Defendant rejected the claim on the ground that Mr. Green had died by suicide, and plaintiff brought this action.

Considerable evidence supported defendant's contention that Mr. Green committed suicide.He was found lying on his bed, with an empty glass on the nightstand beside him and two empty bottles that had contained recently-prescribed pain medication in the nightstand drawer.He had been unemployed for months.He had seen a doctor on the day before his death; the doctor found him to be in good physical health, but noted that he had "suicidal thoughts."According to a police report, plaintiff said on the night of her husband's death that he had been depressed, and had overdosed on pain medication.She refused to permit an autopsy or a toxicological examination of his body, saying that such intrusions were forbidden by Jewish religious law, but she ordered the body cremated in violation of that religious prohibition.

There was also evidence supporting plaintiff's contention that suicide was not the cause of death.No suicide note was found.Mr. Green had no history of mental illness, and had not attempted suicide before.The doctor who noted his "suicidal thoughts" also quoted him as saying he was "[n]ot suicidal" and noted that he had "no plans" for suicide.There was no proof of how long the pill bottles had been empty; plaintiff offered testimony suggesting that she and her husband might have taken all the pills in normal doses over a period of weeks.Family members testified that Mr. Green had behaved normally shortly before his death; they described him as "upbeat" and "positive."

After a nonjury trial, Supreme Court found that Mr. Green had committed suicide, and dismissed the complaint.The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and directed the entry of judgment for plaintiff(Green v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.,48 A.D.3d 37, 848 N.Y.S.2d 109[1st Dept.2007]).In reversing, the Appellate Division did not exercise its factual review power, but held that "the evidence failed as a matter of law to overcome the presumption against suicide"(id. at 44, 848 N.Y.S.2d 109).It reasoned that because "there are other reasonable conclusions that may be drawn from the evidence, aside from suicide," the "application of the law regarding the presumption against suicide necessitated a directed verdict in this case"(id. at 40, 848 N.Y.S.2d 109).Defendant appeals as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601(a), and we now reverse.

II

We have repeatedly held that a presumption against suicide is applicable in litigation under life insurance policies (Schelberger v. Eastern Sav. Bank,60 N.Y.2d 506, 470 N.Y.S.2d 548, 458 N.E.2d 1225[1983];Wellisch v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,293 N.Y. 178, 56 N.E.2d 540[1944];cf.Matter of Infante v. Dignan,12 N.Y.3d 336[2009][decided today]).The presumption "springs from strong policy considerations as well as embodying natural probability"(Schelberger,60 N.Y.2d at 510, 470 N.Y.S.2d 548, 458 N.E.2d 1225), and we held in both Wellisch and Schelberger that the presumption justified leaving the issue of suicide to the jury, even where powerful evidence pointed to suicide as the cause of death.

We have never held, however, that the presumption against suicide requires rejection of a claim of suicide as a matter of law.As long as such a claim finds support in the evidence, a factfinder should decide it.The presumption, as we said in Wellisch, is "really a rule or guide for the jury in coming to a conclusion on the evidence"(293 N.Y. at 184, 56...